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THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION 
PENSIONS - THEIR SCOPE Al'lD }1EANING IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 
There is a tendency amongst worker-organisations and theor~sts to accept the 
basic s~ocial relation embodied in the "provisiod' of "pension benefits", to which 
workers themselves must contribute; the bourgeois notions of ~'saving" or a 
"deferred wage" are often readily accepted, and what is questioned are the 
terms of the exchange ofa proportion of the \vage for a pension after retirement . 
.. This is by no means ..a simplequestlon: c.1qarly, in the absence of full state 
provision for the working class - whether in or out of employment - this is 
a concession which the working class has won through struggle. Capitalist 
production, particularly in the phases of mechanisation and automa~ion, 
determines that at between 55 and 65,1. a worker's lahour-power is redundant; 
usually by that time a worker \vould prefer to leave if he/she was ensured of 
some kind of 1ncome, and see this as a right. 
On the other hand, to establish a critique of the wage-relation and the social 
relations of production and domination in capitalist society, one has to 
recognise capitalists' interests 1n the provision of "fringe benefits" and the 
interests of workers in a return on their labour which meets the full cost of 
their reproduction, including illness, unemployment, old age. 
Today, in most capitalist countries with a developed proletariat, pension 
and other "social security" benefits/insurances are provided for in a collective 
form by state-, capital- and wage-earners' contributions, as well as on a 
"private" earnings-related basis. Like other forms of "social insurance", 
pensions are available only to people who have been productively employed. 
1. These have fluctuated depending on the level of mechanisation, unemployment, 
etc, in a country. cf ILO publication "Introduction to social security". 
L:. 
_ It is easy to misunderstand their function as simply ensuring th-e-po-litical 
and social stability/conservation of those affected by technological, cyclical, 
and other forms of unemployment. 
Rattier, their primary purpose should be seen in terms of capitalist production's 
need for continuoualy higher rates of surplus value, and continued cap~~~l____ _ ~ ___ . 
. - -.-. --~---...;'"-'::'--
acc:umulation. .This is achieved in different ways and essentially involves a 
process of class struggle in \vhich the s tate is always present , though ~n 
different forms. Before we examine this historical process, we should note 
(1) that there are qualitative differences between provisions made by the 
state an<;l those made at the work-place, though they both relate to the 
management of labour-power, and further (2) capitalist privison involves the 
contradictory unity of finance and productive capital. 
There are three basic capitalist characteristics of the 'use of labour-power that 
come into play in the "provision" of pension benefits and the establishment of 
"pension funds". These are: 
(1) work discipline; 
(2) insecurity of employment; and related to this, the 
(3) supply of labour-power at the lowest possible cost. 
Though always present in capitalist production these three features are distinct 
and articulate in different ways, conditioning the involvement of the state. l • 
a - --
The state is always called in to manage labour-power where and when capital 
cannot secure these conditions directly; the state as a result of its relative 
1. I go along with Poulantzas' v~ew of the state as present in the production 
and reproduction but not in a direct, coercive form, because of the very 
nature of capitalist relations of production ie the separation of the 
reproduction of the commodity labour-power from the immediate sphere 
of production.~cf.Aumeereddy et al. Capital & Class No 6. 1978. 
2. This refers to the practices of the state, in securing the conditions for the 
expanded reproduction of labour-power; the state assumes responsibility (in 
training, housing, transport, education) regulating the type of labour capital 
requires, and the quantities needed. 
separation from the cap~talist priduction process is able to, through its 
presence in the ·process of capitalist accumulation, act where capital can't. 
The existence of pension provisions in different forms is not related 
mechanistically to the level of proletarianisation, mechanisation, etc., or to 
_the emergence of separate financial insti-tutions-whichspeciali-se in their 
investment, eg banks, insurance companies._ Capitalists. have never 
"spontaneously" demanded the reproduction of workers who are no longer able to 
sell their labour-power; this has always involved a process of struggle between 
capital and labour in production, and by the working class against their general 
social conditions of existence. 
The Wage and the Maintenance of Workers 
While capitalism operates to make the wage appear as the "price of labour", 
exploitation, which distinguishes between labour producing goods necessary to 
reproduce labour power, and unpaid surplus labour. is obscured. Labour power 
is only renumerated when it is used in the production process. If the value-of 
labour-power were to include the workers subsistence requirements during illness 
old age, unemployment, then the direct wage would be lower than this value. 
Capital gives priority to its own self-valorisation and does not assume complete 
responsibility for the reproduction of the labour-power which it nonetheless 
requires. The wage bargain implies that the worker is obliged to ensure its 
reproduction. The wage, unless it is supplemented by various institutional 
allocations, is insufficient: the commodity form of labour-power cannot be 
upheld within the confines of capitalist production. Pension contributions 
are to be understood as an aspect of the individual wage,l. ie.the amount of 
1. et ale Labour Power and the State. Capital & Class. No 6. 1978. 
Aum eddy et al distinguish between the direct wage (once taxes and contri-
butions are deducted) the private and social wage, the Individual and 
collective wage and variable capi tal. '-
3. 
money necess(lrily laid out to set labour power to work, under the form of 
"direct wage", taxes, contributions, v.'hich in turn is one element of the 
collective wage. The collective wage expresses the contra.ints imposed on 
the capitalist by valorisation. In its structure the collective wage expresses 
the reproduction of the hierarchichal structure of the collective labourer, 
the latter being guided by political requirements and the need to reproduce 
its technical structure. 
This analysis helps to establish the material limits of pension-contributions 
but we cannot understand it fully on this level. Most of the (very little) 
literature available on this subject is plagued by abstractions. We need 
to understand the emergence and development of pensions in concrete situations, 
where their prov~s~on, non-provision or rejection can be understood in terms 
of outcomes of economic, political and ideological strugg~. 
Thus I have chosen to introduce this study- which is a concrete analysis -
through another concrete study of tendencies in advanced capitalist coutries. 
Hopefully, the reader will be able to pick up some general points with '''hich 
to proceed. 
Capitalist Solutions to workers insecurit%\ 
, 
The capitalist solutions to the insecurity of employment of workers were 
initiallyprivateVinitiatives. l • As a result of workers struggles against their 
4. 
working conditions, individual capitals made provisions to guarantee a sufficient 
supply of disciplined labour eg allocations to charitable and pension funds. 
" Responding to the needs which the wage earner was unable to 
satisfy - particularly the need for security - these supplementary 
benefits were surrounded by conditions requiring workers' loyalty 
1. de Brunhoff.S. ~The State, Capital and Economic Policy' 
(1976) 
and good conduct ... the tvage did not suffice far the 
worker, neither did it for the employer, who needed 
additional means to enable him to keep his labour force 
well under control" 1. 
Philanthropic measures were insufficient; even when their resources were 
principally drawn form workers' contributions, the allocations provided did not 
correspond to a right defined by the wage contract. Management of payments 
was arbitrary and the status of contributions not secure, particularly if 
filns were small. Some companies demanded no contributions from workers, others 
did; however the employer was always free to dismiss the 'vorker, or deprive 
him of his right to a pension. These institutions were only effective if 
controlled by a number of firms. 
When capitalism changed in size and financial structure, private " . penSl.on 
funds" emerged working on the basis of "capitalisation" or by investing their 
funds mainly in shares) eg.after world war II, in tlle ~ private com~anies 
were not required to establish funds so that half the wage force was covered 
by one of 115 000 pension funds established by their employers in 1974. The 
other half depends on welfare and savings accumulated during employment. 
As the establishment of funds are a matter of company choice, even when they 
work well, the needs of all wage earners are not met. 2 • Their effectiveness 
depends on monetary stability and the yield upon investment so that stock 
market slumps threatened to undermine them seriously (1973 ~ 1974). As a 
result their purely private character was called into question by legislation 
which: 
1. Hatzfield. quoted in de Brunhoff 
2. de Brunhoff p 18. 
5. 
u. 
(a) relaxed conditions entitling one to a pension ~ length of service 
and age; 
(b) reinforced existing rights and created a federal insurance fund, funded 
by employers, to protect wage earners from bankruptcy; 
(c) obliged less "generous" firms to increase their contributions into 
funds. 
Even in the case of large "private" corporations specifically capitalist 
solutions to the problem of insecurity of the proletarian situation are 
necessary but inadequate; as their pr1mary purpose is to raise the rate of 
surplus value production, the state had to intervene. 
Whatever its former mode of operation, the ma1n task of the state's 
management of labour-power is to assl~sponsibility for the part of its value 
which capitalists do not directly remunerate. This is not done either through 
primarily "coercion" or "persuasion". Rather, 1n restructuring the environment 
within which capitalist exploitation develops and functions, the means of 
regulation, established by the capitalist state,form part of capitalism's 
. 1 1. econom1C arsena • 
State intervention to "share the social costs" of the insecurity of employment 
across classes varies according to the manner in which systems of 1nsurance are 
financed. French social insurance schemes first adopted the practice of 
capitalisation which is still followed in the USA, which the Labour Party and 
the Conservatives have been squabbling over during the last couple of decades, 
and which finance capital in South Africa is wanting to achieve today. We have 
already seen how inflationary and financial dangers through placing workers' 
1. Meillasoux C (1975) pp 162 - 163. 
contributions at the mercy o~ cpaitalist instability, cause problems for 
these systems. In the aLsence of institut.ional means of "sharing social 
costs" insurance and pension funds in_USA, though they massive capital-savings, 
.. . 1. 
are deprived of £~nanc~al secur~ty. 
The state financed contributorY-13ystem, in contrast to private captialisation, 
centralises the collection of contributions and makes payments to those with 
rights from its inception (pay-as-you-go scheme). This system ~s predicated 
upon a constant supply of contributing workers: financial problems arise when 
there is an imbalance between "active" and "inactive" (eg retired) workers. In 
·periods of high unemployment and crisis the whole social security system is 
affected. de Brunhoff cites the example of a miners' special fund: in 1959 
one contributer provided one pensioner's income and by 1974 one contributor 
. 2. 
supported four pens~oners. Such a scheme would be vulnerable in times of 
unemployment and crisis, unless political collective decisions are made. 3 • 
The "sharing of costs" does not rema~n constant. The principle of the shared 
distribution of the costs related to unemployment presupposes a continuous 
reproduction of the active labour force to pay for the upkeep of unused labour-
power. During crisis periods both the state (as in Britain) and individual 
employers can attempt to bypass public regulation; in order to drive down the 
value of the reproduciton of labour-power towards its daily value; the degree 
of success depends on the current balance of class forces in those countries. 
Even where the forms of state regulation and. management change, from relief to 
welfare, the form of state regulation are still determined by capital's need 
for waged labour, and labour of a specific kind, ie. specific levels of skill 
1. de Brunhoff· op cit p 32. 
2. Room G. The Sociology of Welfare (1979). 
3. O'Connor J. pp 137 - 144. I Fiscal Crisis of The State t (973). 
and political division.,This can be ~een clea~l¥ in the cF\se o~ immigrant 
workers in France and the discriminatory benefits "social insurance" gives 
them. 
S de Brunhoff distinguishes a phase of "econQrnic.p.2!icy!l after the 1930' s in 
the advaIlced capitaliet countries, It refers to a'~ form of state inter,'--
vendon within the circuit of capital (H - C '"' M~), though still in the 
decisive areas of public management of labour-power and money.l. 
"Economic policy" emerges when the conditions of state interventi,on change. 
" 
With the merger2• of productive and money capital to form Finance'Capital, the 
state's financial institutions are reorganised and the public financial circuit 
I 
inserted into that of private finance. The state is now involved in the 
3. 
management of the realtionship between money and labour-power; or in the 
management of capital's circulation, involving new compromises between classes 
which capitalis.ts cant achieve'direcJ;ly. de Brunhoff agrues that the pre-
conditions for "economic policy" are: 
(1) that the working class should see the wage as an exogenous variable; 
(2) that the form of the bourgeois state as an "impersonal apparatus of 
I?ower" must be accepted; 
(3) that the working class is unified as an "economic subject" - receiving 
and spending a monetary income; for this to be possible the working class 
had to have become a 'ipolitical subject". 
,Since the 1930's then, state management of l~bour power has been bound up with 
centralised capitalist' contr~l, at the level of the st~te, of the direct nominal 
wage as a strategic variable • 
• de Bt-unhoff.op.cit. pp" 62:"66. 
Poulantza8.~975.) PP.III-II5 • 
• deBrunhoff.p64. 
9. 
de Brunho[£ suggests that in the 'exceptional' states (e.g. Germany after WI, 
and South Africa), \vhere the working class has either been liquidated as a 
"political subject" or never broken through as one, the nature and 'economic 
policy' is limited. While aspects of the sta.tes econom~c measures 1:vill coincide 
with those of , for example, the interventionist state, its sphere of legality 
is restricted to the management of the economy. 
At present a struggle is being waged by sections of the black working class 
against private pensions schemes introduced by their employers, and insured by 
the increasingly powerful finance capitalists situated in South Africa and the 
advanced capitalist countries. The workers who have decided that these schemes 
do not benefit them are not skilled 1:vorkers ,vith significant 'bargaining pmJer' 
or representation on the schemes' administrative bodies (as is often the case in 
similar struggles ~n advanced capitalist countries). They rely almost entirely 
on their united strength ~n opposition to capital in the context of maSS1ve 
1 1. unemp oyment. Members of the capitalist classes, of state apparatuses and 
reformist trade unions have responded in a characteristic fashion to workers' 
demands ~ the most crucial of which is against the proPGsed preservation of pension 
contributions until retirement age. They claim that neither the workers, nor their 
trade unions understand the concept of preservation, which they insist is a means 
of assisting workers to build up a reasonable pension. They say that workers must 
be 'protected against themselves', as they are inclined to withdraw their contrib-
utions when they leave a job and "squander these, without due consideration for their 
old age".2. They are silent on the effective non-existence of unemploYment insurance 
, ---
for most black workers and the long periods of unemployment between leaving and 
~ng a ne\v jo~. They claim that workers become dependents of an inefficient 
state "welfare" scheme and that workers' organisations are "misleading their ,yorkers" 
by supporting their present demands to withdraw altogether. Once again they are 
1. Although many workers are in more strategic semi-skilled positions, they are not 
'unreplaceab1e' • 
2. These views were expressed repeatedly by industrialist, insurance companies, pens: 
fund administrator~ _ '1'TTr.~A nff; {'; <'11" ("AA hAl nt.'" ...:.. 
10. 
silent on the inadequac~ of state provision of old age pensions, gross discrimina~ior 
and the need to change this, which effects many more than those Horkers who are 
considered eligible for a private pension scheme. Horeover, black workers who are 
not members of a compulsory private scheme~· (the majority of black workers), are 
expected to pay taxes to support the state scheme, which today pays out a maximum 
pension of R33 per month. 
The point made by representatives of state and capital about the workers and un~ons 
not understanding how pension funds operate 1S interesting; indeed, the dominant 
classes have been successful in obfuscating the entire process and the state has 
backed the divisions which exist by never making worker participation in schemes 
a requirement in its legislation. In the process of doing this research I have 
found the area of pension insurance and administration (benefit calculation, 
liabilities, contingencies, investment, interest rates etc) to be so specialised 
that the employers themselves, and many people in insurance compan1es are unsure 
about a number of issues. The working class 1S on the other hand in an objective 
position to see their exploitation quite clearly, without having to penetrate a mass 
of statistics! It is kno~~ that the South African state and capital have always 
opposed welfare measures for black workers; today the cost of a supposed move 
towards "ensuring the social security of the black (urban) aged" is being shifted 
squarely onto the lvorking class. 
Also, exper1ence has shovffi black workers that there 1.S no real "security" for them, 
even when they have supposedly "insured" themselves with their own contributions. III 
having to rely on "capitalist solutions" to the insecurity of employment in the 
absence of adequate state provisions, the workers have been at the mercy of employers 
arbitrary powers and manipulative practices. 
1. In terms of Bantu Taxation Act No. 92 of 1969 contributions into a compulsory 
private scheme are deducted from a worker's income to calculate taxable income. 
11. 
. of ~tudy: Out1~ne ..., 
In section 1 I raise some of the most important theoretical points through looking 
at pensions and "social security" in the advanced capitalist countries. 
In section II I look at the history of welfare and pensions, very briefly, befor~ 
1948. This should help us to construct a historical view of the "limits" to 
welfare in South Africa. Section III looks at the early Apartheid period and shows 
hO\11 these "limits" are not solely imposed by the preservation of non-capitalist 
forms of production or by the process of capital accumulation. Essentially the 
disorganisation of the \l1orking class and the racially-exclusive state, prevent 
demands from being heard, let alone met. I wil~ show how the incorporation 
of Afr.-±c8n workers into the industrial council system complemented the strategy 
of.~ression. Section IV goes on to look at why private pension funds 
developed rapidly in the 1960' s, hotl1 they were formulated viz. African ll10rkers 
and hml1 they were implemented during the 1960's and 1970's. Section V looks at 
the struggles over the provision of pensions during the 1970's and suggests why the 
state was forced to intervene during the late 1970's to establish adequate "social 
security" provisions for the African ~l1Orking class. 
In conclusion I will try to relate the resistance to the state's proposed measures, 
to what can be seen as the "limi ts II ll1hich have developed historically, both in the 
structural development of the South African economy and in the nature of the class 
struggle which can go beyond those structures and lead to significant organisational 
victories. 
section II. THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND PENSIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
THE STATE, CAPITAL AND THE AFRICAN WORKING CLASS BEFORE 1948 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the South African State and various fractions of the bourgeoisie had 
debated the issue of the nature of the urban working class since the beginning 
of the century, and particularly since the formulation of the Stallard doctrine 
and the adoption of its segregationist policies in 1923 (Native (Urban Areas) 
Act), it was raised as a crucial short- and long-term question for the first 
time during the 1940's. This was done in the context of a whole range of 
related 'problems' facing the State: the decline of reserve production and the 
massive inflow of whole families into urban centres; the growingiimportance of 
the African working class in production, the need for a settled semi-skilled 
fraction within the working class to meet the needs of a more mechanised, 
integrated and continuous labour process in the manufacturing industry; and 
a rising cost of living, resulting ultimately from the nature of South Africa's 
integration into the world economic system and the uneven development between 
sectors, branches and departments of production. As is often the case in 
capitalist social formations, the way in which the state and capital had dealt· 
with these 'problems' in the past had intensified contradictions and produced 
---------~-----~ ~isiS and impediments to expanded capital accumulation. We should 
briefly look at this process and the resulting 'problems' more closely: this 
will enable us to understand why the state was concerned with 'social security' 
and the extension of welfare provisions during the 1940's; what economic and 
political options it had; and what 'solutions' it found at the end of that 
decade. This will, however, be treated very schematically. 
12. 
It is important to note that: 
II The State's concern, through social policy, to maintain and 
enhance the wealth-producing power of the working class is in 
part a simple and pragmatic response to the everyday problems 
created by capitalist society; the problems of poverty, un-
employment, disease, overcrowding; and the genreal physical 
and mental consequences of urban life. At certain times, 
however, this concern has become the subject of conscious 
debate and deliberation, when under the press of events j the 
practice and purpose of social policy has been reconsidered and 
reformulated in order to meet the urgency of the situation" 1. 
1930 - 1940: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM AND THE STRUGGLES 
OF THE WORKING CLASS 
The Fusion period (1933 - 1939) witnessed an impressive rate of industrial 
expansion: industrial development till then had been largely predicated upon 
extensive tariff protection; how, with the abandonment of the gold standard 
and the consequent boom in mining profitability, the crisis for the government 
in extending tariff protection measures was reduced, and the imposition of the 
excess profits tax provided the fiscal means for a wide variety of state 
subsidies2• and expenditure, for example, on the public sector (ISCOR) and 
agriculture. Also, with the consolidation of monopoly capital in the centres, 
different requirements of production were emerging in peripheral countries and 
1. (emphasis added RR) Jones, C and Naval, T The State and Social Policy in 
Capitalism, State Formation and Marxist Theory (ed) Corrigan, P (1980). 
2. Gold taxes prov~ed some 27% of state revenue as against 6% in the Pact 
period (Kaplan (1977) 275). 
13. 
the need arose to insert fixed capital into manufacturing industries there,! 
in part to facilitate further development of raw material production~' in 
order to increase competitiveness of those monopolies producing raw materials 
14. 
-v i-s-a-vi-s those manufacturi ng commod i ties. In S.A. during the mid-1930's n-ew- waves of 
foreign capital poured into manufacturing industries, or foreign firms established 
as agencies extended their activities: to serve mining's needs~' to make full 
use of local raw materials, to evade protective tariffs, to take advantage of 
local iron and steel industries and to undertake heavy construction work. 3. 
These changes were in part responsible for the growth of a relatively strong 
manufacturing industry from tile mid-1930's, as also for the perpetuation of 
a bias towards concentration in certain sectors, the slow development of a 
capital goods sector and the tendency to import, whilst. struggling to compete 
with its finished products. 
The value of net output rose by some 110% during this period; the number of 
establishments by 32%; and the number of employees by 77%.4. The period saw 
production concentrated in small-scale establishments, with, however, a slow 
transition from manufacture to machinofacture and the beginnings of the 
repetitive machine-operative tasks that are the hallmarks fora change to the 
real subsumption of labour to capital. But while the average number of 
employees per establishment grew from 22 in 1924/5 to 33 in 1939/40,5. this 
did not go with a significant rise in the capital/labour ratio or changes in 
the labour process.- In fact, Palmer suggests that this ratio actually fell in 
1. Mandel, E. (1975) Ch 3 pp 75-107; Poulantzas (1974) Ch 1 pp 42-65. 
2. BTl No 282 (1945) Till 1936 2/3 foreign investment in mining; 2/5 in 
commerce, manufacturing and agriculture. 
3. Legassick, M and Hemson,1 D (1975) 10% of private foreign investment in 
industry in 1930's; as yet insignificant in industry. 
4. Davies (thesiS) p223.(l977). 
5. Norval (1962') Table 1. 
the period 1933 - 9. 1. However, we will see that this placed severe limitations 
on the process of capital accu~ulation and on the activities of the state, for, 
15. 
to put it very generally, while relations of production were becoming increasingly 
capitalised, there was still a. severe IIblocking~ of the productive forces. 
This can not be understood in purp.ly "technicist" economic terms: it is 
integrally bound up with the historically developed class structure of Southern 
African society; . (1) the ownership and control of the biggest mining companies 
by foreign capitalists who were at least initially not primarily concerned with 
broadening the industrial base; (2) • the destruction of an African peasantry; 
(3) whilst also the preservation of Non-capitalist subsistan~e production; 
(4) the restricted internal market; (5) the maintenance of small capital; 
and (6) the racial division of labour and the racially exclusive state. 
I 
The question' of non-capitalist production is crucial for our purposes as we 
are interested to know how this related to the demands for welfare measures 
and/or forms of\ncome rna intenance\~ or lack thereof. 
It is wrong to see the preservation of non-capitalist forms of production 
purely as a result of deliberate state action ~ince the 1890 I s;2. although 
this did exist, the process was one of class struggle. I As Marx wrote: : 
the maintenance and reproduction of the working-class is, 
and ever must be, a necessary condition to the reproduction 
of capital. But the capitalist may safely leave its fulful-
ment to the labourers instinct of self-preservation an1.p~p~ 
.§.gation, all the capitalist cares for is to reduce 
1. Palmer)G.(1954) p.131S.AJE.. 
2. Di Cooper (UC'T Honours thesiS) The Glen Grey Act. 
the labourer's individual consumption as far as possible to what 
is strictly necessary. 1. 
For workers, those involved in wage-labour and those separated from the means 
of production and making up the surPlus-population,2. the question of the 
value of their labour-power is one of obtaining the necessaries of existence; 
the class struggle of these people to defend and advance their living standards 
can be against the tendency of capitalism to undermine the non-valorised 
contribution to the reproduction of labour-power (family, subsistence production) 
or to demand compensation for the use-values which are becoming valorised 
(eg land), on the one hand, or it can be a direct struggle over the already-
valorised parts of the means of subsistence (eg wage struggles). These struggles 
and the political and ideological processes which accompanied them were also 
crucial in shaping the development of the social formation, particularly until 
the 1940's. 
The state's role in maintaining a specific class structure was probably clearest 
in its influence on the racial division of labour in the capitalist production 
process; and it was in this sphere that at the end of the 1930's and during 
the war it was most crucially faced with a capitalist system which was coming 
up against the limits of its own relations. During the 1920's, secondary 
industry was seen as the area most capable of maintaining the racial division 
of labour which had developed in the mining and agricultural sectors. 
While the state's IIcivilized labour policy" was not anti-capitalist as is often 
1. Marx Capital Vol I p 572 
2. We must distinguish here between the formation of absolute (primitive 
accumulation) and relative surplus population (a result of rising capital 
intenSity). The absolute surplus population can be found in a latent or 
floating form: they may appear to still have a productive relationship to 
the soil (latent), or they may appear in the form of lIunemployed workers ll 
(in the town or countryside) with no attachment to the land. cf Marx Vol I 
Ch 25 particularly Parts 3 - 4; Legassick & Wolpe 1977 RAP.E. 
1(,. 
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asserted, it did produce contradictions. Davies and others have shown that 
it favoured larger capitals and the movement of Whites into new petty-bourgeoisie 
supervisory places as the labour process changed and this did not impede capitalist 
development; also in some industries, the employment of White labour allowed 
for a stability and low labour turnover that was important in a period of 
transition to mechanised produ~tion. 1. On the other hand smaller, less mechanised 
units (with largely skilled and unskilled labour forces) were given some protection 
against competition: 2. th~ civilized labour policy depressed the value of black 
labour pm'ler by keeping black wages expressly below the IIci vi lized minimumll through 
outright repression of organisation (later 1920 1s) and through the institution-
alisation of what had been socially determined as IInecessaryll to produce this 
labour. This was basically the wage of a single migrant worker - taking the 
overtly political form of segregationist policies. The state disorganised the 
working class in a way which enabled the IIreproductionll of black labour at a 
level far below that at which the newly created white proletariat could subsist. 
GROWING CONTRADICTIONS IN THE SOCIAL FORMATION 
The working class was, however, not going to let this level of exploitation 
continue. While the state1s strategy pre-empted any significant united action 
between white and black workers, the late 1920 l s saw the emergence of new 
industrial unions organising around wage-demands. The Depression saw further 
decline of reserve production and a larger urban settled proletariat - whose 
living and working conditions were exacerbated by the period of recession and 
1. Hence the invalidity of the liberal agruement that racism and the civilized 
labour policy of the Pact Government impeded capitalist development or that 
Pact was a IIworkers state ll . 
2. Along with the state1s protectionist policy. 
unemployment 1. - while the civilized labour policy was applied more strictly 
than ever before. 2. During the years after the recession when employment 
picked up, African workers were demanding wages corresponding to the 
cost of their repro:iuction and an onslaught on the civilized labour pOlicy.3. 
We will return to examine the struggles below and how they compounded the 
contradictions facing continued capitalist development. 
We stated above that during the i930's there were as yet no significant changes 
in the level of capitalisation in manufacturing, and as a result in the labour 
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process. While mechanisation proceeded in a number of industries - eg engineering, 
clothing and textile, sweetmaking, furniture and leathering, a number of industries 
were still very small and employed a large unskilled labour force in non-mechanised 
labour processes. Amongst these were most of the food- (wage good) processing 
industries: flour and grain mills, bakeries, fruit and vegetable canning, 
butter and cheese factories. 4. The BTl enquiries into all those industries 
spoke of "redundant inefficient and uneconomically-Iocated plant which leads 
to increased costs ..• , which have to be borne by consumers".5. And in 
1941, a government commission argued strongly that: 
. 
" At present, with few exceptions, South African manufacturing 
industries work on a small scale, are not highly mechanised 
and are largely dependent on protection. They are therefore 
adapted neither to make the best use of labour supply nor the 
ample supply of cheap power available. With cheap power and 
and given an adequate market, South African manufacturing 
1. Native Ec Commission U.G.22 - 1932 See paras: 72-5; 82-5; 92-4; 250-349. 
2. White workers were replacing African workers at 'civilised minimum wages' 
though not without problems for capital. 
3. In the period ,1926 - 30 there were 47 strikes involving 19 684 workers 
and 23 151 working days lost. In 1936 - 40, the corresponding figures were 
116 - 18 622 - 47 129, and most of these workers were Africans. Simons H.J.(1949~ 
4. Smith E.SAJE.(1945) Most of these employed less than £500 in capital equipment. 
5. BTl Reports 255.0~and No. 296 (1947}-into the relationship between prices 
of wheat, flour, meal & bread; and fruit & vegetable canning industry respectively, 
industry could be mechanised to a gredter extent . " In 
many industries the position created by the small lccal market 
has been aggravated by the erection of a multiplicity of factories 
mostly below optimum size and below working capacity.1I1. 
We indicated above, however, that the civilized labour policy in itself did not 
hamper capitalist development'. However, as far as (1) m intaining a "restricted 
'l--market" and low level of black "buying power", and (2) making it difficult for 
-------------------------------capital to move cheap black labour into new semi-skilled positions, the liberal 
D. 
critics were correct. Further, (3) limits imposed on the organisation of unskilled 
workers against wages, working conditions and the cost of living, protected--
industry in as far as a generalised process of mechanisation !was not waged, as 
I 
was the case, for example in England. 2. 
Increasingly, the state was forced to intervene in a crisis of profitability, 
which only emerged clearly after the war, although the tendency was there already 
in the late 1930's.3. The continued reliance on the gold industry was also 
exacerbating these contradictions, as industrial capital's ability to mechanise 
in order to raise surplus value depended on th~ foreign exchange earned by 
mining capital. By the late 1930's the mining industry also entered a crisis. 
Gold production appeared to be tapping low grade ores, and it did not look as 
if it could continue to provide the conditions for a dynamic growth in other 
sectors. Reproduction of capitalist relations implied continuous growth and 
that manufacturing would have to be more self-sufficient. Further, while 
'-D U.G. 40/41: paragraph 38 - 9. 
2. Marx, K Capital Vol I Chapters 12 - 15. 
3. The theory of capitalist crisis and the social law of the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall entail, basically the point that the state often 
jntery~nes to restore IIprofitabilityll, usually by attempting to raise the 
rate of surplus value. 
manufacturing was on the whole not well situated to mechanise in order to 
cheapen wage goods, tariff protection was meaning rising costs in the social 
t . 1. forma Ion. The continued extension of tariff protection, to the pOint that 
semi-processed and otller manufacturing inputs would now be produced at higher 
costs than internationally, threatened to generate an unsustainable rise in the 
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cost structures throughout the economy, threatening the very basis of profitability 
in the manufacturing industry, particularly the relatively low wage-costs in 
a situation where relative surplus-value production was severly restricted. 
How far, on the other hand, could capital raise the rate of exploitation 
through depressing the wages of workers (ie increasing surplus value without 
increasing the organic composition of capital and thus cheapening wage goods) ? 
This process was limited by the threat of the total extinction of the working 
class, espeCially its members with no access to subsistence production. 
The commissions of the war-years and many semi-state apparatuses, pOinted to 
these dangers: the Van Eck Report2. and Social Planning and Economic Council 3. 
noted and warned against the physical deterioration of the labour force to the 
pOint where the reproduction of future generations was in jeopardy. 
THE WAR YEARS AND SOCIAL WELFARE PROVISIONS: THE IlLIBERALII WELFARE STATE DREAM 
The conditions of war time production required qualitatively different state 
1. Bloch, G U.C.T. MAThesis. p.120. 
2. 1st Interim ,Report U.G. 33/1940. 3rd Report. (van Eck) 194-1. 
3. U.G. 14 - 1944. 
poliCY vis-a-vis the dominated classes. The recruitment of a large number of 
workers into the armed forces, together with expanded production had marked 
effects on the size and composition of the labour force. The 1945 Report of 
the Department of Labour comments on two features: (a) "a notable shift from 
rural to urban areas", and (b) lithe employment of women in war production and 
especially in the so-called 'heavy industries' on a scale unprecedented in 
our experience" 1. African workers were drawn in - at lower wages and under 
inferior conditions - to operative places previously filled by whites, so that 
steps were taken to move white workers upwards to supervisory places, artisan 
-places and to other operative places. It was stated policy to make use of 
cheap African labour power in new places whilst still maintaining the racist 
division of labour. 2. Thus, more white women were recruited - also at lower 
wages - into areas where men had previously worked, as well as into the expanding 
garment industries, food and canning, and so on. Further, legislative measures 
were taken to reinforce the isolation of white from black workers, particularly 
where they occupied similar places, both physically and in terms of protection 
of skills. 3• 
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More important, for our purposes, were the measures taken to contain the struggles 
of the~ess-priVelegetworkers; sections of industrial capital encouraged 
specific concessions under state control as they feared that the difficulties 
following temporary expansion whould be exacerbated if working-class demands 
could not be, to some extent, incorporated; entering a period of economic, 
political and ideological crisis, lithe whole power of the state, reinforced 
by appeals to the workers patriotism" was needed to ensure stability. 
1. Dept of Labour 1945: page 2. The number of Africans employed in industry rose 
by 25% during the war; the percentage of Africans in urban areas rose from 
18,4% in 1936 to 23,7% in 1946. 
2. 3rd Interim Report para 173 and BTl No 282 p 44. 
3. See R Davies 1977 pp252 - 280 eg training facilities, factory Acts. 
In 1943 the United Party secured a massive electoral majority which included 
recapturing a large number of the rural seats which were lost when Herzog and 
other members of parliament resigned in 1939. This was in part a result of 
the beneficial effect of teh early war years on agricultural prices, in turn 
a result of the government's emphasiS on export-agriculture. This victory 
enabled the Smuts Government to implement various "reforms". 
While tllis is not the place to examine the various areas in which this process 
took place,1. or the debates that took place throughout the war over welfare, 
wages, trade unions, family housing, etc., it is worthwhile looking more closely 
at the state's approach and the highly 'selective ' nature of concessions made, 
particularly with the extension of cost-of-living allowances and social pensions 
to sections of the African dominated classes. 
With almost full emplOyment2. on the Rand at the beginning of the war, and the 
lack of substantial wage increases, more had to be done to conciliate African 
workers, particularly the more settled and organised workers who were seen to 
be gaining economic, political and ideological ground: 
II The existence of a number of Native trade unions demands some 
form of recognition . grievances they are labouring under, 
if well founded, have to be remedied, rather than that the 
advice of some unbalanced semi-educated Native of promptings 
of disreputable Europeans be adopted .. 3. 
The state feared the breakdown of the sort of social controls to which rurally 
located Africans were thought to be subject, and the possibility of their 
organisation with other workers (white, 'coloured' and Indian) in a "united 
22. 
1. eg the Wage Boards operations, the state's food schemes, its "health campaignslf. 
2. (of men, presumably) see M. Stein (1978) 
3. Native Affairs Commission 1939/40 p.8. 
front II . 
II there can be a Bantu natio:1 in South Africa ... to force 
the Bantu down to a denationalised and submerged economic 
class would be a calamity 111. 
At this stage, it seems, it was thought that non-statutory recognition of 
African trade unions would prevent their growth and the dissemination of an 
alternative ideology. Furthermore, by controlling the already organised and 
settled workers, the colour, skill and wage divisions already achieved through 
wage determinations and industrial conciliation machinery could be intrenched 
and some 'acceptibility' could be gained, and further divisions created: 
IIUnlike the migrant who is not so concerned with the amount of wages he gets . 
. . the native industrial worker who has become a permanent dweller has to 
provide for his food and housing ... and his family, out of the wages he 
receives - which are directly influenced by the presence of his tribal com-
petitor. Such competition . encouraged by both employers and altruists 
alike, is disasterous to the urban Native's standard orfi living. 112. 
COST OF LIVING ALLOWANCES 
The acti vi ties 0'11 the Wage Board during the '\war-years, its role in containing 
working-class struggles, the concessions it made or merely suggested and the 
responses these provoked, are instructive, as it dealt with the grievances of 
the majority unskilled workers who were most severly affected by the increased 
cost of essential wage goods. 
1. Native Affairs Commission 1939/40 p8. 
2. ibid. p.8 
23. 
In 1940 the Wage Board noted that, though the cost-of-living, as indicated 
by the retail price index, was low taking into account the war conditions 
(4.4% over the 1938 figure) this was a serious matter for the low-paid 
workers. 1. By this time most organised work~rs already had cost-of-living 
allowances (COLA) provided for in their Industrial Council Agreements. 2. It 
suggested that increases in the cost-of- living should b~ provided for in its 
determinations, without regard to an industry's capacity to pay. War Measure 
No 71 of 1941 introduced a COLA for all workers earning under 75 s per week, 
but it excluded those employed by the state, domestic- mine- and farm-workers. 3. 
Cost-of-living allowances were meant to be amended as the retail price index 
rose, although there was no method of enforcing its payment, and the Guardian4. 
pOinted out that, whereas in 1941 a 6 - 10% increase in wages was due to the 
provision of cost-of-living allowances, inflation was running at more than 15%. 
Furthermore, the original measure applied only in the nine major urban centres 
where worker (and non-worker) protest vis-a-vis food prices or wages were 
expected to be more disruptive than elsewhere. Realising that this was a 
misjudgement, and that food prices were higher in rural areas, the measure was 
amended in 1943, so that workers in all parts of the union employed in 
extablishments of 10 or more workers were covered by the COLA. Mine-, farm-
domestic- and state-employees were still excluded, as were workers in other 
exclusively black employment sectors, reflecting the state's attempts to further 
divide the working class and maintain the conditions for expanded accumulation. 
Most of the demands for COLA's came from these workers and farm~reas where 
employers evaded these and other wage determinations. 
For most sections of industry, however, this was seen as a way o~ preventing 
1. Department of Labour 1940 p.31. 
2. ibid p.32. ' 
3. The justification being that workers were paid in kind and had families 
producing in the rural areas. 
4. 7/8/1941. 
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"industrial disruption" and ultimately relieving the pressure for increased 
wages; also, as we will see, many employers and their allies were concerned 
with the reproduction fo a "healthy and happy" labour force, as much for 
political reasons as to aid their productivity drive. They were also to 
benefit from the system of price control, which made provision for the control 
of maximum prices for most consumer goods, including essential foodstuffs, when 
the Marketing Boards came fully under state control. 1. 
It was in this context that the Social Security Committee was appointed in 
January 1943. It was apPointed after a recommendation in the Social and 
Economic Planning Council, which in turn was formed out of the needs perceived 
by the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission in 1940. The terms 
of reference of the Committee were: 
II to investigate and report on the existing social services and 
social security arrangements and to recommend a scheme for the 
future, involving any necessary extensions of the existing 
measures or the introduction of new measures. 112. 
Referring to the limitations placed on state action by the process of capital 
accumulation, the committee added: 
" In such investigation and report the Committee shall have due 
regard to the productive capacity of the Union and its possible 
increase. and to necessary safeguards to preserve individual 
.--- ---"" 
resp_onsibility, initiative and thrift.,,3. 
The last pOint emphasises the bourgeois economists preoccupation with encouraging 
consumers' savings wherever possible, rather than state expenditure which would 
1. See T M Tinley Chapters 2,3. 
2. Para 5 REport of the Social Security Committee U.G. 14-1944. 
3. ibid para 5. 
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mean increased taxation of everyone and consequently presssure on wages. 
Taxation to subsidise welfare expenditures - eg payroll taxation for UIF, 
W.C. and pensions - is called IIr~tion" in bourgeois economic 
terms as it takes a larger fraction of the poorer classes' income than it 
does of the wealthy. The Committee noted, however, that the extent of poverty 
amongst the working class was such that there was no support when the central 
bread-winner's labour power was redundant as a result of injury, unemployment 
or old age, and that this was aggravated by the wage structure which "makes 
no conscious provision for family life ll .1. Capitalists, individually, were 
not prepared to pay adequate wages, let alone to foot the bill for welfare 
provi s ions, so that the commi ttee accepted the need for "CO llecti ve provi s ion 
against ttle contingencies ll - i.e.the insecurity - of wage labour. 2. 
Significantly, the Commission linked the provision of social security benefits 
to the need to raise the productivity of the working class3. and stressed that: 
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II the improved standards of living for the population should be 
ensured through steps such as improved and extended opportunities 
for education, housing, the subsidisation fo food and health 
services. 1I 
The Report investigates the insurance of "every citizen of the state against 
every economic contingency of life, from birth to deathll - though its conclusions 
and recommendations clearly did not quite amount to that. The Committee 
distinguished from the start between an A system for IIEuropeans, coloureds, 
1. ibid para 10. 
2. ibid para 10 
3. ibid para 12. 
Asiatics and such 'permanently urbanised Natives~ Native farm workers and 
Nati ve employers in the Reserves II, and a B system for 1I 0 ther Nati ves, 
comprising the bulk of the Bantu population". The commission noted t~at the 
difficulty of distinguishing "permanent urban Native residents who are fully 
dependent on earningsll from temporary \'Iorkers from farms and Reserves, and 
1I0ther Natives ll had in the past led to their exclusion from pension and other 
schemes, although the relevant reports confirmed that they should be included. 
They should be given the same option to contribute as IIdeveloped farm-workers 
and the Native employee class in the Reserves".1. 
Thus, as in earlier investigations, the Committee distinguished between the 
permanent Reserve inhabitants, the settled urban, and the migrant labour; 
force; however, they went on to argue that the deteriorating conditions in the 
reserves and 'great poverty and overcrowding' made it necessary to extend 
'moderate assistance' to the peasant class when crops fail, and to those who 
are blind, old or invalids' .2. The SSC continued: 
II Otherwise, the vital essentials for improved well-being in 
the Native areas are more land, education, (with a vocational 
bias), measures to assist improved farming, better transport 
and a large extension of medical and health services II 3. 
But these benefits would be no more than arbitrary grants or 'poor relief' 
handouts. The 1936 Land Act had limited areas for African occupation; 
this along with overcrowding makes it difficult to see how agricultural 
improvements would help.4- The SSC condemned the approach of previous commissions, 
based on a misconception of the "living standards of Reserve Natives and of the 
1. ibid paras 129 - 134. 
2. ibid (emphasis added) paras 130 - 131. 
3. ibid Dara 131. 
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ability of the family group there or in town to care, unassisted for the 
children of absent relatives or for old parents or invalids". However, 
gathering from the lack of any real change in the policy vis-a-vis the 
Ipeasantry', as well as the exclusion of Itemporary workers I from the main 
_pension scheme, it did not differ much from its own characterisation of earlier 
approaches to pensions for this group: 
II Rural Natives were excluded from old-age pensions mainly on 
the assumption that Native custom makes provision for main-
taining dependent persons. Urban Natives were excluded in 
consequence, regardless of their needs, owing to the difficulty 
of distinguishing this group. In other directions, administrative 
provision has been made for Natives, but in giving effect to it 
the guiding consideration has been that benefits should not 
conflict with or break down their tribal food-sharing habits. 
In practice, the result has been ... the virtual exclusion 
of Nat i ves. II 1. 
Secondly, it was recommended that 'Native farm workers I and 'Natives who live 
in the Reserves, but are employed under contract of service (eg clerks, teachers) 
and who have no option on land, be given the option for pensions, at the same 
level as those for 'rural coloureds ' • 
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Thirdly, in the case of 'urbanised Natives I the l sse recommended that 'there must 
be a test of urbanisation to identify town Natives dependent upon earnings". This 
is because; 
II it is apparent that the primitive condition of the Native people 
and the temporary presence of many Reserve and farm Natives in 
towns, renders it impossible to make cash benefits available to 
1. ibid para 129. 
all Natives employed in towns ... "1. 
Thus the sse sought a method of excluding not only those Africans living 
permanently in rural areas, but also tho!;e who were migrant workers; this 
would also be an added means of enforcing regristration. African workers 
----- .., 
would have to prove that they were 'permanently urbanised' when they applied 
--------- ------- -------
for social pensions: this meant that they would have to be in an urban area 
,--
for a least 5 out of the preceeding 7 years; if married, a workers wife must 
r--have been in an urban area for 3 out of the preceeding 5 years; and he should 
have no free allotment in the Reserves.2. In this way, the sse hoped to stop 
a potential flow from rural areas to the cities and towns in order to receive 
29. 
pension benefits, "which will be relatively attractive compared with the relief 
available to the tribal section,,3. but would aggrevate "the already unsatisfactory 
urban housing position". Furthermore, applicants had to prove that they were 
65 before receiving benefits. 
The various rates and qualifications were accepted by the government and became 
part of the legislation.4. Nine areas were classified as 'cities' for pension 
purposes; 'towns' were defined (for the second pension rate for Africans) as 
those where the white population exceeded 2 000. The third rate was for Africans 
in rural areas (8 scheme) Draper comments that while records do not show how 
many people fell into each of these categories: 
" it would appear that it is government policy to apply the various 
rules and regulations very strictly, (especially in recent years) 
and that many (if not most) Africans who are in fact living in urban 
areas are being paid out at the lower rural rates. 5. 
1. ibid para 135 (emphasis added) 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
ibid paras 136 - 137. 
ibid para 137 This indicates the intense poverty in the reserves, if one 
bears in mind that maximum pensions were set at R24 per year. 
M Draper (1964) Social Pensions in South Africa. SAIRR Fact Paper 15 P.6. 
ibid. 
proletariJnised they should be permitted into urban-industrial areas only 
for the term of their work; for the period they sell their labour power. 
As workers they should return to the Bantustans only to reconstitute them-
selves and maintain crucial links with their dependents. 
With respect to pensions the vicious circle that people were caught in is 
clear: from 1944, a migrant worker qualified only for benefits from the 
B pension scheme'· and received 10s a month in cash plus rations (not exceeding 
5s). Thus, unless a migrant qualified eventually for Section 10 rights, which 
was becoming increasingly difficult, he too would have no choice but to live 
in a homeland/Bantustan dependent on his working family.2. 
As important as the economic effects in maintaining the value of the workers 
labour-power depressed, and reducing the State's responsibility, were the 
political effects, or "isolation ·effects", as they have been termed. The 
State acted to disorganise the dominated classes through the maintenance and 
establishment of a set of ideological and juridical structures which excluded 
them representation within the Central State. Through bolstering existing 
tribal and extended family structures the majority of African workers were 
portrayed as "temporary sojourners"') wi thout even a formal legal equal ity to 
other "citizens". This goes a long way towards explaining why demands for 
increased "social security" and other welfare measures have not been made 
of the state. 
1. see above 
2. We will discuss the implementation fa the State pension scheme below, 
its non-functioning during the 1970's and the State's attempts to shift 
the entire responsibility onto the governments of the "independent 
homelands/states". 
Sec tion II 1. 
THE APARTHEID STATE: 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO "HELFARE STATISM" 
(AND DEMOCRACY) 
In order to understand why the minimal economic concessions made to the African 
working class were not extended to improving their working and living conditions, 
to incorporating their organisations and giving some form of democratic rights 
after the war, and to understand the alternative 'solution' worked out in st~ggle 
by the dominant· classes, He need to grasp: (a) the economic, political and 
ideological crisis which characterised the social formation at the end of the war; 
(b) the nature of the early Apartheid state, what particular class forces it 
represented, and how these were conditioned by the need to secure the conditions 
for capital accumulation and the political, social and economic conditions of 
existence of the capital relation in its varied forms throughout society, This is 
crucial if we want to understand specific state policies, such as social welfare, 
or the lack thereof, and what was implemented as an alternative way of maintaining 
the aged, the unemployed, the sick etc. This cannot be examined 1n any detail here, 
not least as no satisfactory analysis of the Apartheid state has been produced. l • 
THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND IDEOLOGICAL CRISIS FACING THE. DOHINANT CLASSES AT THE 
END OF WORLD ~JAR II. 
The 1ssues which divided the dominant classes and which intensified during the war 
not least because they were divided over the 'war effort' itself - were far more 
complex and wide - ranging than I can describe here. The struggles between various 
factions of capital and their petty bourgeois and wage-earning supportive classes 
concern nothing less than the preconditions for continued accumulation and the 
political, social and economic conditions of existence of the capital relation in 
1. Kaplan's analysis (1977) goes some way, but tends to reduce the state to the 
exigencies of capital accumulation cf. O'Meara. D. Thesis. (1978). 
~ts varied forms throughout the society. 
At the end of the war the t~vo leading white political parties presented the v1e .... Ts 
O f the rna]" or fractions of the capitalist classes and "their" and interests 
supportive classes - on possible strategies to be adopted in order to secure the 
conditions of capital accumulation and the political domination of the white 
dominant classes. The most significant official expressions of the two vim"s 
were the NATIVE LAWS COMMISSION 1946-8 (F&gan Report) and the Sauer Report 
1 
respectively.4·Sauer advocated total separation and saw a settled, urban African 
population as a temporary solution. Fagan, like the VanEck Commission (1941), and 
the reports of the B.I.I. (1945) and S.P.E.C. (lg45), accepted the de facto 
situation which had developed during the 1930's and the war. Given that the 'reserves 
were increasingly unable to subsidise labour-reproduction, given that secondary 
industry required black labour, t"ith higher skill levels, (and a corresponding lmoler 
job turnover), and given that there was a growing settled, urban proletariat, more 
Africans should be allmoled permanent residential rights in cities. Labour-reprod-
uction costs (housing, welfare, pensions, ammenities, etc) should be financed through 
the state in urban areas. Along with this went the call from sections of industry 
for a relaxation of pass laws, limited economic concessions to African workers and 
recognition of the independent African trade unions as a means of institutionalising 
and controlling industrial conflict - as well as limited separate political repres-
entation. On the other hand, Fagan, if not the earlier war time reports, saw the 
need for regulated 'migratory labour' and centralised rather than local control in 
order to allocate labour more efficiently. 
Most of these recommendations spelt decline, if not ruin, for the smaller industrial 
capitals, mining and agricultural capitals. The issues appeared as far more complex 
and wide-ranging than those mentioned above, but basically, increased struggles 
emanating from the dominated classes in the factories, townships and rural areas, 
1. Native Laws Commission 1946-8 U.G 28/1948 (Fagan) Verslag van die Kleurraagstuk -
Kommissie "van die ' .. HNP (1947) (Sauer) 
f orcing elements of capit3l with differing conditions of accumulation into yere , . 
·opposing a!1d conflicting strategies - for the maintenance of capitalist social 
relations and their particular conditions for favourable surplus creation. The 
larger capitals' immediate interests lay in securing political domination through 
minimal. concessions, whilst at the same time also ensuring the conditions for 
expanded capital accumulation in its sector, ,i.imi ted as it was by low Organic 
Composition of Capital (OCC) and the problems of access to the world market. In 
effect this meant that they too Here happy to keep 1Vages (variable capital) low, 
and also the "incidental" and social expenditure involved in reproducing an urban 
working class. It was thus important that its size should be controlled. 
Although it was not clear at the time, this increasingly implied a direct assault 
on the living conditions and organisations of the dominated classes; however, the 
mere \.Tillingness of these capitals and their liberal proponents to make concessions 
threatened other sections of capital, and of course the (Afrikaner) petty bourgeoisie 
and while workers as they were seen to be leading, inevitably, to political and 
economic integration. In the short term, they feared that with the manufac~urer8' 
support the changing division of labour would bring larger numbers of Africans 
into semi-skilled operative positions; and that higher wages in industry and commerce 
would mean greater labour-shortages on the white farms; also, emerging Afrikaner 
business (and smaller "English - speaking" capitalists) were concerned to keep a 
cheap labour policy to ensure their OWll accumulation in low capital-intensive 
d.. 1. con l.tl.ons. 
The differences between sections of the dominant classes were thus by no means 
clearcut, but they coalesced in different attitudes: to the siting of the African 
reserve army of labour which had grown rapidly during the war, to the forms of 
labour control, and the extent to which direct assault of living conditions and 
organisations of the black dominated classes was necessary. 
1. See Legassick, M. "Legislation, Ideology and Economy" (JSAS 1974); Kaplan P.hd 
Thesis (1977). P.hd. Thesis (1979) Bloch, G. MA Thesis (1980) O'Meara, D 
While the structural contradictions which were growing 1n society, and the points 
of unity between classes, can be seen as the outcome of forms of struggle in the 
accumulation process, the resolution of conflicts was not an automatic result of 
th~se struggles, and the outcome can therefore not be reduced to the dynamic of 
accumulation. The manner in which different class forces organised themselves with 
or without a viable strategic direction was also crucial. The factory and urban 
struggles of African workers brought certain contradictions to a head, but they were 
not organised as a political force. These contradictions were compounded by the 
ideological and political forms of crisis of the 'liberal' bourgeoisie, reflected 
in Smuts's government's vacillating, 'defensive' position. On the other hand, 
under the leadership of intellectual elements of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, 
deep and successful organisational work is done. The economic movement united 
capitalist, petty bourgeois end wage-earning strata under a set of immediate 
demands. The banner under which the disparate forces of the Afrikaner nationalist 
movement was united, was Apartheid.I·The common programme linking these groups 
and their parliamentary victory 1948 gave them control over key state apparatuses 
to inplement practical policy. This reflected a shift in relations between classes 
and was important in consolidating and implementing the strategies of that 
particular alliance of class forces. But the Apartheid state was still a capitalist 
state and at the outer limits its activities and policies were always subject to 
the conditions for the continuance of the capital relation in the social formation 
as a whole. Thus, while we noted above that even the larger capitals could benefit 
, 
from the repressive political strategy followed during the 1950's and 1960's, 
the state was also sensitive to the particular needs of the larger capitals, and 
was crucial in securing the 'economic' conditions for the transition to monopoly 
capitalism. This will be discussed below. 
1. O'Meara op. cit. p205-6. 
{I) Withdrawing the concessions 
We saw in the previous section that as the capacity of the reserves to 
subsidise labour-power"declined, liberal policy in the 1930 ls and 1940 ls 
advocated on the one hand the enlargement of the reserves and intensified 
agricultural development, and on the other hand the provision of social 
welfare benefits in urban areas, with an increasing though never exclusive 
emphasis on the latter. He also pOinted out that fe~1 industrial capitalists 
were committed to a "social welfare ll strategy,wl1ich would (a) tie them to 
a growing settled and organised urban proletariat, with all the associated 
costs; (b) result in more unemployed and other "redundant people ll 1. seeking 
the means to remain in urban areas - eg poor relief, pensions, unemployment 
insurance, and other social services; also (c) this strategy would be seen 
as a further attempt to wean away the agricultural labour supply. These factors 
resulted in a vacillating attitude. As in all capitalist countries, a system 
of unemployment insurance designed to appease working class militancy exists in 
South Africa. The example of unemployment insurance illustrates how the Smuts 
Government set a trend in the stricter enforcement of influx control, whilst 
at the same time making some concessions to the settled urban proletariat; 
and the response of the Nationalists in 1949 was indicative of the firmer stand 
taken after 1948. 
Under the unemployment Benefit Act of 1937, as amended in 1942, provision was 
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made for the establishemnt of Unemployment Benefit funds for particular industries 
(through Industrial councils - I.Cls). Unemployed workers could receive no 
statutory benefits unless a fund had been established for their industries. 2. 
This strategy, like others, associated with the I.C. system,was meant to protect 
smaller capitals and prevent the benefits from spreading across industries. 
As such, they were established mainly in larger industries as an insurance 
1. Urban Areas Act (~o 25) 1945 S.28 deals with the removal of IIRedundant 
Bantu II from prescribed areas. 
2. Department of Labour, Annual Report for the years 1944 (No UG no.) and 
1945 (U.G. 9-1947). No reports for 1942 or 1943. 
~ainst unemployment after the depression on the request of white unions, who 
!lso feared redundancy_ 1. As a result, the funds came to cover African workers 
In 1942 ttle Act was amended; beneficiaries could not include among others, 
'labourers', i.e. persons earning less than £78 p.a. and engaged in certain 
types of work, or people who were under contract in terms of the Native Labour 
Regulation Act, i.e. migrants. 2. In May 1946 there were a number of U.S. Funds 
') 
covering about 230 000 workers. ~. 
As a part of the "reforms" following the African mineworkers strike, the 
Unemployment Insurance Act (No. 53 of 1946) extended unemployment insurance 
to workers earning less than £78 per annumJand previously excluded. It brought 
the funds already established under a single central organization and covered 
about 550 000 workers. 4·The Act still did not apply to workers in domestic 
service, agriculture, the public service, provincial administration, Railways 
and Harbours Administration workers or those earning more than £750 per year. 
In addition, mine workers who "were provided with food and quarters" were 
excluded, as were all rural African workers not in industrial undertakings. 
Workers earning up to £78 p.a. contributed 3d a week and the employer and 
the state each 9 d per worker; their unemployed benefit would be 225.6d, 
or 3/4 of their weekly earnings, whichever is the less. Workers earning 
between £78 and £130 p.a. contributed 8d, the state 10d and the employ~r 
1s',5. and the workers benefit was 25 s a week. A more repressive aspect 
of this fund was formulated by the Association of Administrators of Non-
European Affairs (on and around the Reef) in 1947)when they were attempting 
to restrict influx into the towns. They suggested that local authorities 
1. Cape Federation of Labour Unions (CFLU) memo to Industrial Legislation 
Commission (1934) and Annual Reports 1934 - 45. 
2. Unemployment ~nsurance Act No 53 1946. 
3. Department of Labour Report. UG 9 - 1947. 
4. S. van der Horst (1949) in Hellman, E. 
5. See U. I. Act No 53, 1946. 
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should administer the U.I.F for African workers as a means of controlling 
the number of "redundant" or lIidle and undesirable 1., by tracing "unauthorised 
natives,,2. This foreshadowed the policy with regard to the administration 
of State unemployment and pension schemes in later years. 
The Nationalist Government, in line with its greater emphasis on migrant labour 
and industrial decentralization.as well as a more concerted attack on the living 
standards of African workers, even those with urban residential rights, cut 
back on some of the provisions instituted by the Smuts Government for urban 
social welfare - for example, the concession discussed below was withdrawn 
and eligibility for unemployment insurance further restricted: No African 
workers earning below £182 p.a., and no casual and seasonal labourers could 
3. 
receive benefits after 1949. Also, workers had to take any job available or 
forfeit the benefits. This provoked vigorous opposition from the Trade Union 
4 
movement . but the Minister of Labour - Schoeman - stood firm. 
(ii) Repression and migrantisation 
As an alternative to the provision of benefits to lessen workers' insecurity 
whether over the fear of being dismissed and not being able to find work, or 
the fear of having no income after retirement, the state sought to ensure that 
these demands would not be heard and that "redundant labourers" returnea to 
the "reserves". The proposal made after the war by the S.A.A.U. 1 for 
the reorganisation of state control over the African masses through the 
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introduction of State Labour bu reaux, was accepted as an impo"rtant means of enforcing 
this, but its success would crucially depend on the establishment of rural 
structures minimally acceptable to African people~and the political disciplining 
of working class and popular organisations. The first move in this direction 
1. See Urban Areas Act No 25, 1945 S28 and S29. 
2. E. Hellman (1949) p242. 
3. Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act. 
4. Guardian articles 1949, 50. Simons papers (S.A. Library) See Correspondence 
between Ray Alexander and the S.A. T.'-C. 
was the passing of the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act. This extended local 
administration of the African dominated classes and attempted to resurrect 
so-called "traditional" political structures. 
The Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 passed resolutions 
which opposed the recommendations of the Industrial Legislation Commission" 
(1951) which basically: (a) rejected outright prohibition of trade union 
activities; (b) advocated sorre form of collective bargaining rights for 
African workers; (c) recognised a limited right to strike. 2·Liberal opposition 
(United Party and its allies) was essentially concerned with "stabilising the 
industrial field ", and containing workers struggles at the pOint of production. 
They articulated a narrow fraction of interest,which changed as political 
struggle escalated and trade unions weakened after 1946. The Nationalist 
Government, on the other hand, had the task of securing the political domination 
and control over the African dominated classes as a whole; they were concerned 
amongst other things, with denying political movements access to an organised 
proletarian base. 3·The Native Labour Act of 1953 did everything to prevent this 
alliance, short of banning the existence of trade unions: it outlawed strikes, 
failed to recognise African trade unions, and established a system of works 
committees to take their place. 4·In 1955, representatives of African trade unions 
were denied access to Wage Board hearings and in 1959 the Bantu Labour Act made 
stoporders for African trade unions illegal. 5. 
In this context!, it was difficult for any movement to organise around the ex-
tension of social welfare benefits; and it is clear that, more than ever, 
these had to be struggled for. SACTU unions, however, realised that the 
consequences which capitalist production has on a worker's life, extend 
1. U.G. 62/1951. 2. ibid para 1824. 
3. L. Welcher SALB Vol 4 No 5. 
4. These were elected by workers and operated at the factory level only. 
5. D Hemson "The Wage Board" Unpublished mimeo. 
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:beyond the workplace. Although workers sell their labour power for only 
a specific period of time, each day 3nd each week~heir proletarian status 
ensures that all aspects of social life are circumscribed by the realities 
of powerlessness. The most severe insecurity is caused by not knowing how 
one will survive when there is no work available or when one is forced to 
retire. Realising this, SACTU unions took up the issues of unemployment 
Insurance, Workmen's Compensation and demanded a full pension at the age of 
60 as a workers right (and a right for all people who were not able to labour 
in the capitalist system after a specified age). Workers had to know and 
understand more about these schemes, so that they could take action. 
As far as the removal of "redundant" people went, the Nationalist Government 
by no means embarked on a concerted campaign at onc~ and the number of Africans 
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in urban areas actually increased. In the early 1950 ' s it laid the administrative 
and legislative framework to set its programme in motion. 1. But as we have 
said, this was predicated on the disciplining of the African popular classes. 
As a result of the struggles of the 1950's both at the point-of-production and in 
·the townships, and the mobilisation of thousands around bourgeOis-democratic and 
specifically working-class demands, the state was forced to scrap the Sauer-
dream of Total separation along racial lines.' On the other hand, the Fagan 
Report's stress on the "differentiation" within the African people along class 
lines was gradually driven home. They began to realise that thIS "differentiation", 
and the fact that rural production had declined significantly and produced its 
own class structure, required an altered official strategy. What occurred 
I 
with respect to urban blacks was not a policy of "migrantisation" (except in 
certain respects) but rather a de facto recognition of their permanent place 
in the towns)and a simultaneous onslaught on black wages)deSigned to promote 
1. eg.Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952j Black Resettlement Act 1954. 
·.capital accumulation within manufacturing industry. African real wages 
declined for much of the 1950 1s. This decline hJS been estimated at 5%1 . 
. althOugh the Consumer Price Index was used in the calculations, and as this 
is based on average White family income, it is not a completely accurate picture 
of African real \vage trends. We said earl iet that the fundamental questions 
facing the dominant classes were over the size of the reserve army, the extent 
of this onslaught on living conditions and the resolution of the farm labour 
shortage. 
From the mid-1950 1s the state placed more emphasis on removing Africans from 
the towns. By the early 1960 l s its proposals aquired a concrete content as 
statutes depriving Africans of residency were increasingly enforced. Un-
qualified workers and the aged, sick and disabled would be required to return 
to their IIrural origins ll , the workers to renew their contracts and the IIre-
dundant ll people to struggle for survival, depending on their earning family. 
(iii) Political lIisolationll 
Thus the IInecessary wants!1 and reproduction costs of the workers were kept 
at a minimum: amongst other things 1it was hoped that they would expect no 
more than to return to the IIreserves" at retirement. With reference to the 
provision of social welfare benefits out of taxation, the Minister of Finance 
wrote in the introduction of the Native Taxation and Development Act, 1958: 
IIWe do not have one homogeneous community in which the 
prosperous people can be taxed to provide services for 
the less prosperousJbut we have various communities 
which must be economically sound individuallyll 2. 
There was a fear that if permanent residence and citizenship were extended 
to Africans within the central South African State, their economic and 
1. P Bonner IIAfrican Trade Unions since World War Two" mimeo (1978) 
2. Native Taxation and Development Act, No38 fo 1958. 
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political power would bring about high levels of taxation and social services, 
. while under separate development the responsibility would devolve on the IIBantu 
•••••.• and the extension of services will be a function of the ability of 
. the Bantu to pay. II The Nati ona lists wanted to evol ve a system whereby: 
IIWe can reinstate the natural obligations of Bantu 
Author'ities and Bantu chi ldren to thei r elders" 1. 
The State had to recognise that it (tind therefore, indirectly, White Capital) 
would have to provide some of the funds for the necessary infrastructure in 
the reserves eg hospitals, old-age homes, housing. Money would be transferred 
into the Native Revenue account to provide the facilities in those areas. 
The cheapness of providing facilities in the reserves for the reproduction of 
labour, as well as the unemployed, aged, sick, etc, and controls on the worker 
who was forced to return home, was related directly to the migrant labour system. 
The Native Affairs Department described the policy in the mid-1950's: 
"Dependants of poorly paid workers in urban areas will be 
much better off financially if they remain in the reserves 
or take up residence in a rural village where they can grow 
their own mealies, vegetables, etc. The breadwinner can be 
accommodated either on his employers property or in a hostel 
andlremit as much of his monthly earnings as he is able 
to, through the Native Commissioner, to his dependents. In 
this way, he will at least save a pound or two a month in rent." 2. 
It was hoped that this system would perpetuate itself: we can see that the 
aim has been to situate the majority of the African working population and 
their dependents as "citizens" in the Bantustans; and although fully 
1. HAD 13 June, 1955 col 7628. 
2. N.A.D. Official to S.A.I.R.R. See Race Relations Survey 1956 - 58 pp144-5. 
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'SOCIAL_ SECURITY PROVISIONS" IN THE INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL SYSTPl. 
-
1. The State and the "Responsibility of the Urban employer" 
In the theoretical section. of.this paper we saw that the general tendency 
iri the provision of social welfare benefits in Capitalist societies was that 
they were initially made at the point of production - where the contradictions 
were clearest - by individual employers. Then, as these were inadequate -
for social welfare was not the most profitable area of investment in the early 
manufacturing period - and as the state was in the position to secure the 
political domination of the capitalist classes as a whole, the state intervened 
to spread the costs of social welfare across all classes. 
I think it is clear that as far as the principal dominated classes go,this 
process has been very different in South Africa. Even the bigger, most 
'liberal'capitals were not prepared to commit themselves to the establishment of 
a settled, urban African proletariat with rights as workers and as "citizens". 
The specific path of capitalist development and the reliance of the state on the 
continued support of small white capital and wage-earning classes, meant that 
the state was reluctant to shift tne cost of reproducing an urban proletariat 
onto those classes. Important here too was the fact that throughout the 1950's 
and 1960's, even when the larger industrial capitalists did oppose the way in 
which the state conducted an assault on the African working class, they never 
acted decisively to establish an alternative form of state. Generally then) 
they supported the government's activities. 
Here too, an important comparison can be made with advanced capitalist countries. 
In those countries state intervention in social welfare did not entail a 
mechanistic "switch of responsibility\which is implied in those writings 
which see the state as external to the economy and intervening from the 
outside to sort out the chaos of capitalist production. This process was 
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Integrally tied to the emergence of a new form of state, the "enlarged" state, 
spurred by the economically dominant class becoming the ruling/hegemonic class. 
Seen from a different perspective, the state could only legitimately take on 
the role as "guarantor" if it had the backing of the capitalist classes, and 
as a result of the latter's activities in "civil SOCiety", the "support" 
of the dominated classes. The whole notion of "manufacturing consent" at the 
point of production is crucial to understand this process. 
2. Wages and Working Conditions: The Industrial Council System 
While the Smuts Government worked within the framework of some kind of "welfare 
state" distribution system, however limited and tentative,· the Apartheid 
State's stated policy has always been to keep this at an absolute minimum 
as far as the African dominated classes are concerned. On the level of 
implementation this has fostered such bureaucratic resistance)that even less 
than the intended expenditure has ultimately reached these people. From the 
early Apartheid period, then, the State's strategy has been: 
II Opposed to the RepubliC'S developi.ng into a welfare 
state as it is understood and has manifested itself in other 
parts of the world, but is committed to a policy which is 
aimed at independence of the individual and of the community 
and is conducive to optimal social functioning. 1I 1. 
On the one hand, as we have seen, this has entailed the elaboration of the 
"Bantustan policy" with regard to social welfare and a highly discriminatory 
"urban social welfare policy", all of which increased the direct dependence 
1. Department of Social Welfare and Pensions RP91/1975 p1. 
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of "redundant people" on their working families. On the other hand, the 
r~tionalist Government has often stressed the (direct) responsibility of 
the (urban) employer to his workers, and increasingly, as we will see, the 
need for self-neliance of the individual worker. The fundamental premise 
is that the African proletariat should not become a "burden" on the State 
in times of unemployment, old age, sickness and so on. I would argue that 
this applies to the active workers too, in that the state has not involved 
I 
itself in providing the means of reproduction/collective consumpticn,~or 
which capital does not provide through the direct. prjyate wage. Although 
this is not our focus, it is clearly crucially linked and, I repeat, should 
be kept in mind constantly when we examine the relationship between the 
state, capital and the unemployed section of the working class. 
The state1s attitude then, was that individual employers should take the 
initiative in these areas but left it to them to decide when, how and to 
what extent African workers should be included in "social security" and 
"fringe benefit" schemes. As we saw, there was little done to raise \'/ages, 
which in fact fell for the most part of the 1950 1s, and that the ability of 
workers to organise to demand improved conditions of employment was severely 
curtailed. On the whole, employers were reluctant to include African workers 
in any schemes which would effectively raise their wages. The liberal "Poverty 
Datum line", and the administration of unskilled wage determinations by state-
controlled wage boards continued to justify the perpetuation of differentially 
low wages to African workers. Further, they acted as instruments through 
which the economic demands of workers were controlled, and by which they were 
divided from those white workers who were still in productive roles. Hemson 
has shown that while wage determinations levelled wages between urban areas 
to resolve inter-capital competition, they did little to close the gap between 
skilled (white) and semi-skilled and unskilled (black) wages. 1. As with· 
1. Hemson, D. "The Wage Board" p.12 
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wages, there were ways in which employers could escape extending any existing 
schemes (for white workers) to Black workers. 
Various studies have shown that the relative autonomy given to employers and 
workers organisations, from statutory regulation, under the Industrial Council 
system in the 1930's meant that, given the growing semi-skilled fraction and 
the less clear distinction of this fraction, both in skill and colour terms, 
agreements between employers and "employees" were often extended to African 
workers in certain categories. 1. This was a complex process which will not 
be explored here, besides to make a few points as to how this development 
affected class forces. In implementing the "ci vi I ized labour pol icy" and 
later "job reservation", the state was freed of the burden of the more blatant 
and racist methods of fixing black labour's price and working conditions. On 
the other hand, its practices were brought more closely into line with the 
needs of capital accumulation, deskilling job fragmentation and the replacement 
of expensive \"ith cheaper labour. Also the control of white semi-skilled and 
unskilled, rather than just skilled fractions was secured through the 
2 Industrial Council System .• 
For the bigger, more mechanised industries, which was where Industrial Councils 
were usually established, this encouraged a process of "rationalisation" which 
involved less statutory regulation~3. it acted to maintain white worker support 
for the state, whilst pre-empting any state intervention which would impede 
capital accumulation. While the benefits of mechanisation would only show 
once it became a generalised tendency through the 1960's, the stage was set 
+1. See R Davies (Thesis) Parts I and II; D Budlender - Ch on I.C. Act. 
2. 
3. 
Unskilled white workers still made up 21.8%.of white workers in 1936 
• and it was often likely that the least privelaged fractions eg women, 
would unite with their fellow black workers. 
Following the recommendations of the Van Eck (1941 - 2) Reports and 
B.T.I. Report No 282. 
43. 
as we have shown through the state's differential treatment of different 
capital's needs. With regard to the racial allocation of labour and wage-
levels, capitalist planners stressed that the maintenance of white privileges 
depended on the "proper use of the product.ive facilities" rather than "repressive 
measures of legislation". They recommended that as far as possible the racial 
allocation of work roles, wages and~employment benefits"should be negotiated 
on an industry-level between employers, the relevant unions and the industrial 
council established for an industry: this would entail a IIcontinuous revie\'1 
of the classification of jobs and of manufacturing methods in the light of 
changing methods of production".1. Reduced government intervention in these 
terms also meant that the material benefits gained by some categories of Black 
workers moving into semi-skilled positions, would not be spread throughout 
secondary industry. Black workers were employed in more productive and strategic 
positions with the consequent benefits, but only at the rate that particular 
industries could accommodate this, whilst moving displaced White workers into 
supervisory-type positions. The model for this new management-strategy was the 
engineering industry, which became the largest secondary industry sector during 
the war (overtaking the food and drink industry), and had the greatest capital 
investment and employment potential after the mining industry. Its employers 
and white workers were well-organised/so that during the war they had, through 
the Industrial Councils, initiated a national agreement over the racial 
allocation of labour. 2. 
1. See Van Eck Commission pp 81 - 82; B.T.I. Report No 282 pp 45 - 46. 
2. Hemson, D "Engineering Industry in World War II (Unpublished mimeo): 
Department of Labour Reports and I.C. Agreement (1943) for Engineering. 
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3. Pensions and Provident Funds - A Note on Legislation passed 
During the 1950's there was considerable growth in the existing Pension 
schemes and in the variety which presented themselves, particularly in the 
field of occupational pensions. At various times in the past, the question 
of state supervision of their activities received attention, but on each 
occasion there was a struggle over the extent to which IIprivate,,1. pension 
funds should be controlled. 
In 1925 an extensive "Friendly Societies and Superannuation Funds Bill" was 
drafted but never published. In 1942 another draft Bill was prepared and a 
revised version introduced into Parliament in 1946. Parliament referred this 
Bill to a select committee for enquiry and report. It recommended that two 
separate Bills, one for Friendly Societies and another for pension funds, be 
prepared. As a result, the first draft Bill dealing exclusively with pension 
funds was published in the Government Gazette on 6th December 1946. When it 
was introduced early in 1947, Parliament once again referred to a Select 
Committee. This Committee brought forward an amended Bill in March, 1948, 
but before it could be enacted, Parliament had been prorogued. With the 
new Government taking office in 1948, the Bill was not proceeded with. 
Developments in the 1950's posed the question of control of pension funds, 
their conditions and benefits, their administration and their investment, 
all the more urgently. We have seen that the state was creating incentives 
for the growth of Finance Capital in South Africa, both through encouraging 
banking and insurance institutions and creating the infrastructure for Industrial 
Capital to raise its own Finance. 
1. "Private" is used very broadly to refer to funds which are not part 
of the social Pension Scheme, or established by a state Department 
for its employees. 
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Thus, a certain amount of regulation of the "financial soundness II of private 
pensions and the distribution of capital accumulated in these funds, was 
necessary. The state's attempts to expand the public sector meant that capital 
had-to be directed to that sphere. This had to be done, however, without 
impeding the growth of crucial (Afrikaner-dominated) financial institutions. 1• 
Also, the I.C. Act (No 24 of 1956) made'iH1lvision for the establishment 
of pe~sion and provident funds in terms of Industrial Council Agreements; 
-
thus there had to be co-ordination between these and privately administered 
and/or underwritten funds, especially if these overlapped in terms of member-
ship. A Bill which differed materially from the last (1948), was introduced 
into Parliament in May 1954, and after further deliberation, again in early 
1956, this Bill was passed as the Pe~sion Funds Act2.; 
-
lito provide for the registration, incorporation, regulation and 
dissolution of pension funds and for matters incidental thereto" 
The main differences between this and previous Bills were: (a) Provision 
for the incorporation of I.C. schemes, (b) less stringent control over the 
activities of insurance companies, operating in terms of the Insurance Act.3. 
The Act made provision for the appOintment of a Registrar of Pension Funds 
in the office of Financial Institutions. The following funds were expected 
to submit statistical information, register and comply with the provision in 
certain sections of the Act: 
(a) Foreign Funds, ie funds with the head office of the employer-party 
outside the country. Increasingly stringent controls'were enforced, to 
keep their assets inside the country. 
(b) State-controlled Funds, ie funds subject to control from any State 
Department, including the S.A Railways and Harbours Administration. 
1. Later, as we will see, assets were invested with local authorities and 
administration Boards. 
2. Act No 24 of 1956. 3. Act No 27 of 1943. 
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(c) Underwritten Funds ie funds administered by Insurance Companies 
and Life offices. These funds, however, operated in terms of the 
Insurance Act and were exempted from most of the Pension Funds Act's 
requirements. 
(d) Privately-administered funds, ie a fund which invests its own assets. 
The Registrar's office was primarily involved with the regulation of 
'these funds' activities, to ensure that they could meet their liabilities. 
(e) In terms of S.2 (1) of the Act, pension funds established under Industrial 
Agreements were exempted from its provisions. They had only to submit 
statistical information to facilitate the co-ordination of different 
funds. 
Industrial Council Old Age Funds 
Above, ~"e saw how the institutionalised "collective bargaining" system .-
through Industrial Councils - came to cover African workers. In the field 
of provision of "fringe benefits", this system enabled employers to extend 
pension and provident funds to include African workers when it benefited the 
lega I part ici pants most. It fac iIi tated a "di scretionary policy", where the 
scope and size of benefits were decided upon by the employers and (white) 
"employees". Once again, these need not be applied throughout secondary 
industry. It is significant that tllis is where the "private" provision of 
"old age social security" benefits for African workers were initiated; it 
remained the most important area until the early 1970's when employers moved 
increasingly towards self-administered or underwritten funds, ie capitalised 
funds, for most categories of workers. 
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African trade unions excluded in terms of the I.C. Act did not participate 
in the establishment of agreements over pension and provident funds, even 
though these were frequently made to cover certain categories of African 
workers. After TUCSA opened its doors to African parallel affiliates 
in 1962, informal discussions were sometimes held where representatives 
of unregistered unions participated,1. but this was usually not the caSE. 
Registered trade unions who spoke of IIcombined negotiation teamsll, had 
representatives for \-Jhite, IIcoloured li and Indian workers, \'/hile the majority, 
African workers. were referred to the Bantu Labour Officer and a member of the 
Centrdl Bantu Labour Board. They were also excluded from the subsequent 
committee decisions investigating the infringement of agreements, although 
they were covered to a greater extent than any other section of the workforce. 
It was possible for c management committee of a particular fund (made up of2 emp-
loyers and 2 workerrepresentativeS. appointed by the relevant Industrial Council) 
to exclude categories of workers. eg.clerical workers and unskilled workers 
in the case of the Baking and Confectionary Industry Provident Fund. from an 
agreement. 2. It seems that even where benefit schemes were extended to 
African workers. the bureaucratic nature of the Industrial Council machinery 
often prevented them from deriving any benefit from established funds. In 
the building industry, for example, Africans found it impossible. unlike 
white workers, to claim rainy-day pay from stampcard contributions. because of 
the bureaucracy involved. In.~be engineering and allied industry. about 
200 000 Africans in 1973 were ml6mbers gf 6 pension fund hilt not covered b.,y 
a.~l scheme. Two reasons have been given for this discrepancy: Firstly. 
pension and provident funds accumulate capital at a rate closely related to 
the number of members. which explains, in part. why white workers would want 
1. Interview with A Grobbelaar. Jan 25th, 1981 
2. I.C. Act. 1956 as amended in 1961 Baking and Confectionary Industry {Cape) 
Provident Fund Agreement 17th Feb 1961. 
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to include Africans; (2) Secondly, administrative discrimination: the 
services rendered by pensi~ provident funds required far less direct 
contact with members than a sick-pay fund or medical scheme. 1. 
Provident Funds 
Although pension and provident funds are discussed together, provident funds 
have always been viewed by workers more as a form of forced saving, rather than 
as provision for income on retirement, as they only cater for lump sum payments, 
rather than annuities (see below). Also, they allow for withdrawals upon leaving 
an industry as well as for the taking of loans. It has been calculated for the 
Provident Fund of the Clothing Industry (Tvl) covering 25 000 workers (1972 - 3), 
that only one-fifth of the members actually benefit from the scheme in terms of 
lump-sum payments at retirement. 2·There is in most schemes no provision for 
transferability of accumulated benefits when a worker leaves; and as the 
majority of the provident funds operate in low-wage labour-intensive sectors, 
including the clothing, textile and allied industry, leather industry, liquor 
and catering, baking and confectionary, sweet-making, non-artisan section of 
the motor industry, etc., it seems that this effectively deprives unskilled 
workers - who are most mobile - of a pension on retirement. 3. 
Workers who are eligible in terms of an agreement usually qualify after 1 year 
continuous service. Contributions are sometimes the same irrespective of 
earnings, but more often ranging according to the wage (eg Group I earning 
R30 a week or less, and Group II more than this amount), further, contributions 
are low and always in actual figures (eg 10c or 20c a week) rather than a 
1. L.C.G. Douwes Oekker "Improving Social Services" in Thomas, W (1974) 
2. Douwes Dekker ibid, p198. 
3. This does not mean that there should be enforced preservation, as we will 
argue below. 
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percentage of the wage. This absolute fixing leads to a deterioration of 
benefits over tirre (agreements alter the amounts once every three years at 
the most); unlike percentages these cannot adjust automatically with wage 
increases consequent on inflationary pressures and worker demands. Employers 
are reluctant to increase contributions, which are usually very low: about 
three percent of the minimum wage, divided equally between the worker and the 
employer. Benefits are paid out as lump sums. If a worker leaves before 
retirement, he gets his contribution plus interest (after a minimum of 5 
years service). At retirement, the worker receives the sum of double his 
contribution, subject to the conditions of long service (10 years) and a 
"well-behaved working life". 
According to available information, there were 32 provident funds by 1972/73 
with a contributing membership of 336 767 workers as against 25 pension funds 
with a membership of 446 131 in the same year. 1. In the same year, however, 
49 Industrial Councils out of 100 had no pension and provident f Of 
these funds, 41 were established after 1961, which corresponds with the time 
that TUCSA established closer links with the unregistered unions. 
1. Registrar of Pension Funds Annual Reports R.P96/73 (1971); R.P.74/1974; 
R.P. 105/1975 (1973) Douwes Dekker op cit. 
50. 
PENS ION FUNDS 
Industrial Council pension funds unlike provident funds, have been established 
largely in industries with a big 'semi-skilled and skilled' labour force, 
so-called artisan industries. The following figures give some idea of the 
growth-rate of these funds. What is evident is that there is not a tremendous 
growth in the number of funds, but rather of members, as a result of the 
inclusion of African workers. 
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Pension Funds make provision for the payment of pensions in the form of 
annuities and lump-sums on leaving before retirement, but without the employers 
contribution. 
Contributions are considerably higher than those paid into provident funds. 
Out of 25 schemes examined by Douws Dekker,1. contributions in 8 were less 
1. op.cit P 199. Douws Dekker gives the number of 25 schemes as the total 
number of pensjon schemes in that year (1972). 
than RI per week; in 13 they were between RI and R1.99; in 4 they were over 
R2 per week. In 5 cases, a percentage of the minimum wage was laid down: 5% 
in four cases, and 2~ in one case. In only eight schemes did employers and trade 
unions contribute equally - unequal contributions \'iere paid in 10 schemes; in 
2 only one party contributed; for the remaining schemes, no information was 
obtained. Thus, as we mentioned earlier, there were significant discrepancies 
between contributions made and benefits offered to workers within the Industrial 
Council system. Furthermore, while 31% of all workers (excluding agricultural 
workers) belonged to an Industrial Council pension in 1960 (this figure had 
only risen to 40% by 1970) and as we pOinted out above, 49 Industrial Councils 
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in 1972 had neither a pension fund nor a provident fund. Furthermore, these 
figures tell us little about the conditions of industries not covered by Industrial 
Councils at all. Workers who work in those industries that are covered are usually 
more organised, and thus, presumably, better off in terms of wages and working 
conditions. 
The following table gives the breakdown of membership of funds set up by 
Industrial Council agreements as at 1st June 1972. While the position here 
improved, these figures refer only to industries covered by Industrial Councils. 
Industries with wage determinations or orders, or sectors such as farming, 
which fall outside any of these, are not reflected at all. 
- Membership of funds No of workers covered by 
I.C. with a fund 
L.tes 188 185 188 488 
Loureds 152 135 164 434 
lians 51 472 52 901 
~1cans 391 106 474 677 
:e: This table includes both pension and provident funds. 
IOU('c..~.:. "])f.:Po..ytt\f.~t c\'- \(X'ooUY" r~ort .feY" 1911. 
No of workers covered by 
ALL I.C. 's 
. 218 686 
192 915 
61 486 
537 475 
MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL FUNDS AND WORKER PARTICIPATION 
We saw above that as a rule, African workers, and often Indian and 'coloured' 
workers, were excluded from negotiations in terms of Industrial Council 
agreements and any subsequent decision-making. As a result, controlling power 
is placed primarily in the hands of the employers and their organisaitons, and 
in the past in some form of consultation with registered unions who have not 
really challenged the nature of funds, or sought more control. 1. In fact, 
--
moskof th~ly Industrial Council schemes used t~admjnistered by the 
arti~s themselves until they were 'handed over' to a jOint management 
committee. 2. 
We saw above that industrial council pension funds are exempted from the 
Pensions Fund Act and thus from its investment requirements. This iSbecausel 
they are usually not as dependent on "capitalisation"as most privatefunds are~but 
, . 
are deposited in a savings account,or in Governemnt stock. Although this means 
that the Nature and size of benefits are inherently limited (ie not including 
death benefits, disability and widows pensions, not being inflation-adjusted, 
and without tax rebate), it would .seem that there is more scope for worker-
participation on all levels. However, this cannot be considered outside the 
bureaucratic nature of Industrial Councils themselves, their undemocratic 
structure and historic bias towards the owners of capital, rather than the 
workers, as well as their tendency to be used to divide workers. Clearly, 
the very structure of the industrial councils would have to change for workers 
to have any meaningful control over the funds which they administer, beyond 
merely improving the benefits. However, this is not a question which can 
be explored fully here. 
1. Douws Dekker op.cit p 199 
2. Interviews with A.Malherbe 25th Jan, 1981 and T Fraser (Jewellers and 
Goldsmiths, Breweries - Secretary) 4th Jan, 1981. (formerly with Clothing 
Industrial Council). 
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Section 1 V. 
THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS (PRIVATELY-ADMINISTERED AND 
UNDERWRITTEN FUNDS): INSURANCE FOR CAPITAL OR POST-RETIREMENT 
INSURANCE FOR THE AFRICAN WORKING CLASS? 
We have seen that until the 1950 1s, there was little or no I'post-retirement 
insurance" for African workers outside the old age pension scheme and the 
social security liabilities that the reserve economy was supposed to meet. In 
the industrial council system, most African workers received lump-sums. For 
most African workers, those who failed to maintain "continuitt' of employment, 
those dismissed and those changing employers - these were theoretical benefits 
at best. A significant portion of the African labour force (migrant and non-
migrant) was not able to rely on the receipt of gratuity (lump-sum) payments, 
let alone pensions. 
The most significant development in the 1960 l s and 1970 l s in the provision of 
"post-retirement insurance" has been the growth of a "private pension fund 
industry" catering for semi-skilled and unskilled, rather than only for pro-
fessionals and artisans and payment of benefits in annuities rather than in 
lump-sums. This development should be understood in terms of: 
(i) the changing size and financial structure of capitalist production 
in South African and the state's encouragement of monopoly capitalist 
relations during the 1960"\s I~ 
(ii) the changing labour process and new labour requirements as well as 
new forms of control and resistance; 
(iii) the growth of a fully proletarianised African working class; 
(iv) the erosion of the social security obligations of subsistence 
production in the "Homelands"; 
(v) the growth of unemployment; and 
(vi) employer responses to these structural trends. 
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THE CHANGING SIZE AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION 
IN THE 1960 l S AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
It has been shown elsewhere,1. and quite substantially, that the Apartheid 
state presided over the transition to monopoly capitalist relations during 
the 1960 l s and early 1970 1s; also that the repression of the political and 
economic organisations of the black dominated classes was a precondition for 
the implementation of strategies which would further divide and control the 
African dominated classes, in particular to allow for expanded capital 
accumulation. This was crucial, both to "discipline" the African working 
class, which was increasingly occupying strategic positions in production 
and to attract foreign capital, without which this transition could not 
take place. 
Already in the 1950 l s the state was aiding industrial capital to raise the 
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rate of surplus value, in the face of various "blocking" structures and relations, 
such as manufacturing and agriculture1s disadvantages on the world market; a 
marked duality within manufacutring; an undeve~oped capital goods sector; a 
low average organic composition of capital; and the problem of attracting 
sufficient foreign capital. Also, it had to contend with the resistance of 
white workers to deskilling and job-fragmentation, which was integral to the 
transformation of the labour process. This transformation was necessary in 
order to raise the rate of exploitation. The state aided capital through: 
(a) its strategy to depress black wages and lower the reproduction 
cost of the African working class; and 
(b) its "economic" policy, which included a discriminatory policy of 
taxation diverting surplus value from the mining industry, the 
protection of agricultural prices, tariff protection, tax concessions 
1. Kaplan (1977) Chapters 9 and 10, Bloch, G (1980). 
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on machinery and other capital goods used in industry, and 
attempts to attract foreign caPital. 1. 
It was only after the political crisis and the outflow of foreign capital at 
the end of the 1950's, that the state's policies actually came to fruition, 
aided by the massive inflow of foreign capital into manufacturing through 
"private" investment and loans. The state provided further economic preconditions 
for accumulation, encouraging definite expansion projects by bodies such as 
ISCOR, SASOL and ESCOM. 2. On the other hand, the state helped the larg~r 
capitals (eg Anglo-American) to establish a financial infrastructure, and 
encouraged the concentration and centralisation of credit. The state established 
financial intermediaries such as the Industrial Finance Corporation, and 
encouraged merchant banking as well as the stock exchange, jOint stock companies, 
etc. Up until the 1940's, capital markets for secondary industry were very 
undeveloped. Money was largely raised through friends, legal firms or raised 
overseas by foreign investors. Speculative investment in gold shares was no 
longer satisfactory and secondary industry found little organised financial 
support. The state moved into this vacuum in order to generate favourable 
conditions for accumulation in the manufacturing sector. Further, with the 
growth of massive parastatals, the state needed to divert investable capital 
towards the "public sector" to finance the expansion of the corporations. One 
of the important ital to the state, as we will see s the 
percentage compulsory investment of pension (and other insurance) funds in 
~ - ----
prescrib~d areas. Further, various state policies encouraged the concentration 
and centralisation fo productive and finance capital and a tendency towards 
monopoly raltions; this also gave the public sector an important role. It is 
worthwhile quoting Hirsch at length: 
1. Bloch p234 - (this discussion drew mainly from Bloch and Kaplan) 
2. Kaplan p335. 
II the redistribution of revenue, mediated by the state, directly 
supports capital accumulation in the 'growth industries', but 
at the same time is used to subsidise sectorally 'backward' areas 
- not least to retain their support. both lead to the consolidation 
of an extensive state or state-controlled finance and credit system 
and the foundation of large-scale 'capital depots' (ie insurance 
or investment funds).11 1. 
Thus, the development of 'private' and 'public' financial institutions are 
integrally bound together: a false separation is made in bourgeois analysis 
reflecting their attempts to limit state intervention. S de Brunhoff has 
argued that in the present phase of monopoly capitalism there is a real problem 
corresponding to this false separation: that of the state's declining capacity 
for economic intervention. We will return to discuss this in the final chapter. 
Underlying the concentration/centralisation of ownership and production units 
and the gro';/th of a "financial infrastructire" to aid capital accumulation, 
weresignificant changes in the capital-labour relation as embodied in the 
labour process. The transition to monopoly relations was predicated on 
intensified exploitation of labour, ie the maintenance of a low-wage structure, 
minimising black labour's reproductive costs as well as a higher rate of 
(relative) surplus value production through the reduction of necessary labour 
time. This involved large-scale mechanisation and deskilling and job-fragmen-
tation. 
The immediate post-war period saw the highest rise in fixed capital stock, of 
some 6,9% per annum between 1946 and 1954, as opposed to 4,5% per annum between 
1954 and 1962, and a slightly higher 5,8% per annum during 1963 and 1972~' 
1. J Hirsch, in Holloway and Picciotto (1978) p 87. 
2. G Bloch (1980) P 132. 
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Mechanisation required capital goods that could not be produced locally: 
imported capital equipment and machinery made up an increasing proportion 
of South Africa's import bill, continually straining the balance of payments 
(and dependence on foreign capital, technology and scientific-technoligical 
expertise). Thus we can see that as it could not wholly depend on the 
profitability in mining and agricultural foreign exchange sectors, and the 
state's ability to tax these sectors disproportionately, industrial capital had 
to concentrate on raising its own finance and merge more closely with financial 
institutions. 
REORGANISATION OF THE LABOUR PROCESS, CLASS STRUGGLE AND "SOCIAL INSURANCE" 
58. 
Real control over the labour process involves changes in the intenSity and skill 
of the labour force, in its composition and numbers, and in its social conditions 
of existence. It bred new forms of resistance, fragmented and split some workers 
and overcame divisions between others, saw changes in racial and sexual 
composition of those employed and unemployed, developed new hierarchies and 
mental/manual divisions, and generated continuously changing and developing 
forms of class struggle within the production process and outside of it. More 
specifically, chagnes in the labour process involved 2 simultaneous movements, 
both of which were real economic (and political) victories for capital: 
(a) the movement of whites into supervisory positions, which meant 
that capital was able to introduce black labour at 50% - 60% of 
the previous wage rate, excluding the numerous fringe benefits 
available to white labour, and savings on black facilities such 
as houSing. 1. 
(b) secondly, the jobs into which black workers were moving, were 
themselves further fragmented. This reorganisation gave capital 
1. Morris & Kaplan "A case study of ISCPR II SALB 1976 Vol 2 (7 & 8). 
a more direct control over the African working class and white 
workers in semi-skilled operative positions. 
In the face of this reorganisation and the possibility of retrenchment, white 
wage earners demanded increased pension benefits, 1. which would act as insut'ance 
against old age and unemployemnt. The state supported the provision of "fringe 
benefits" for white workers which was the political logic behind their 1966 
proposals for preservation of pension rights and their transferability when a 
worker changed from one compnay or industry to another. Workers were consulted 
during investigations and the proposals were dropped when they insisted on 
having the right to withdraw their contributions on resignation or retrenchment, 
amongst objections from other quarters. However, the growth in the pension 
fund industry during the 1960's stemmed primarity from the inclusion of the 
growing category om supervisors and semi-skilled wage-earners.2. 
One can justifiably ask why black workers, or more specifically African workers, 
were included in private pension schemes from the early 1960's when the strategy 
adopted by capital and the state was that workers whose labour-power was 
"redundant" should be returned to the homelands; alternatively, it was argued 
that the IIneeds" of, African workers were lower than those of white workers and 
that the I.C. system would suffice. 
In the mid-1950's, the:Tomlinson Commission showed that reserve production was 
in fact insufficient to fulfil its social security obligations. In spite of 
the tightening of influx control in thq mid-1950's and the institution of efflux 
control, large-scale movement into urban areas proceded; dependency on wage-
labour increased and where people did not have urban residential rights or 
1. Interview with A Malherbe. 
2. See tables of Privately-administered and Underwritten funds. 
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productive ties in the IIhomelands ll , there was clearly no II soc ial securityll 
cutside the options capital offered.'· 
The simplification of tasks, and the low training period required, coupled 
with the existence of a large reserve army of labour of the order of '9% 
throughout the 1960's,2. enabled large-scale dismissals and retrenchment to 
be used as a response to militant and organised labour. 3. This, coupled with 
the continuous application of machinery, held back any reduction in the reserve 
army, so that unemployment remained steady during the sixties. There was a 
growing number of people without any income, and dependent on those who had 
whether from the state's meagre provisions or from wage-labour. After the 
struggles of the late 1950's, capital was well aware that "unsettled labour ll 
and the inadequacy of the government's II race policies" gave rise to that crisis 
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and was eager to prevent this occurring again, particularly during the "sensitive ll 
period of transition. 
This was clearest in the new "personell managerial ll approach to certain 
categories of African workers. A growing section of the African working-class 
was in permanent employment, in semi-skilled, clerical or administrative 
Positions~· Also, between 1946 and 1970, the number of Africans classified 
as urban-dwellers grew from 1 863 277 to 4 989 371,5. a growth of some 27% 
in the number of Africans classified as urban. 
Sections of manufacturing capital situated in the major industrial areas were 
eager to win the loyalty of this section of the working class, and pre-empt 
1. cf D G Clarke 
in Zimbabwe" 
"Social Security and Aged Subsistence Roots of the predicament 
SALB Vol 3 No 6 (1977). 
2. Hirsh A. Wits thesis (1978) p 9. 
3. Simkins (1978) p 34. 
4. Spandau A (undated) "A Study in the Dual Labour Market of a S.A. Plant". 
5. Hindson (1974) thesis IIEconomic Dualism and Labour Allocation" Table 4.4. 
their militant organisation and identification with the majority migrant-
workers. Further, the strategic position of the more settled, semi-skilled 
workers and the attempt to move away from blatant racial discrimination, forced 
some employers to concede that these workers needed some form of 'security' after 
retirement, particularly since the state was arguing that it was their responsi-
ibility. We will see that in this context the IIcapitalist planners ll (eg Fe!) 
and IIpersonell managers ll have attempted to turn this IIconcessionll into an 
insurance for capital. We will also examine how the majority migrant workers 
have been effectively excluded from these provisions. 
In the following sections I want to examine the nature of these funds, the scope 
of their activities during the 1960's and 1970's, the benefits that are offered. 
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I will first look at the legal and administrative framework created by the relevant 
state departments (Financial Institutions, Internal Revenue and Social Welfare and 
Pensions), to facilitate the supervision of funds and particularly their investment. 
This should be seen in the context of the state's involvement in the creation of 
IIprivate and public" finance, and its attempts to regulate to some degree the 
distribution of surplus value through financial institutions, and divert them 
to the "more backward ll sectors. Also this intervention should be seen in the 
light of the state's role as IIguarantorll of bourgeois poli tical domination which 
could be threatened if, amongst other things, capital could not cover its 
liabilities. This dominatlon is also increasingly secured through the state's 
IIsecrecyll and monopoli sati on of knowledge about how these funds operate, where 
investments go and how secure they are, the tendency towards monopoly relations 
in Finance and Banking Capital, etc. 
Following this, I will turn to look at the actual formulatlon and implementation 
of funds for African workers or where they were incorporated into existing funds. 
I will look more specifically at the implementation of pension funds to divide 
the working class and show how this division is in part a political strategy 
related to broader political strategies, and in part, inherent in capitalist 
strategies, where 'social insurance ' is geared primarily to meet the conditions 
of capital accumulation. 
STATE SUPERVISION OF PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS 
PRIVATELY-ADMINISTERED (NON-INSURED) FUNDS 
As is the case with Industrial Council funds (discussed above) privately-
administered schemes are funded, ie they operate on teh basis of accumulation 
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of funds through long-term investment. The trustees of a private scheme, with 
actuarial aid, invest its assets directly in the stock exchange, fixed property 
and other securities. Some of these may be invested in an insurance company but 
it does not involve a policy which would hand over the administration of a fund 
to such a company (discussed below). Privately-administered schemes are adminis-
tered by company officials and a Board of Trustees. 
The difference between these and the Industrial Council Pension funds is that 
the employers/company officials have more control, not being legally obliged to 
negotiate with a union or deal with IC bureaucracy. It also appears that company 
officials have more freedom with selecting investment areas; although I do not 
have substantial evidence of this, there was a strong tendency for the management 
---- ---------------~ 
c~ees ~unds to invest in Qove~ stock, Post Office Savings 
Accounts build· ocieties and banks. 1. More recently, however, funds such 
as the M~al Industries Group Pension Fund (SEIFSA - administered), have~n 
employer-party strong enough to dictate investment. 
------------
Privately-administered funds, on the other hand, are subject to control by the 
of Pension Fund's Office,2. to ensure that such funds meet their 
liabilities and comply with the state's investment requirements. Once again, 
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however, a fund with a Board of Trustees and a registered actuary - a so-called 
deposit administered scheme - is exempt from certain requirements. Still, this 
control entails: (a) registration; (b) access to books of accounts and records 
of all moneys and assets; (c) that the Registrar can scrutinise actuarial 
valuations and the provisions in the rules dealing with the calculation and 
disposal of profits and losses; (d) that investment powers are checked and 
---
financial methods watched; (e) that such a fund can be sued or can sue; 
(f) that the Registrar has the power to suspend a fund. 
It is important to note (as we will illustrate below) that this control attempts 
to "balance out" various interests - individually the state's own, ie the state's 
attempts to relieve its own burden of social welfare provisions and its own 
requirements for investable capital. Thus, when it intervenes to implement or 
change its requirements, it is for a complexity o~ reasons. 
Thus, the most important area of control is over investment, ie laying down 
conditions and principles and checking actual investment of assets to see 
whether these are met. The Registrars Office stresses the importance of security 
in investment and, with a view to switching, liquidity.3. To this end, the 
1. Reports of the Registrar of Pension Funds 1965 RP19/1967; RP46/1970; 
1972 (RP74/1974). 
2. In terms of the Pension Funds Act No 24 of 1956. 
3. 1st Annual Report of Registrar of Pension Funds (1959). This remains a basic 
principle up til today. 
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state intervened in the following ways: 
1-
2. 
(a) Fixed property: To ensure liquidity, the Registrars Office 
discouraged large-scale investment in fixed property; the 
basic principle being that trustees should not invest and control 
at once. After representations, a concession was made to the 
most competitive funds: those of lIappreciable size ll couid invest 
in fixed property, but not more than 10% of their total assets. 
This figure was increased in 1972 to 25%, reflecting the decline 
in the share market due to recession. In the period 1961 - 1973, 
investments in interest-bearing assets dropped from 85,9% to 75,1% 
of total assets, while investments in fixed property and ordinary 
shares increased form 8,6 to 19,4%.1. 
(b) Companies of participating employers. 2• Similarly, the Act prohibited 
investment in the company of a participating employer or his 
subsidiary. This would mean in principle, IIthat the fund would 
depend to much upon the success of the said business ll • 3. It 
does not seem as if the state has been very strict in implementing 
this, although it is naturally very difficult to tell. In fact, 
after representations between 1956 and 1960, the state made provision 
f t · t· 4. or gran Ing exemp Ion. By 1961, the Minister of Finance5. had 
exempted 159 privately-administered funds, and permitted them to 
invest up to 5% of the assets with employer-companies or subsidiaries. 
During the 1960's approximately 100 - 130 funds were exempted 
annually. This practice, according to the state, became more common 
Pension Funds Act (1956) S.19(4) 
ibid S.19(4). 
Registrars Annual Report. 
3. 1959 Annual Report p.10 para 95. 
4. P.F. Act S.19 (6). 
5. Then, the Minister of Financial Institutions. 
and was abused; in i976 and 1977, the Act was amended once 
again to prohibit this form of investment. 1. In terms of a 
further amendment,2. companies can still apply for exemption; 
According to interviews done with management of SAPPI and the 
administrators of the Metal Industries Pension Fund (SEIFSA), this 
. . bl 3. IS POSSl e. 
(c) Loans: There are a set of requirements stipulated in the Act,4. 
and its amendments, which a fund must meet in granting loans to 
members (here private funds differ from IC funds, which cannot 
make loans). Important here, is the practice of granting loans 
or deposits on houses to members. In 1979, loans to meet deposits 
were permitted to members with leasehold rights, in terms of S.6 (A) 
of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 1945, ie 
mainly Africans with S.10(1)(a) rights. 5. 
(d) Prescribed investment: The most crucial intervention that the 
state makes is the stipulation of investment of a certain percentage 
of assets in prescribed areas. This affects privately administereQ 
as well as underwritten6. (and "foreign") funds. This has changed 
over the years and caused contradictions between the state on the 
one hand, and insurers and company trustees on the other hand, 
particularly in periods of favourable investment conditions, as is 
the case in 1980/1981. 
In 1959, privately-administered funds were required to invest 40% 
of all assets in prescribed areas; in 1966 the Pension Funds Act 
was amended,7. requiring that 10% of total assets (as a part of the 
1. Annual Reports of Registrar for: 1975 RP106/1977. Financial Institutions 
Amendment Act S.No 101 of 1976 & No 94 of 1977. 
2. Financial Institutions Amendment Act No 103/1979. 
3. Van den Heever (SEIFSA) & Flynn (SAPPI) March 10th 1981. 
4. S.19(5). 5. Financial Institutions Amendment Act No 103, 
1979, amending S.19 (5) of P.F. Act. 
6. See below, for the differences. 
7. Finance Act No 58 of 1966 S.9. 
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40%) were to be invested in pure government bills, bonds and 
° to 1. secun 1 es. Funds were given 5 years to meet this requirement. 
The other 30% was still to be invested in other prescribed areas. 
The percentages have changed in subsequent years as the following 
table shows: 2. 
I Ye.qr Jotol r-e.so·ibe.d 
lrwe. s tJ-'le.l'\ t 
(io .... emment bilf~, 
bC't'\d~ t :5fc.u.\""\+i~. 
IQS9 40~1o 
t q b(:, 406/0 I 0% (~ ~'("t ~~ 46%) 
,Q1J.3. 50-10 J...C:>"/o 
'911 (3.C> Sep~)It. S~o/. .:t '2. % 
tq17 (31 De~c.o 'l' 5 Ll- $10 21 'It/I. 
l~lg (~l Mo..\'"<:.h') 557- 22'/2 % 
"18 (~JuV\e.Y·' S~·!. 2.0 'h...;. 
Areas of prescribed investment include: 
1. S.A.Reserve Bank stock. 
2. Bills, bonds and securities issued or loans guaranteed by: 
(a) the S.A. government or provincial administration. 
(b) Administration Boards (since Black Affairs Administration Act 
No 45 of 1971). 
(c) Local authorities authorized to levy rates on immovable stock. 
(d) the government or local authority in territories outside the 
1. Excluding fun,ds established by Local Authorities already holding 95% 
of its assets in government stock. 
2. Figures compiled from Acts and Annual Reports of Registrars Office. 
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republic, eg Bophuthatswana. 
3. To other institutions which the Registrar has approved - These include: 
By 1959: SABC 
South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISKOR) ~ 
Water Supply Corporations 
By 1969: Industrial Development Corporation 
Permanent Building Societies (as far as their loan stock which 
have been approved in the Building Societies Act are concerned) 
By 1977: GASKOR 
Richards Bay Coal Terminal Company 
5 million Corporation for Economic Development (limited local 
registered stock, 1985) 
Indian Industrial Development Corporation. 
INSURED/UNDERWRITTEN PENSION FUNDS: THE STATE AND THE LONG-TERM INSURANCE 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
Pension funds "which operate exlcusively by means of policies of insurance 
issued by a person lawfully carrying on insurance business within the meaning 
of the Insurance Act of 1943"1. are exempt from the provisions of the Pension 
Funds Act, and are consequently not subject to the same degree of state-control 
as privately administered schemes. In terms of the Insurance Act, insurance 
institutions are also required to "maintain assets to cover their liabilities 
towards members of such funds", but as pension fund investment are invested 
along with their other policies, and as lito obtain maximum overall returns, 
in order to offer better terms, insurers must be free to choose those 
investments which offer the highest real returns, taking into account the 
1. P.F. Act (1956) S.2 (3)(a) ii. 
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risks involved "!· According to the Insurance Act,2. a long-term insurer· 
must invest in prescribed assets to the extent of 50% of its liabilities 
relating to pension and retirement annuity funds and 30% of the remainder 
of its long-term insurance liabilities. The reaminder of the insurer's funds 
may be invested without restriction, provided that its assets in South Africa 
cover its insurance liabilities here. 
We can see that there is a difference between these requirements and those 
placed on privately-administered funds, of which 50% of total assets (rather 
than 50% of the liabilities, and the two are seldom the same) have to be in 
prescribed investment areas. Also, there are no doubt endless ways of getting 
around this with the number of different policies and funds involved. However, 
the state does lay down certain limits, in order to: 
(a) protect policy holders, 
(b) ensure liquidity,3. and 
(c) as the Franzsen Cornmission4. recommended, draw finance into the 
country's infrastructural development. 
Despite both the state's and financial institutions' commitment to providing 
the conditions for the more rapid accumulation of capital,5. there are 
definite contradictions between financial and productive capital and between 
financial institutions and the state, over the distribution of surplus value, 
and these are particularly noticeable in crisis-periods. We noted above that 
1. Commission of Enquiry into the long-term Insurance Industry R.P.97/1976 p.30. 
2. Schedule 3 part I. 3. Commision of Inquiry 1976 op cit P 34. 
4. Franzsen Commission 3rd REport RP 87/1970. Chapters 3,7 and 8. 
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5. It is not possible to discuss the links between money and production here, 
nor to explore in any detail the relation between financial and manufacturing 
capital. 
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the state actively promoted the growth of financial institutions in the 
19401S, 1950 l s and 1960's, in part as capital had been scarce. It established, 
for example,institutions such as I.D.C (1940), and the National Finance Corporation 
(NFC) (1949), which was underwritten by the state and initiated through the 
Reserve Bank. The NFC in turn spurred private institutions directly involved 
in the money-market.1. The 1950's and 1960's saw the diversification of financial 
institutions and the concentration and centralisation of a few leading elements.2. 
In the case of the long-term insurance industry, the two largest insureres held 
47% of total long-term insurance assets in 1969, and the six largest insurers 
controlled 70% of the total of R2 301m. 3. 
vIe will discuss the effects of the high degree of centralisation on pension 
funds at a later stage. For the moment we can simply note that the insurance 
industry, which has been "an important source of risk capital" and has assets 
tied up in investment, is thoroughly resentful of the compulsory investment in 
prescri bed assets in order to "subsi d i se the infra-structure "; it argues that 
this does not increase the protection of policy holders, particularly in 
inflationary times when insurers should be obtaining a rate of return greater 
than the rate of inflation. Investment in prescribed assets, they claim, 
produces lower rates of return which discourages insurers from increasing 
benefits. According to them, this amounts to pensioners subsidising other 
sectors of the population (via the state's infrastructure). It is clear that 
this struggle is over the distribution of surplus value, in the form of pension-
contributions, and where the cost of the extension of "welfare"-benefits should 
fall, rather than over the pensioners well-being. We will return to discuss 
this below. 
1. Norval (1962) p 104 It encouraged both Anglo-American's ventures such as 
Union Accepta,nce Ltd (UAL) of 1955, and Afrikaner-dominated SANLAM, which 
controlled via preference shares institutions such as Federale Volksbeleggings 
and BONUSKOR~ 
2. Franszen. para 695 - 709. 
3. ibid. para. 734. cf. G.Bloch. (thesiS). pp.118 - 30. 
CAPTTALTST PLANNERS AND PENS IONS FOR AFRICAN h'ORKE?.S.1 
Employers in manufacturing industries were well aware of worker needs for 
post-retirement security and the extent to which provisions in industry 
could have a beneficial outcome for capital. They ~/ere experiencing the 
effects of the incorporation of white workers, particularly those in the 
less-skilled categories, into pension schemes which previously catered only 
70. 
for skilled workers. The benefits which privately administered funds could offerl 
were grellter than those' of funds controlled by unions, Friendly Societies, . 
Industrial Council funds and the State pension scheme. By the early 1960's,~ 
pensions had almost become a prerequisite to the employment of white workers. 
Employers were very reluctant to include African workers in schemes; it seems 
that until the mid-1970's, insurance companies also did very little to devise 
policies which would enable the majority African migrant workers to participate, 
Le.which \oJould not exclude workers wllo were structurally unable to meet the 
n t' . \1 • t 2. con Inuous-serVlce requlremen . 
In 1961, about 30 privately-administered pension funds were registered which 
provided eXClu~or black workers, and some employers included black 
workers in previously all-white schemes. 3. The majority of the workers 
included \oJere "coloured" and Indian, and in fact very few African workers were 
included. Presumably these were skilled and administrative workers, as well 
I 
as professionals,4. although I have not been able to find substantial information. 
The registrar of pension funds wrote in 1961: 
II It is evident that more employers are endeavoring to remove 
the feeling of insecurity which exists among non-european staff 
1. P. A .L. Cuthbert. African Life Assurance (1967). Lecture titled "This age 
of pen s ion s II • 
2. This will be discussed below. 
3. 2nd Annual Report of the Registrar of Pension Funds 1960 (UG 12/61). 
4. Interview with A. Malherbe: 25th January, 1981. 
in regard to thei r future once they reti re due to old age" 1. 
He argued that the inclusion of black workers, Africans in particular, was 
problematic - due to the difficulty in proving age, marital status and 
denendency of claimants; he added that the Bantu Affairs Commissioners could 
help in this area. He acknowledged that their non-inclusion had little to 
do with African workers' "traditional ties", which was still the dominant 
justification given by capital and the state. 
DUT'ing 1962~' 7 privately-administered and 15 underwritten funds catering 
just for black workers, were registered; in 1965~' these figures were 7 and 
41 respectively; in 1966?' 6 and 31 respectively. These figures reflect the 
tendency of underwriters to be more keen to "develop the non-european market" 
than the industrialists. 
In the early 1960's, two newly formed bodies which worked closely with both 
the relevant state departments, and-with the largest insurance companies and 
Trustees of pension funds, started a compaign to get funds extended to black 
workers; these were the Association of Pension and Provident Funds and the 
Bantu wages and Productivity Association. The latter argued that: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
II Most able-bodied males are forced to leave the tribal areas 
to find the means whereby they and their women-folk can 
exist as the land itself cannot provide them with their 
needs. In addition, an increasing proportion of the labour 
force of many concerns is made up of Bantu who are permanently 
resident in urban areas. Their needs are not greatly different 
Registrar's 3rd Annual Report, 1961. RP 16/1963, p1 
Registrar's 4th Annual Report. 1962. p1. 
Registrar's 7th Annual Report, 1965. RP 19/1967, p1. 
Registrar's 8th Annual Report, 1966. RP 19/1968, p1. 
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from those of their White neighbours. Because of this, it 
is necessary for the Bantu to find security in the same ways 
as Europeans have done. 1I1 • 
They also rejected the idea that African workers should be in separate schemes 
IImore adapted to their way of life ll , and argued for their inclusion on the same 
basis as white workers. 
The Association of Pension and Provident Funds compiled a report on the request 
of the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions, and the Registrar. 2. Here 
they set out the reasons why management should extend IIfringe-benefitll and 
pension funds to black workers. They argued that it was important to raise 
the productivity of workers and win their loyalty, and that management could 
not expect these from any worker II regardless of his race, if that employee is 
suffering from anxiety and insecurityll.3. A pension would reduce this, 
especially as 
II wages are low and are consumed in providing the necessities 
of life, leaving nothing to save for old age l.4. 
The reasons given to motivate capitalists were the same as any personell 
management approach; such a scheme would benefit capital by: 
(a) attracting suitable labour; 
(b) improving lIemployer/employee relationships and result in a more 
stable, happy and loyal labour force~5. In fact, it was felt 
that the effects would be felt beyond the work place and assist 
in creating lIa moderate and contented group of citizens~ reflecting 
1. Unpubl i shed, undated Document (early 1960 IS). II Reti rement Plans for 
Bantu Employees". 
2. Report on Pension Funds for Non-european Employees (15th June 1962). 
3. ibid. pl. 
4. ibid. p2. 
5. ibid. p2. 
the sensitivity of "capitalist planners" to the radicalising 
influence of the previous decade's struggles; and 
(c) It would also reduce the costs and wastage resulting from a 
high labour turnover. 
The Report argued that labour productivity would be improved and challenged 
the fear that a fund would prevent capitalists from removing "dead wood ll : the 
rules of a fund "should be complementary to the conditions of employment and 
should preserve the employers rights~1. What this meant in effect was that, 
if an employer chose to establish a fund, a worker who met the eligibility 
criteria would be forced to join as part of the conditions of service, if, 
on the other hand, the worker was dismissed for any reason (often including 
retrenchment) he/she would not benefit from the accumulation of his and the 
employers contributions. 
This is a similar approach to that of "personell management II in most capitalist 
countries. We saw above that the growth of private pension funds in advanced 
capitalist countries also COincided with the changing size and financial 
structure of capitalist production. There too, the extablishment of funds 
was the capitalist decision, in as far as the state did not enforce it. Even 
today, not all workers in those countries are covered by private funds, 
necessitating significant additional state involvement to perform the same 
functions for capital, eg.social insurance which ultimately lowers the 
reproductive costs of the working class (as it is based primarily on their 
contributions) and expanding its productive powers. The crucial differences 
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are, as we illustrated above, that the Apartheid state establi~hed an alternative 
system of lowering reproductive costs and of ensuring that the disenfranchised, 
1. ibid. p3 emphasis added. 
thoroughly controlled African working force would not make demands for 
social security benefits - not of the state or capital; thus, there was no 
automatic movement from the expansion of capital and the state1s financial 
structures to the extension of "benefits" to the African working class during 
the 1950 l s and 1960 1s. While some of the bigger capitals, particularly 
subsidiaries of foreign companies, who were introducing ne\,1 techniques and 
revolutionising the labour process and moving black workers into semi-skilled 
positions, saw the need for a settled urban proletariat with increased security, 
I. 
most employers were satisfied with the Apartheid state1s alternative. This 
can be. seen clearly in the enquiries into and discussions about pension funds 
for black workers, African workers in particular, as well as in their actual 
implementation. 
We must remember that, although social security (whether provided via the 
state or capital) contributes to social and political "stability" by dividing 
off and conservatizing retired2. workers, the primary purpose for capital is 
to create a sense of economic security within the ranks of employed workers 
(and particularly workers in the monopoly sector) and thereby raise morale 
and "loyalty" and reinforce discipline which extends beyond the workplace. 
Thus, when planning social insurance, or pension funds inside industry, this 
should be seen as insurance primarily for capitalists and the state in their 
attempts to secure and expand capital accumulation. As we will see, this is 
usually presented in ways which obscure the underlying processes, the appro-
priation of surplus value and the struggles between fractions and the state 
over its distribution. 
When an employer sets up a scheme with the help of an insurer or an actuary, 
1. Fer Annual Reports 1958:22; 1959:15. 
2. the same applies to unemployed workers. 
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this has to fit in with the company's "organisational planning", the training 
of replacements and possibly placing workers nearing retirement in "less 
demanding jobs" or restructut'ing jobs, lisa that these individuals can perform 
them without impairing their health or the efficiency of the organisation ". 1• 
The choices involved for the employer' and/or insurer in the establ ishment of 
funds involve: 
(a) whether it should be a pension or provident fund; 
(b) whether it should be contributory or non-contributory; 
(c) which groups/classesicategories should be included - in South Africa 
employers have had to choose v/hether to include black and \'Ihite 
workers in the same scheme; 
(d) whether a fund should be self-administered or underwritten; 
(e) the method of financing, ie funded or pay-as-you-go; 
(f) which type of plan to adopt - there are 4 basic types: flat-rate, 
fixed-benifit, earnings-related and money-purchase;2. and 
(g) Related to (d),(e) and (f), employers and insurers determine the 
cost and nature of a fund according to the age of workers in a 
company, the number of years they are expected to live after 
retirement, (taking into account the type o:fi production they are 
involved in, the general conditions of health and safety, etcJ and 
the benefits they are expected to receive if this is determined 
according to their final average salary (over the last 5 years). 
As a result of these considerations a policy stipulates criteria 
which must be met in order to benefit from a fund, such as age, 
sex, continuous service and length of service. 
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1. Chruden-Sherman "Personnel Management" SW Publishing Co (USA) 1963 p599-600. 
2. discussed below. 
While these methods al'e more or less universally applied, it is crucial fur 
us to note that, inserted in different conditions of capitalist development 
these were implemented in a distorted way which, as we will explore below, 
has caused the system to come up against its own internal contradictions, 
these relate basically to the fact that: 
(i) funds were initially racially-exclusive and that black workers 
joined them at a disadvantage; and 
(ii) that most African workers were structurally prohibited from 
meeting the continuous service requirements or the "benefits" 
of length of service. 
Seen from a different angle, capital was reluctant to introduce funds which 
would not raise worker~ productive capacities, but simply involve administrative 
costs and complications. From the workers' point of view, I would go as far 
as to say that attempts to create "industrial citizens,,1. have not been as 
successful as in the bourgeois-democratic states, and in fact are inherently 
limited. Repressive action by the employers and the state to reproduce the 
wage-relation and general conditions of capital accumulation have too long 
been closely associated: the attempts to create the "relative autonomy 
of the internal state2. are limited by the historically developed forms of 
struggle and political domination. 3. 
The "capitalist planners" of the 1960's tried to encourage employers to go 
beyond their narrow fractional interests, to implement strategies which would: 
(a) encourage individual responsibility and relieve the state of the 
1. This notion is used by M Buraway (1979) to ~laifi ~ew e~ent to capitalist 
domination is secureG iA prsduction. cf eh 7. 
2. ibid. 
3. This relates to what De Brunhoff cited as one of the preconditions for the 
development fo "economic policy": for the working class to become an 
'economic subject' with a particular conception of the wage and the state, 
it had to break through as a political subject with particular "rights". 
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burden of social security,1. whilst at the same time move away 
from blatant discriminatory practices embodied in the Apartheid 
state; and 
(b) be benificial to the individual employer, but also to capital-in-
general in as far as such funds would raise productivity and amount 
to a savingof investable capital. Insurance companies and banks 
in particular argued that they IIwould provide the machinery and 
arrange more efficient and successful investment and accumUlation 
II 2. 
of funds. 
FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PENSION FUNDS 
We should turn now to look more closely at the formulation of funds 
according to the criteria (a - e) outlined above3~ and at concrete examples 
of their implementation during the 1960's and 1970's. 
Urging employers to choose the most widely effective strategy, insurance 
companies and the relevant state departments argued that a pension fund was 
preferable to a provident fund: it would provide a monthly pension instead 
of a lump-sum, as well as early retirement-, death- and widows benefits. A 
lump sum tended to be squandered "by non-europeans who lack experience in the 
administration of substantial sums of monetA. and increased the state's 
burden. Pensions, which were calculated according to final earnings and 
length of service, provided more incentive to workers. 
1. Association o~ Pensions and Provident Funds, op cit p.3. 
2. cf eg SANLAM Annual Reports, 1960 - 1980; Interview with Mr Toyer, AFC; 
February 3rd, 1981. 
3. These criteria are interrelated in a complex way and cannot discussed 
separately. 
4. Association of Pensions and Provident Funds, op cit p.3. 
I I • 
However, until recently, employers and some insurers have preferred a lump-
sum arrangement, as they have not been prepared to take on the administrative 
problems involved with sending small monthly payments to pensioners in the 
IIhomelandsll/llindependent states ll . Also they argue that the increased incentive 
did not always alter the level om labour turnover. As a result, many employers 
have remained within the Industrial Council scheme with the majority African 
workers, migrant workers in particular. One such example is the Brick and 
Clay Company. They have a scheme for 300 white workers and monthly paid 
IIcoloureds ll and Indians. They have recently included all African workers in 
the scheme, other than 700 migrant workers. They have no intention of making 
provision for migrant workers outside of the Industrial Council scheme; the 
main reason given is that few workers return to the company. I. 
'Employers were urged to set up funds to include black and white workers under 
similar conditions and with similar benefits, if not in the same scheme. They 
would not, however, be legally compelled to do so. Planners argued that 
combined funds would reduce administration costs and that larger funds were 
'1.. generally more stable than small funds. 
They also pOinted out that separate funds and/of different rules would 
possibly lead to black worker resistance. This was quite a naive statement. 
Black workers have been so successfully controlled and divided from the white 
working class that, particularly at that stage, they were not in the position 
to compare their position to that of white workers. Until the 1970's, most 
private schemes operated exclusively for IIWhites ll or for lIall races except 
/ ( Af ') 3. , Blacks" meaning flcans. ;' 
1. Survey by N Nel S.A. Financial Evaluation Services and interview 12.2.81. 
2. Association of Pension and Provident Funds p.4. 
3. SAN LAM "Pension Benefits in South Africa" (1981) 
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Black workers in skilled and semi-skilled categories and, more important, 
able to meet the continuous service requirement (ie.with urban residential 
rights)'· were gradually drawn into the same schemes as white workers, either 
from a separate scheme or from indystrial council schemes. According to 
SANLAM's analysis of 100 "of the largest pension funds in the country"~· the 
ratio of funds that provide for "all races" to "whites only" and to those that 
provide for "all races except blacks" is given as 76% : 20% ; 4%. In a 
breakdown of the various types of industry, the following ratios are given 
as: 
Conglomerates: 80%: 10% : 10% 
Construction: 100% "all races" 
Co-operatives: 50%; 40% ; 10% 
Corporations: 70% "all races" 30% "whites only" 
Financial Institutions: 81% "all races" : 19% "whites onlt' 
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Government Departments and Local Authorities: 56% "all races" 44% "whites only" 
Utility and Manufacturing Companies: 81%: 15% : 4%. 
The-£onclusion is ~ comp~ies have moved away from discrimination during the 
1970's. As I will show in more detail be~~ls Incorrect In a nu~r of 
ways. Firstly, it has been easy for companies to maintain discriminatory 
practices without this being presented in blatant "racial" terms, by for 
example discriminating between workers above a certain wage/salary and those 
below, where the divide is usually between a majority white (and sometimes 
"coloured" and Indian) workers on the one hand, and African workers on the 
other. Until very recently, with the growth of trade union organisation 
amongst African workers, employers were able to get away with this. Today, 
1. Discussed in more detail below.More recently employers have simply deducted 
the period that workers take leave.l 
2. The results of this survey are most probably "fixed"; SANLAM gives no 
names, and only give percentages rather than actual figures of the number 
of workers involved. 
however, this is not so easy, and the example o~ the AFC Group Pension 
Fund for Premier Paper Company1. where the Paper and Allied Trade Union 
has intervened, is instructive. 2. Here the question om IIdemocracyll has also 
been crucial, as skilled workers are consulted but not African (majority 
unskilled and semi-skilled) workers. 
Before the AFC fund came into being, all permanent African workers who had 
completed 12 months' continuous service were bound to join the Premier Paper 
Bantu Pension Scheme,3. established in 1973.4. Workers were never consulted, 
rules were never explained, but they were warned that IItlley'd be shown the 
gate" if ever they decided to withdraw or oppose the fund's provisions. As 
a result, \vorkers had to accept pension-deductions without questioning. 
During January 1980, the scheme was cancelled, and without being consulted 
workers were told that they now belonged to the new AFC Group Pension Fund,5. 
which caters for lIall Premier Paper workers ll . However, II sa l ar ied staffll need 
only 6 months continuous service to qualify, whereas IIhourly paid staff" need 
12 months. All workers contribute 6% of the basic wage, while the employer 
contributes 11,5% om the pensionable salary for all except African workers; 
the employer contributes 14,7% 0$ the wage of African workers, presumably to 
make up the shortfall resulting from the smaller contributions in the "Bantu 
Pension Schemell~' African workers' contributions, which have doubled are 
1. A Barlows subsidiary. 
2. Interviews with workers; Paper & Allied, and managers of the AFC fund. 
3. Underwirtten by African Eagle, 75% controlled by Anglo-American Insurance 
holdings. 
4. Before 1973, all African workers received IIdischarge pay" with no 
pension provisions. 
5. Underwirtten by AFC Benefit Consultants. 
6. However, this is inclear, as workers have not been informed as to where 
their contributions into the old scheme are being held. It is possible that 
these will gradually be transferred and that the increased employers' 
contribution (7,7% to 14,7%) is supposed to pay for better benefits secured 
over the years that workers belonged to the old scheme. 
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justified in terms of the increased employers' contribution. Further, the 
scheme offers various new benefits such as increased "ill-health, early-
retirement " and death-benefits, apart from an increased pension on retirement. 
But at the same time African workers are contributing more towards the provision 
of benefits which they seldom can make use of, eg "voluntary early retirement H 
and deferred pension benefits, as well as towards the establishment of) a 
benefit which is still in its experimentation phase, namely the "continuation 
option ll • 1• 
When it comes to calculating pension benefits, the scheme discriminates between 
workers with a pensionable salary of R6 000 or more per annum and those below 
this amount. At retirement (60) the first group receive an annual pension 
(payable monthly) of: 
2.5% of the final salary for each year of service -
ie salary x number of years 40 
Workers with an annual income of, below R6 000 receive only: 
2% of the final salary for each year of service -
ie salary x number of years 50 
This blatant discrimination has been challenged by the union. AFC has been 
very defensive and plans to alter this. Their reasoning is interesting. 
Mr Toyer argues that when this was formulated in 1974, many white workers 
earned less than R500 per month, but admits that today it amounts to blatant 
discrimination. He disagrees, however, with the argument that African workers' 
contributions are doubled for pension benefits which are minimally higher than 
those in the old scheme, where the calculation was: 
1,66% Of the final ·salary for each year of service -
ie salary x number of years 60 
1. This enables workers to purchase an individual life insurance policy with 
their pension rights on withdrawal or retirement. Interview with Mr Toyer 
of AFC. 
31. 
Furthermore, Afric<1..YJ. vlOrkers' "Pensionable Service" prior to the 1st 
January, 1980, still attracts pension at the Hate of 1,6661~ of the 
final salary. 
PENSIOlIS ... Hill HJTENSIFI.l1;D BXPLOI'J.'A'rION, CONTROL AND DIVISION 
OF TEE .-iOrlKING CLI.SS 
~ie have situated the incorporation of 1i.frican 1I10rkors into private schemes 
82. 
in the context of a tendency tot'lards a higher rate of surplus 'lalue pro-
duction ( in its relative form). l-ie also pointed out that the state and 
capital's sporadic attempts to move aw~ from blatant racial discrimination 
coincided Vii th the more deliberate strategy to distinguish between "permanent; 
residents" and "temporary sojourners"'. In a sense, the basis for this 
division was material in as far as "permanent urban residents" relied 
t . 1 1 b f th' d t' 1. d h t ". en ~re y on wage- a our or e~r repro uc ~on an on w a ever soc~a~ 
security benefits" the state provided, if at all. However, it can be shorln 
that the same applied to migrant workers who were nevertheless forced onto 
a migrant basis. This division \'las tllus constantly having to be reinforced 
by capital and the state, for politica~ reasons, and to maintain the costs 
of reproducing the majority of the \-rorking class at a minimum (ie with 
facilities such as housing, transport, welfare, etc). As regards the fully 
proletatianised African working class, the strate6~ has also been to shift 
the costs of their reproduction onto the workers themselves; in the absence 
of substantial state provisions for retired workers, pensions too served the 
purpose of making workers responsible for their own reproduction, and as 
such. a method of extracting relative surplus value. This surplus is then 
rapidly reinvested in industry to ensure the continuing and expanding 
accumulation of capital. We will see that in more recent years the strategy 
has been the same vis-a-vis migrant workers, but through separate insti tuti ons·. 
The concrete day-to-day implementation of pension schemes at the workplace 
has been as much a part of capitalist strategies: 
(1.) by making the pension a condition af employment and encouraging 
"continuous service" with the same employer, capital attempts to 
raise the workers' productive capacity and reduce the costs of a 
1. although the question of the informal sector enters here. 
high labour turnover; hence, the administration of pension fWlds 
becomes tied to the \·;hole "personell-management" thrust. 
(2) by dividing the labour force into various categories and treating 
them as such, capital is able to control workers more effectively. 
UJ. 
There is widesp::>ead belief today, even amongst critics of the capitalist 
state, that it is primarily state policy and its administration which subjects 
the African workir.g class to bureaucratic controls, and that these political 
divisions are somehow inserted from the outside into another "normal" 
capitalist production process. On the contrary, political and ideological 
relations of division and domination are produced and reproduced \'lithin the. 
workplace. Thus, a.long \'Ii th the attempts to create the industrial citizen 
and, I st~gest, tending to subvert it is an increasingly strict division 
betweelL workers with "permanent residential rights" who become a part of the 
"permanent staff" of an establishment, and other workers - migrants, hourly-
paid workers,l. temporary/seasonal workers. This, as we will see, became a 
concerted strategy in response to mass struggle and working class militancy 
during the 1970' s. But it is important to see that the limits and options 
were set by tendencies embedded during previous decades, in and out of 
production. 
The formulation and implementation of pension funds illustrates that this 
division went beyond the entrenchmen·t of skill and/or wage-divisions by 
making it difficult for all but IIpermanent staff" members to participate in 
and benefit from private pension schemes. During the 1960' s, "planners." 
encouraged employers to make thi'S distinction on the grounds that many African 
workers coulQ easily be incorporated within conventional schemes operating 
on the basis of "continuous service".2. 
In their attempts to open "the black marketll~. social insurance planners 
urged employers to be more "lenient" in specifying eligibility criteria. As 
we will see, these are also determined by: 
(a) who administers, and 
(b) who contributes to a fund, as well as 
(c) the type of fund and method of funding chosen. 
1. As yet, not all hourly workers are those who are deprived of residential 
rights. aee A.Claassens Wits Honours (1980) for detailed discussion 
on divisive ·strategies in the workplace. 
2. "(Bantu) iiages and Productivity Association" p l. 
3. Cuthbert. op.cit. p 8. 
The planners argued thu;!; it \las wrong to assume that all African workers 
changed jobs frequently, and that in fact, an examination of the COID-
paritive statistics in a few retirement plans showed that there was a 
slig.h:tly lower turnover among African workers than among white \wrkers. l • 
This applied primarily to "permanent urbanised Bantu in higher categories 
c.f employment" but also to -those migrant workers who returned to the sarne 
job. 2• As a result, they argued that a longer minimtun-service requirement 
for all African workers was unjustified. As regards migrant or temporary 
\wrkers, employers vlere encouraged to make adequate arrangements to ensure 
that they returned to the same company. 
It was also noted that employers for the same misconceived reasons specified 
"' a higher admission ag~ for African workersJand excluded \wmen. Referring 
mainly to white women, employers were advised to let them decide whether 
or not they want to make up contributions lost during eg maternity leave or 
ha.ve that time deducted from their contributory service. The option has 
very rarely been open to black women as the experiences of women at 
Langeberg Co-op, Paarl have frequently shown. These women merely have their 
contributions (51~ of basic wage excluding .overtime, night-shift pay, allowances 
and bonuses) ended and are told to join again. 4• 
On the question of whether a fund should be contributory or non-contributorJ, 
employers were similarly advised that it was wrong to assume that in a 
contributory scheme, African vlOrkers vlOuld resign merely to lay their hands 
on their accumulated contributions, which was what many employers feared, 
knowing that workers regarded. their contribution as a method of saving. 
(r should expl'ain: when a scheme is contributory, a worker is paid out his/ 
her c ontribut ions on wi thdraT.-lal before ret irement • The employers contri but ion 
stays with the fund, "/hich being fully tax deductable, is no loss to that 
employer). 
The "planners" - \·;ho were concerned .. lith broader economic and political 
questions - argued that, in the absence of adequut.e. unemployment insurance 
1. W and P Association. p3; Southern Life Association Annual Reports. 
2. The call-in card system had since the 1964 Bantu Labour Act eased this 
process. 
3. Who usually start \'lorking at an earlier age. 
4. Interview w'ith L Abrahams, organiser for AFC,m in Paarl. 
and "full state care for the aged and unemployed", refunded contributions 
where dismissal is lL.'"lavoidable, vlould be an important means of appeasing 
Horkers.I. It was further argued that Horker contributions "give the 
worker a greater sense of responsibility and r;::uuce Jr-,bour turnover".2. 
The specification of eligi bili ty criteria st!ch as "perma.!lency", minimum 
continuous service and the choice between a contributory and non-contri-
butory scheme was determined not only by the nature of the labour force 
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or how the employers perceived the workers. These were tied up wit~the 
size of the firm, its ability to raise its own finance through, for example 
underHriting Cl.nd administering its OvIn fund, as well as the type of policies 
that insurers are most eager to sell. Even when a fund is underwritten by 
insurers, the employer is able to fix criteria as to who qualifies, who paya 
Hhat and how long workers have to belong to a scheme to receive any benefits 
on 'tdthdrawal prior to retirement, hence the la.ck of uniformity amongst 
funds. 
Funding methods and types of accumulation of funds 
There aTe 2 basic methods of funding pensions and other ..... elfare benefits, 
pay-as-you-earn and funded schemes. The PAYE schemes are most clearly 
utilised in funding state old age pension schemes and the old trade union 
administered schemes. Capital regards this method as "unsound, theoretical1~ 
and on principle". Basically, it means that current income, covers current 
expena.i ture, leaving very little capital to be invested, "to cover liabili ties~,3 
Conventional methods of funding private pension schemes, by investing 
acc~'llulated contributions and paying benefits according to a definite 
formula, are again divided into 6 different types. 4• Those most widely 
used in the South African situation are the fixed-benefit and money-~v~chase 
types. Each type specifies a different method of funding, and relate 
differently to contingencies such as probable 1ngth of service, the number 
1. Association of P & P Funds op cit. This is interesting: more recently 
the state and insurers have argued the opposite. 
2. ibid. 
3.. Interview with Hammond-Tooke, FCI economist. 
4. Fixed-benefit, Flat percentage, Noney-purchase; deferred profit-sharing 
combined money purchase, deferred profit-sharing, flat benefit type. 
of workers involved , lifevexpectancy , and the relative size of contributions 
and pay-outs as these are affected by factors such as inflation. 
The fixed benefit type is computed by mUltiplying a pre-determined pension 
rate, usually a percentage of 1% to 3%, of the workers l basic wage (eg 2% of 
Rl 200 p.a.) by the number of years "continuous service" or years of 
participation. The amount credited annually is established by formula, so 
that the amount of annuity payable to a worker can be predicted in advance, 
and investment is planned accordingly. 
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This type of fund is usually contributory, but not necessarily. The contributions 
required to purchase the calculated annuity, credited each year, rise according 
to expected rates of inflation and insurers' investment priorities; in most 
cases then, where employers were reluctant to have contributory schemes, they 
were forced to do this in order to "meet the costs". This however, disguises 
what really happens. The employers' contributions are fully tax deductable 
anyway: they achieve this by being allowed to add their contributions to 
\vage costs instead of profits which are invested. This helps to give workers 
the impression that pensions are a "deferred wage" and that the employers 
contributions effectively mean a wage increase for them. 
Further, as benefits are fixed and inlply a long term investment, liabilities 
can only be covered if a large amount of finance (surplus value) can be 
raised. Thus, where this type of fund is self-administered, it is only by 
the larger industrial capitalists, such as Barlows and Anglo-American. 
The money-purchase type, on the other hand, does not give a fixed but a variable 
benefit: a percentage of the workers' basic wage is set aside each year, either 
by the employer, or by the worker and the employer. The employer's contribution 
~s a definite percentage of workers' salaries or payroll, while the workers' 
contribution is related to earnings. The money-purchase scheme is simpler 
and often used by privatl?i y-administered funds. The amount which can be 
withdrawn on retirement by a worker depends on the overall size of the fund, 
the size of the individual worker's accumulated contributions, the length 
of time that contributions are made and accumulated, and the rate of return 
on investments. These funds' viability rely more on the inclusion of as many 
contributors as possible than on continuous service, meaning continuous contri-
butions, and are thus much more able to adjust to breaks ~n employment. We 
will see how this has been used as a capitalist solution to the intensified 
problems of the 1970's, namely in the establishment of schemes which deal 
exclusively with migrant workers. 
The fixed-benefit type scheme is preferred by employers and by insurance 
companies. Being earnings-related and strictly according to length of service, 
management argues that it provides more incentive to workers to "advance"and 
encourages "loyalty" to the company. Insurers usually offer policies of the 
fixed-benefit type. They are able to calculate in advance more precisely what 
their liabilities will be in the future and make the necessary provisions to 
cover them. Also contribution rates in these schemes are usually higher. As 
the fixed-benefit type encourages continuous service with one employer, insurers 
are able to make long-term investments in areas where the rate of profit and 
therefore returns are the highest, often involving high-risk shares and non~ 
liquid assets eg in fixed property. 
Seen from this perspective, the antagonism of insurers to prescribed invest-
ment is easier to understand, as is the need for state-intervention to ensure 
that liabilities are ~n fact covered by fixed~interest bearing assets in the 
private sector.!· Recent exposures of private pension and insurance companies 
1. cf."Planning pensions ~n Inflation: Published by NDMF (Johannesburg). 
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~n the U.S.A. and Britain, as well as independent actuarial calcuiQtions in 
South Africa have shm..rn that insured fixed-benefit type funds become tied up 
in high-risk and non-liquid areas of investment, so that the payment of 
benefits is often more problematic than is apparent. 
To understand this we need to look at crLses ~n capitalist production in the 
monopoly capitalist phase and contradictions between non-monopoly sectors and 
monopoly sectors, as well as amongll the latter, in the face of the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall. In this context, further concentration of 
industrial capital and centralisation of finance capital take place (as a 
counter-tendency of TRPF), as well as the devalorisation of certain fractions 
of capital. This results in a squeeze also of "private" financial institutions 
such as ~nsurance companies and banks. Hany of their operations overlap and 
need to be rationalised. The banks, hm.lever, in their closer relationship to 
the state, in centralising the control of money and credit, have been 
strengthened. 1. 
As a result, in the advanced capitalist countries there has been a trend towards 
the investment of pension funds in banks with a Board of Trustees and actuary 
administering schemes, along with company officials and union participation. 
This tendency has been hastened by trade union demands over eligibility 
criteria, retirement age, retirement benefits, years of service, and methods of 
funding \..rhich were previously directly dl!termined by l.nsurance policies' 
. 2. 
requl.rements. For example, a struggle to institute a short eligibility 
period and therefore more freedom of movement between jobs, contradicted the 
requirements of fixed-benefit schemes, and resulted in the establishement of 
money-purchase schemes. Other demands, such as for a flat-rate pension 
1. Poulantzas, N (1975) De Brunhoff S (1973) & (1976). 
2. Union interest in Employee Retirement Plans (1965) H C Kwasha, New York. 
Distributed to managernnt in South Africa by NDHF. 
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for workers irrespective of earnings or length of service, however, have 
met the limits of capitalist-flexibility; here, unions have themselves 
capitulated in the face of capitalist divisive strategies and demanded this 
only for workers with 20 years of service. Hanagement's conclusion was 
optimistic and correct: 
" In the light of past experience, it 1S known that 
employees will soon become dissatisfied with a plan 
\..rhich grants the same benefits to an individual with 
40 years of service as one with 20 years, or if wage 
rates differ by as much as 50 to 75%" 1. 
Hith inflation eroding pensions and demands for increased benefits, "capital 
depots" such as insurance funds are "squeezed" more severly. In this event, 
they attempt to "priv~:tise" the problem by demanding that the state diverts 
less capital into fixed-interest "public" areas such as corporations, 
administration, services, etc. 
In South Africa, finance capital in the form of insurance funds has been faced 
with the (added) contradiction which we examined above; namely that the method 
of funding which benefits it most, excludes a large section of the working 
class, which is the ultimate source of the (capital) funds. 
1. ibid. 
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section V. 
THE STRUGGLE OVER THE SOUTH AFRICAJ.~ PENSION SYSTEH IN THE LATE 1970' s 
Crisis 1n Production 1n the 1970's 
We outlined various changes in capital and the evolution of production 
relations during the 1960's, as well as the growing rate of proletarianisation 
and unemployment. These tendencies became more concentrated in the 1970's. 
During the period 1970 - 1980, the South African economy witnessed a r1se to 
8. 
domination of monopoly capitalist re.\.tions in all sectors and departments of 
production. A recent studyl. gives an approximation of the monopoly nature of 
d . 2. pro uct10n. An industry was considered highly concentrated if the ten 
largest firms were responsible for 70% or more of the total output. Nine 
industries fell into this category, with the tobacco industry leading (with 
3 firms producing 98,4% of all turnover in 1971 - 1972) and followed by the 
glass industry. Du Plessis concluded by saying: 
" economic power is highly concentrated ... the South African 
economy will, in due course, be dominated by government 
enterprises on the one hand and a few conglomerates on the 
other ,,3. 
As a result of his method of analysis, du Plessis failed to see that this is 
already the case, as he ignored the question of ownership and control, so that 
companies that are in fact owned and controlled by the same conglomerate, appear 
to be separate. Other areas of confusion one often finds are in analyses of 
"state corporations", often largely controlled by local or foreign "private" 
capital; also share ownership is often a poor indicator of where control lies 
1. du Plessis, p. G. "Concentration of economic power in the South African 
manufacturing industry." SAJE Sept 1978. 
2. The Monopolisation of the South African Economy. Social Review No 5. (1979) 
3. du Plessis. pp 268 - 9. 
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eg ~n so-called "nationalised" companies. The Mouton Report (1977) lists 75 
categories ~n manufacturing ~n which three or less firms produce 70% of the 
total turnover. 
On the other ha~1d, important features of the economy have remained eg uneven 
development betw"een departments and sectors; particularly important is the 
imbalance between departments in manufacturing, tied to South Africa's position 
in the imperialist chain. Manufacturing's reliance on imported plant and 
capi tal equipmentl. put increasing strain on foreign exchange reserves and 
reinforced the dependence on the primary earners. Throughout the 1960's, 
as manufacturing applied more fixed capital to raise the rate of surplus value, 
there was cronic ba1ance-oE-payments deficit. 2. Due to declining levels of 
productivity relative to that of advanced captia1ist countries, merchandise 
exports (ie excluding gold) made up a steadily declining proportion of G.D.P 
South African producers' cost inefficiency grew during the 1960's bringing about 
a tendency for the rate of profit to fall. 
During the 1960's, the counter tendencies were strong enough to keep the crisis 
at bay: 
(1) the boom \01as predicted on the repression and disciplining of the dominated 
classes; 
(2) capitals low wage structure was unchallenged; 
(3) sophisticated forms of labour control and allocation minimised reproduction 
costs; 
(4) the degree of concentration and centralisation ensured a high rate of 
profi t; 
1. 30% of imports 1n 1957 and 45% by 1970. 
2. Bloch, G p 247. 
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(5) an expanding internal market through the 1960' s sustained vlithin exceptable 
limits the production levels necessary to allow for effective valorisation 
f d d·· 1. of manu acture commo 1t1es. 
(6) a sophisticated money market ensured a m1n1mum of delay and cost before 
productive investment, while credit mechanisms extended and stabilised 
consumption. 
(7) there were changes 1n the labour process involving job~fragmentation, 
encouraging more efficient production and the cheapening of costs through 
employment of semi-skilled black labour. 
However, there were limits to and blockages 1n the extent to which this 
transformation could take place, related to the historically developed racial 
division of labour. While the resistance to deskilling and replacement from 
white workers was not particularly strong in thE' .. 1950' s and 1960~s, the organ1-
sation of white workers to prevent under-cutting, slowed down the process:' 
also the inferior educational and training facilities for blacks excluded them 
. . f k 3 • from certa1n categor1es 0 wor . Growing shortages of semi-skilled and skilled 
labour, and white resistance to job-reclassification for fear of being replaced 
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1 d d h f h · . 4. h'l . h 1 b s owe own t e extent 0 mec an1sat10n; w 1 e 1t as a so een argued that the 
conditions of existence of black labour, absenteeism, high labour turnover, 
illness and hunger, contributed to a less intensive application of black labour 
in semi-skilled positions and a loss of productivity.5. 
Thus the application of machinery to control the working class (discussed 1n 
prev10us section) was no! very successful, owing largely to their general 
1. Bloch C. p 248. 
2. Davies R. (1978) JSAS p2 "Wiehahn and the restructuring of the racial 
division of labour" 
3. Meth argues that the level of skill required to fill these jobs should not 
be overestimated. 
4. Davies op cit 
5. Meth (1979) SALB Vol 5 (3) "Trade un10ns and skill shortages". 
conditions of existence, political repression and low wages. The system of 
migrantisation was co nfounding itself as the "homelands" were no longer even 
able to "reconstitute" the worker beth'een periods of employment, while people 
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were still being forced back to lower the cost of reproducing the working class. 
This, coupled with rising unemployment (rising from 19% to over 22% in the 1970's)1. 
and growing working class and popular struggles exacerbated capitals crises and 
turned it into a crisis of the social formation as a whole. 
The Falling Rate of Profit and the State 
Th~ers Commission pointed out that this resulted in higher costs and 
declining competitiveness on foreign markets. Where previously the use of 
cheap black labour helped to offset this, new positions in the labour process 
were being filled by white workers who ~.,ere able to demand high \.,ages. The 
increase in labour cost per unit of output were in the order of 247. in manu-
facturing during the 1960's and the process accelerated into the 1970's, thus 
also affecting international cost-efficiency. 
The rising costs of industrial goods began to threaten the viability of export 
earners and of producers for the domestic market alike, and thus the ability to 
earn foreign exchange needed for imports. 
Further, following from what we said about the limits to mechanisation, it 
increasingly was difficult for manufacturing, and the capital goods sector to 
raise its own finance. There were record deficits in the balance of payments, 
underlying the serious structural imbalance faced by the economy. Thus, manufac-
turing and the state were facing a double-bind situation: for expanded capital 
accumulation the development of manufacturing was essential; to reach this 
1. Simkins (1978) p 34. TABLE 20. 
position, hmvever, required an increase in primary and processed goods exports 
1.n order to gain foreign exchange. This was exacerbated by "imported inflation" 
1.e the rising cost of foreign imports,l. particularly oil. 
As a result of this analysis, we could speculate that surplus value extraction 
slowed down 1.n the beginning of the 1970's, and a corresponding fall in the rate 
of profi t. The rate of profi t is reflected roughly in the G. D. P. , and 1.n the 
------------------------------
rate and source of investment (which roughly relates to accumulation). Dagut 
shows that between 1955 and 1976 the GDP increased on average by 5,32%, but ----~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
between 1974 and 1976 only by 1~73%.2. 
It can be shmvn that while the rate of investment increased in fixed invest-
ment betw·een 1970 and 1976,3. the increased import costs would mean that the 
rate 1.S slmver than it appears. 
"P~\:.-Wo..Y' t\"e.nd~ it'\ gY"05S OCcne.shc.. ti'l.e . .d i'f'"\V~hne.n.t 
O.t c..~e~t pr\c.e5. 
RQbo of 
'Ie.o.t"5 19b5-bO 1~1a-b5 1'l7b-70 
'-ota.\ of ~0$.5 I J q l,b 2,cg +ivd i'"'~'e5~ 
Also, symptomatic of a falling rate of profit is the declining share of private 
business enterprises in the gross domestic fixed investment. 
declined from 63% in 1946 to 51% in 1972, to 49% in 1975. 4 • 
Th ·1$ share has 
At the same time, 
the share of public Quthorities and corporations increased: public authorities 
1. Dagut,M.B.- S.A: an appraisal. Nedbank Group Economic Unit 1977. 
2. Dagut op cit. p 215 
3. Berger, Shapiro, Roux. "The South African State l.n the World Economy" 
(mimeo) pp 28 - 32. 
4. ibid. and Dagut. p 139. 
94. 
from 3410 to 38% ~n the period 1946 - 1972, to 34% in 1975; and corporations 
share increased from 3% to 4% ~n the period 1946 - 1972, to 17% in 1975. The 
ratios of investment increases Eor the private businesses have been much lower 
than for public investment, indicating a lower rate of expansion of private 
investment in the South African economy, as compared with public investments. 
In this context, the state expenditure on welfare, homelands administration 
bureaucracy, coercion and control, what O'Connor terms "social expenses",l. 
\began to 
khllS one 
appear inadequate, rising to one third of state expenditure in 1977/8. 
third of its spending did not add directly to the rate of surpltis 
') 
value:-' The leading areas of increased government expenditure for 1970 - 6 
were: transfers and loans to the governemnts of "homelands": 70,5 average 
--- ------------------------. 
~ncrease per year; efence and Armaments Board: 32,8%. 
On the other hand, the average increase per annum to public corporations 
was 28,2% for the same period (1970 - 6), indicating that the state has been 
providing conditions for relative surplus value extraction. 3 • The category 
used to describe these two trends in investment (Dagut's "consumption 
expenditure") does not reveal this as it is trying to push for II pr ivatisation" 
of the problems facing capital. However, it seems that t~vo thirds of the 
state's expenditure still contributes to surplus value. We saw above that 
there was additional involvement of the state in the economy through its share 
in gross domestic fixed investment. 
1. O'Connor. "Fiscal Crisis of the State" p.7 (1973). 1~ 1n areas that are 
cL'ucial for "legitimation" and political domination but not directly pro-
ductive through contributing to the rate of accumulation. 
2. Dagut: op cit pp 94,95. 
3. ibid. 
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As the state's share of gross domestic expenditure has risen during the 
1970's, its allocation between consumption and investment has been rising to 
favour the latter:' According to Dagut, this investment included expansLon by 
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both public authorities and public corporations, particularly the latter. 
? 
"Public" corporations-· such as ARMSCOR, ESCON IDC (and its Bantustan offspring 
BDC), SASOL~ SABC, ISCOR, etc, in 1976 accounted for 31% of the public sectors 
fixed investment, ie assets such as fi xed property, construction \vorks, 
transport equipment, and machinery. The state's rising involvement in these 
sectors, through largely the public corporations reflects its direct and in~ 
direct contribution to raising the rate of surplus value, profit and accumulation 
as a counter tendency to the TRPF and thus the contribution of the "private 
sector" to national accumulation. 
~--------
Bourgeois economists, such as Dagut regard the state as !'trespassing on the, 
------
domains of private enterprise and weakening,the profit-seeking motivation that 
has historically been a powerful driving force in South Africa's economic 
development~ He fails to see that the state d to intervene to restore the 
rate of profit and accumulation, rather than simply to defer "an adjustment of 
the South African economy to the recession experienced in other countries", which 
he assumes is only in the power of "private" capital to do. From our perspective 
surplus value has been devalorised/statized3., which seems to be indicated by 
the growing rate of investment and falling growth-rate. 4 • This counter--
tendency is not directly contributive to accumulation, but is a means of 
1. Dagut p 249 Table 107. 
2. We must be\vare here, as thei:e is clearly significant "private" capital 
invested in these "public" corporations. 
3. In Poulantzas' sense. (/978) fPI14-- b 
4. Shapiro.et.a~ (1980) p 35. 
increasing it; being deval6rised, the surplus capital gained by the state 
(taxation, foreign liabilities, prescribed investment by banks and insurers) 
ie.statized capital, permits the transfer of surplus value to other sectors. 
The crisis has subsequently led to a spate of mergers between diffe~ent 
capitals, a greater centralisation of c~pital. further application of a 
capital-intensive labour process and rapid deskilling of thE majority of 
the workforce. 
THE STATE AND PENSION PROVISIONS 
Once again, 1n order to grasp why the state intervened in 1976 to propose 
a National Contributory p'ension scheme, it is not enough to pose this at the 
level of structural analysis. On one level the state did intervene 1n 
"welfare" because it was ~ the most profi tab] e ar.e£L-'lf--i.~estment for 
capital, particularly with the rate of profit being what it was during the 
early 1970's. But to settle for this is overly economistic. The state, as 
a condensation of class relations, also responds directly to the struggles 
of the working class, which underlie capitalist crises. The state intervened 
during the 1970's in response to working class and p~pular struggles, even if 
these struggles are distanced from the actual state apparatuses. 
During the early 1970's, the state was forced to become more involved 1n the 
reproduction of the African ~mrking class, and the productive workers 1n 
particular, but in a qualitatively different way from previous decades. We 
saw that in the 1950's the state intervened by placing the majority workers 
onto a migrant basis and giving the reserves a "social welfare" function, whilst 
it minimised the demands that the urban, settled working class could make. 
1. Poulantzas (1978) 175 - 6). 
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During the 1960~s boom. capital was (prematurely) given more autonomy, in 
the. field of housing, pensions, bypassing the labour bureaux system. However, In 
In spite of its articulated needs and its demands of the state for the provision 
of facilities, the monopoly sector did not go very far in trying to gaIn the 
support of the working class; its "human relations" ideology and "personell 
management" techniques meant very few material concessions for the working class, 
and as a result, had little political effect on the workers or the state: one 
could almost call it "misplaced attempt at hegemony"~· 
The groHing struggles of the working class t capitalist exploitation In 
the early 1970~ the crISIS In production, and ri~ng unemployment forced 
the state to intervene to make some minimal concessions - in order to stave 
off the worst for capitalist domination. It was clear that African workers' 
working conditions,wages and general conditions of existence were not 
improving and these were causing spontaneous mass lvorking class action (eg 
Namibia, 1971, Durban 1973); further the conditions in the. "homelands" were 
worsening as fewer people were finding work (particularly young people) and 
the productive capacity declined further. Unemployment soared (to a figure 
of 2,3 million in 1977) and the labour-absorbtive capacity declined in the 
period 1969 - 1976. 2 . An increasing burden was thrown on the urban areas 
which, in spite of labour control, attracted increasing numbers of work 
seekers with no other means. 
In the field of the provision of social welfare benefits, and pensions in 
particular, the state was forced to intervene where: (a) its old age pensions 
------- -
1. ideological justification,with little material basis. 
2. Simkins (1978) p 41. 
it sought a solution which coincided with the broader political strategy 
adopted namely the division between "insiders" and "outsiders". 
State Old Age Pensions 
In chapter II we sa~y that the state introduced pQnsions for Africans in 1944; 
already then, a distinction was made between "permanent urban", migrant 
and "permanent rural" Africans, both formally and in terms of the provisions and 
institutions through which they were made. Old age pensions for Africans 
increased minimally during the following three decades, and the. gap bettyeen 
white and African pensions widened. In 1944 maximum African pensions were 
R24 per year, 21,4% of white pensions; by 1959 it was R4l per year, 15,56% 
of the l.;hite pension; by 1966 it was 12,3%; this reflects a deterioration 
of African pensions, at least, during the first half of the 1960's seen 
against the cost of living/the utter poverty of African pensioners can be 
appreciated. 
We saw that during the 1950's (and 1960's) the state wanted to "reinstate the 
natural obligations of Bantu Authorities and Bantu Children 1n regard to their 
old people, with the support of an equal amount of money to that which lye are 
spending lyrongly 1n caring for them"l. Small increases were justified by the 
state as "money had been paid annually to the Native trust for disbursement 
through Bantu Authorities to persons in need of assistance in tribal areas,,,2. 
1n an attempt to strengthen Bantu Authorities. 
In fact, Pollak lVrites: 
1. Minister of Bantu Affairs 1955. Quoted by Draper, M (1964). SAIRR 
Fact Paper 15. 
2. SAIRR survey (1963) p 268. 
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" •.. the government considered the system of pensions to be 
'inappropriate' for Africans. Efforts were directed at 
creating another system 'more in accordance \"ith Bantu 
custom and tradition' " 1. 
It appears that v ery little of the money allocated to the "Bantu Authorities 
b . . 2. was e1ng spent on pens1ons. 
In 1962, for the first time the principle of a "right" to a social pension 
instead of a "privilege" was established in law~ and the Pension Laws Amendment 
Act4 dropped the distinction between "city", "town" and "rural" pensions for 
Africans. However, the Minister of Finance claimed that this was to avoid the 
movement of Africans into the cities; at that stage 70% of all African 
pensioners lived in rural areas. 
During 1959 - 1960, control of welfare services for Africans was placed under 
the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) as var10US 
"homelands" were granted partial self-government, welfare services became 
their responsibility. As conditions there deteriorated, the "social 
security" function of the homelands had to be bolstered to maintain the 
distinctions between urban and rural Africans, particularly as most pens10ners 
had been in industrial employment and were being drawn back to receive 
payments in the "homelands". 
The various bantustan authorities took over pensions when they "achieved 
self-government" as the central state during the 1960's and 1970's attempted 
1. H Pollak (1977) "Pensions and Welfare". Centre for Intergroup Studies.UC.T. 
2. Draper. pp 54-5. Mare, G "OAP and the Bantustans" WIP 17 (1981). 
3. Old Age Pensions Act No 38 of 1962. 
4. Act No 102 of 1965. 
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to place the burden of health and welfare on bantustan authorities, away 
from the place of employment of migrant workers. This corresponds with other 
tendencies towards a centralisation of the state's control functions, particularly 
over movement and the concomitant decentralisation of power to local bureau-
crats. Unless registered as a permanent urban resident (SlO (1) a or b) a 
pensioner could only receive payment every second month from the nearest 
Bantu Commissioner's Office~' This has clearly amounted to a form of control 
for retired workers with no income. Further, decentralisation attempts to place 
the blame for reduction, cancellation and delays on the shoulders of the 
bantustan branches of the central state, while at the same time making them more 
1. dependent on the central state. 
In addition to drawing retired workers into their respective "bantustans", the 
"social t.,relfare" responsibilities have been expected to extend to all "undesir-
abIes", ie unemployeq, sick and more recently those defined as non-citizens, 
and those workers receiving no benefits, eg "unproductive" units shifted off 
white-mvned farms. The history of this practice is a sad one; in almost all 
the bantustans/"independent states" the payment of pensions has dropped, and 
only the corruption and bribery of KwaZulu was officially exposed. 2 . 
The situation of pensioners in urban areas has been as bad, but has not 
surprisingly received much more attention. Pensioners are discriminated 
against in terms of the means test (ie rent, support of children and ex 
gratia payments are counted as income for Africans but not for mlites, 
"coloureds or Indians).3. For urban pensioners as well as those in the 
1. Mare op cit. 19S0 
2. Mar~i 8t 'a.tl1. S a.~h file-so 
3. Social Pensions Act, No 73 (1973). 
"bantustans" the system of taxation has also been discriminatory; pensions 
are funded out of general taxation, \.,hile Africans start paying at a lOvler 
income level and at higher rates than other groups. As in the bantustans, 
pensioners in urban areas have had to deal with a vast amount of bureaucracy. 
Application procedures are often protracted, documents are required to 
establish eligibility, age, etc. 
During the 1970's, pension payment has clearly been used as a form of influx 
control and eligibility criteria have been more strictly applied. Thus, only 
people with S.lO(l)(a) qualifications have been eligible for pensions in urban 
areas, and the means test is applied to exclude as many people. Pensioners are 
paid out bi-monthly, at pay-out points in townships or at offices of P .. P.A.D./ 
C.A.D., but regular visi~~have to be made to the Bantu Commissioners Office. l • 
The following tables show (1) the disparities between pensLons received by 
different groups, (2) the % pensionable people actually receiving an old age 
pension, and (3) illustrates the discriminatory means test. 
: 
Maximum ~oc:inf penAions in rand. Percentage r3lio of soci:!1 }:cnsions, 
YEAR WHITE COL mDtAN AFRICAN YEAR WlilTe COL H:DIAN AFRICAr; 
1929·37 5 3 1929·::7 100 60 
""if 1947 10 5 5 2 1941 100 50 50 
1950 14 8,50 5,50 2,50 1950 100 4SA 39,3 11',9 
1960 23 9,25 8,25 3,40 1960 100 40,2 35.9 1-'.9 
1965 . , 28 14,00 11,50 3,70 1965 100 50 <:4.3 13.2 
196G 30 14,00 11,50 3,70 19GG 'j JO 4G,7 41 1l.2 
1C17~ 35 lG,50 1(;,50 5.00 1970 1vC 41,1 47,1 t4,3 
lJ7, 38 1B,QO 1B.00 5,75 1971 100 46,1 56,1 1~.1 
19/2 41 20,50 7.0,50 6,50 1972 100 50 50 15,9 
1913 41 23,50 23,50 8 
-., 
1973 100 50 50 17,0 
1914 51 :<9,50 29,50 11,25 1914 .100 51,8 51,8 19.1 
1975 64 34,00 34,00 15,00 1915 100 53,1 53,1 2:l,4 
1976 72 38,50 38,50 18,50 1976 100 53,5 53,S 25,7 
1977 79 42,50 42,50 20,50 1977 100 53.B 43,8 25,9 
1978 fI1 41,15 41,75 23,75 1979 100 5J.!f. 53.9 2/.0 
1979 ~7 54,00 54,00 .77,50 1!l79 100 55.7 55,7 :a.4 
1980 105 82,00 62,00 -:33,00 l!JOO 100 56,9 66.9 :'10,3 
pe- -rin'\~6 44- BO, 
1. Unlike other pensioners. who collect monthly payments either from a post 
office, welfare organisation or through deposits. 
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F='3~re.::> i\\ustro..4; ~ 0;0 pe",~i cY\a.'o\~ ~p'~ <\.c::\-UQ\\'j 
re.c:..\€"v\V""\3 C\n <::)k! ClSe. pe.nsion_ 
No. Of I')o.ot', ~.~ R?,opIE' of R?Dp{e &Le,jYi~ Q,iOiiJ fb({l.(}. Tr~ PJv\s;~alie a S--tq+E: a! (iiaup A3e, Old ~~~bll\ °jgt'\51 IA 
W~ite 38(;lqlO . fg~ ~t~ 35' I 
~'aV\ a.\ 700 I 5a'1 GIO,GJ 
Cnkl.t~ ql ~2D '"IV 34 7 8S)~ 
@acK fJ40qOD I~:t.la'l ~X'o 
"' 
Tor~ 12?,b 130 40q~49 '63 )\ 
. 1. 8r .. SIC CO~ISOLIDATED PENSIONS I\S t'lT 1. 12.197:; (PER MINUM) 
Whites Indians Bantu 
(i) M~ximum amount of Ponsion (7) 684 
(i i) {Imount of free i ncom.,3 allowed 
without effecting tho pension 504 
( iii) 
246 
252 
Pension plus ()nnui:ll incofll'::; 
& means nGt to exceed 98:~ /~98 
(cr 1068) • 
135 
80 
•• 128 
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THE CRITIQUE OF PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS BEGINS 
In the last chapter we noted a number of inadequacies in the existing private 
schemes: many funds were still racially-exclusive, many only paid out lump-
sums
l
. on retirement, and the eligibility criteria tended to exclude the more 
temporary, hourly/weekly and often lower pa.id unskilled workers. lve went on 
to look at different types of funding and how finance capital prefers the 
fixed-benefit scheme which establishes long-term liabilities, but is regarded 
as unsuitable for less permanent workers 1e those who capital feared would not 
return to the same employer. Once again, as there \l7ere no legal requirements 
for uniformity amongst funds, individual employers were able to choose whether 
or not to administer a scheme for workers legally bound to return to their 
respective "homelands". Most employers are not prepared to do so.2. Also 
long qualification periods exclude many workers from any benefit, and, further, 
many of these schemes involve pensioners with as much bureaucracy as does 
the state old age scheme. 
The follm.;ring examples, most of which were researched 1n 1976 are instructive: 
Roberts Construction 
Their BIC Pension Fund for African, Indian and "Coloured" hourly-paid workers 
provides for membership only after 10 years of service. Of their 25 000 black 
workers, 2 066 are members of the fund. 3 • It is non-contributory, requiring 
an employer contribution of 14% of a members wage, which is only about 1% of 
the entire black payroll. 
1. 82% of private schemes available to African workers 1n 1976 still paid out 
lump-sums - Survey by Urwick International. 
2. There are exceptions, for example Fattis and Monis, Picbel and Langeberg 
have in the past simply deducted the period of leave from the "pensionable 
. " serV1ce • 
3. Nic Nel op cit (1976). 
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Of the 351 pensioners 1.11 1976, a,bout 6070 lived in a "homeland" and pension 
payments were made through the Bantu Affairs Corrnnissioner of Nagistrate, or 
a local store that hoped to sell provisions at the same time. Redundancy is 
provided [or by an immediate pension, though few workers qualify. All monthly 
paid staff belong to the main pension fund. 
The fund was seen as a bridging operation till Industrial ~ouncil schemes 
provided better benefits. 
Fedmis 
By 1976 Fedmis had separate pension funds for blacks and whites which they do 
not intend integrating. Black workers earning R4 000 per year. and above 
qualify immediately, while other black workers have a 2 year waiting period. 
Management says this is due to a high labour turnover and due to the 
"administcative work" involved in taking people on and then "knocking them 
off". The company works very much on a seasonal basis including 1 500 out 
of 2 300 black workers. The company enforces a 6 month witholding period as 
\.;rorkers go a\~ay for 3 months or longer: this period is a gap in service which 
trustees have accepted. Management 1.S quite clear about its needs: 
" We hope to retain in the company the employees who are likely 
to stay for a worthwhile period of time, and eXclude those who 
would just leave. " 1. 
Calan Group 
In Calan subsidiaries, the norm 1.S separate funds for African and White workers, 
but slowly a two-tier system is com1.ng into operation. People earning above 
a certain figure will be combined with a main group pension fund, while the 
others will be in the Old Mutual Croup Pension fund which caters particularly 
. k 2. for m1.grant wor ers. 
1. Quoted by Nic Nel (1976). 
2. a.M. fund discussed below. 
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National Industrial Council for the Newspaper and Printing Industry 
Their fund for unskilled workers has a standardised contribution level and is 
transferrable in the industry. If a \vorker goes to a "homeland", he/she is 
regarded as leaving the industry and the fund pays out his/her contributions. 
'Putco 
Puteo regards itself as "Africanising flat out"; 460 out of 3 950 workers in 
1976 were whites. At the same time, where 5% of their drivers were migrants 1n 
about 1970 and 95% urban residents, the proportion 1S 60% to 40% ItJW.They had 
a contributory scheme \vhich differentiates strongly by salary (above and below 
RSOO). Ivorkers' and employers' contributions are higher in the above RSOO 
scale (12!%) than below RSOO (4~%). 1. 
Sandvik 
In 1976 employed 700 African workers, only 50 of whom were migrants. The 
labour turnover is less than 5%, and "urban" Africans are preferred due to 
a higher level of education/skill and a lower turnover. African workers are 
included in the same schemes as whites and on the same basis.. There is a 3 
month waiting period for everyone. N Pension benefits are calculated at 55th of 
the average of the last three years salary. Sandvik places a lot of emphasis 
on personell management: "Sandvik consider that a lot depends on the selection 
procedure and in training African workers to understand the industrial society 
and the role they play in it".2. 
We can conclude that: 
(1) With the movement of: (a) "Coloured", Indian and African workers into 
1. Interviews. 
2. Management, Quoted by Nic Nel op cit. 
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clerical, white-collar, technical and non~manual positions, (b) Africans into 
skilled positions,1. and (c) Africans into semi-skilled positions, increasic.g 
from 54,7% of that categories workers in 1969 to 66,7% in 1977, there is an 
increased emphasis on permanence and tying the \"orker to a job. 
(2) the personell management approach 1S strong. 
(3) Very little had been done by 1976 to cater for the migrant worker's 
"economic security". 
(4) It seems that migrant 'vorkers would only benefit if and \"hen they have 
been working for one employer long enough to gaLn S.lO (1) rights. Thus it 
seems as if capitals "selection procedures" entail a selection too,of who \"ill 
or worlt qualify for urban rights. Hore recently, Riekert has proposed that the 
employer should have more responsibility in the employment of contract labour/ 
migrant labour. Thus the workers ,.,ith the worst "economic insecurity" \"ith 
unemployment being ,,,hat it is, were in most cases effectively excluded from 
material benefits. 
Crisis in the Long-Term Insurance Industry 
All evidence points to the fact that pension funds \"ere being squeezed by the 
unfavourable conditions for investment. 
At the end of 1977,financial year, there were 10 579 occupational pension funds 
with a total membership of 4 159 193;' 244 974 of whom were pensLoners. In the 
1. Proportion OE Africans in this category rose from 9,3% in 1969 to 23,2% 
in 1977. Simkins and Hindson (1979). 
2. Registrar of Pension Funds 19th Report 
figures for 1976 were: 10 175 (funds): 
(pensioners) (See Tables II and III). 
p2 RP 91/1979. The corresppnding 
3 086 733 (members): 108 884 
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same year there were an estimated 9 787 000 economically active people in South 
Africa. Keeping in mind that some people belong to two funds, 42% of all 
economically active people \"ere members of these schemes. Hhile it is 
difficult to make a "racial" break down, if vIe take 58% as the number of people 
not in funds and 70% as the % of Africans of the total labour force, it is likely 
that the majority African workers did not have access to occupational pension 
funds. 
Other inadequacies ,,,hich subjected the private funds to critique ln the mid 1970' s 
1 f . d' 1. d 1 were that the payment of lump-sums e t pens loners estltute an as a resu t 
more dependent on state old age pensions. We saw that in 1976, 82% of funds 
for African workers paid out only lump-sums on retirement. In the period 
1961 - 1973 the amount that was paid out by private funds in conditions other 
than retirement or death grew tremendously, as the following table shows. 
+--.-----------------~--------.-----
LUNP-$UH PAYMENTS 
:~:.'TfP-!JIJ·~ pnym.·ht~ under 
Year An"uitie" cjrcu"'~tance~ other than 
ret~nl or d""th 
1961 8 60', 673 1) 0::8 )91 
1962 10 105 ')'14 12 575 8)) 
196) 12 668 480 1'1 79) )05 
1964 14 1,)4 68) 19 776 )26 
1965 16 665 097 20 5)5 259 
1966 19 5'1) 745 22 952 961 
. 1967 2) 228 200 25 ;80 000 
1968 26 932 000 29 )71 coo 
1969 35 If'1t 000 38 920 000 
1970 39 550 000 46 8';6 000 
1971 1t7 589 000 52 " I', 000 
1972 5A 95) 000 62 488 000 
197J 71 546 000 76 495 000 
Fro~ this tabla it is ~lear that the 3mounts paid out aa 
a result oC reaignations etc. increase annually and 81~o. 
,~ ___ that _ this is not something new. 
Besides the results this was said to have for the state and the taxpayer, the 
"pension fund industry" claimed that it was the absence of preservation of 
pension rights which had brought this situation about. 2 • 
1. Urban Black Aged. U.F. Report 1980 (J Eales). 
2. The Preservation-option will be discussed below. 
State expenditure on old age pensions rose to an all time high 1n 1975/6. 
Out of R240 million budgeted for social pensions, financed out of Revenue, 
R160 million was for old age pensions (see Table I), as opposed to Rl09 
million in 1974 and R88 million in 1973. If one compares the figures for the 
different groups it is evident that this increase was primarily the result of 
the increased application of white pensioners at higher pension-rates, showing 
a decline in their "standard of living". As most ,,,hite pensioners are eligible 
for occupational pensions during their working years, this increase indicates 
the inadequacy of private fund pension annuities. This should be related to 
a higher cost of living and rate of inflation. The consumer pr1ce index rose 
from 100i3 in 1970 to 157,2 in 1975. 
Urwick Internationals surveyl. revealed that the insurance industry's claim 
to command schemes (eg fixed-benefit schemes) which were far more readily 
inflation-adjustable than a pay-as-you-go scheme vTaS un3Y"Ounded. In a survey 
of "fringe benefits" of selected companies, 48% of participant 3chemes made no 
provision for inflation and 35% had the opportunity to adjust payments to 
allow for inflation depending on actuarial surplus. Only 17% of occupational 
pension funds made provision for inflation.(Seebelow) 
Further evidence of the crisis 1n the insurance industry was the fluctuation 
1n the number of funds. 2• Every year the Registrar of Pension Funds registers 
ne\V' funds while several hundred are terminated, which clearly is a threat to 
workers "security" in their old age. When a fund closes down, members usually 
rece1ve their contributions plus interest. During 1976 995 new funds were 
1. Salaries, Fringe Benefits and Enlployment Practices: Asiatics Blacks and 
Coloureds in South Africa. Report No 135. (Jhb) (1976). 
2. Investigation into the possible establishment of a National Contributory 
scheme. Dept of Social Welfare Pensions. (1976). 
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establishedl . and 355 were terminated; during 1977 841 new funds were 
established and 447 terminated~· A Spandau calculates that the annual "death 
rate" of funds between 1964 and 1967 and 1971 and 1973 ~s 34% while the 
. ". ". 66% 3. correspond~ng b~rth rate ~s o. 
The cr~s~s 1n the insurance industry must be related to the general crisis 
facing capitalist production ~n the 1970's. We argued that an index of the 
crisis of a falling rate of profit was the (1) higher percentage ownership 
of fi~ed capital stock, (2) higher rate of public investment in the economy, 
no 
(3) more investment expenditure by the s~te, and (4) growth of investment by 
public ~~s. We argued that \vhile the state, having to secure political 
domination, invested in areas that were not directly productive, it also invested 
in areas that were contributive to relative surplus value. 
In this context, \ve can understand why pens10n funds' investment in prescribed 
assets rose during the 1970's. The state was also increasingly having to 
intervene in the reproduction of labour power where capital was not; for 
example, one of the leading areas of increased government expenditure was in 
transfers and loans to the governn)ents of "homelands" ~ This was necessary to 
give/restore a material basis to the strategy of political division. Also, as 
we have seen, state expenditure on social pensions increased. These factors 
would help to explain why the state encouraged the investment of funds. 
(see Table pf,b ). 
During most of the 1960's till the early 1970's investment of funds in the 
private sector rose \-lhile that in the "public sector" fell. The opposite 
1. Registrar of Pension Funds 18th Annual Report. R.P 98/1978 for 1977. 
2. 19th Annual Report. 
3. Conunents on "Report of an Investigation 
L.P. Programme. Wits. Report No 9. 
l' op cit. July 1976. 
trend was marked in the 1970' s. 1. Furthermore, investment in Government 
Stock in 1976 and 1977 surpassed the minimum requirement of 20% and 22% 
in the respective years. In 1976 total investment in prescribed assets was 
72%, far above the required 50%.2. '(rABlE BELO\N) 
\~hat this cr~s~s meant ~n terms of the industry's liabilities is unclear 
according to the insurers. The state was largely to blame, for neglecting to 
introduce preservation of pension rights and for requiring high levels of 
prescribed investment "to subsidise the infrastructure". Thus, their inability 
to meet liabilities, and some sources say this was the case;' is well hidden. 
'1~r. Gove.y\-\W\e.nt ~i'led ·j"te.re.st ~t<:lt.~. b~C\l('ih9' 
1911 \~,l b\ ,1 
Iq12 
1973 '8,~ 5b.1. 
1~14 
,Q75 1\ ,:.1. 51,4 
I"'~ 2'l,~ 4\1 
1~11 2A",' 41,5 
1. Investment ~n fixed property and ordinary shares grew during the 1970's. 
2. Figures compiled from annual reports. 
3. F.M. 5/10/76. 
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As workers struggles lead to higher wages in the mid and late 1970's 
1n part a response to the rate of inflation and consequent rising cost of 
living, funds' earn1ngs on investment were not comparing favourably with 
the rate of inflation, or rather rising \vages which would mean higher 
pensionable salaries. 
-I 
,~ ~:'irninR'!l r,.,f.c.::, I:lflation ra\"vu;:-ahle !',,;::ar 
On .vcr~l;i' r .. te difference On ~ev (e;(cl. C,S.T.) i:r.re::.t:..:le':l~s funds (3) - (4) 
----- ----
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
:: z 4 % '~ 
if 
~ 
1900 5,S 5,5 1,5 4,0 ~ ~, 5,5 5,5 2,0 3,5 
:;2 6,0 5,1 1,5 4,2 f 63 5,5 5,6 1,2 4,4 ~ j 
64 s,n 5,4 3,2 2,2 
1;5 . • 5 5,4 3,5 1,9 
66 6,5 5,3 3,7 2,1 
67 7,0 6,2 3,0 '3,2 
68 7,25 6,6 2,5 4,1 
69 7,25 6,a 3,5 3,3 
1,70 7,7~ 7,1 4,2 2,9 
71 3,0 . ,8 5,5 2,3 
72 9,0 8,2 6,2 2,0 
-73 3,3 8,3 9,5 -1,2 
_it. 9,5 8,7 12,0 -3,3 
75 iO,75 9,4 13,2 -3,8 
76 12,5 10,4 11,2 -0,8 
77 12,0 11,0 11,2 -0,2 
7e 11,0 11,0 10,0 1,0 
7') 10,0 10,0 12,0 -1,4 
SOuv-Q: D.J.Mo.\~ A<:.hl. 0.. Y"~. - _i 
The table above shows that since 1973 returns on "estment compared unfavourab1y 
with the rate of inflation; put differently, the funds did not anticipate 
workers winning wage increases. 
The State's Response 
I stated earlier that the state has been forced to become more involved in the re~ 
production of the African wod-in~s - to take some responsibility for that 
part of - the va~e of labour pmver wi cb capital does not. In the past and in the 
1970's the state has been successful in shifting the burden onto the backs of the 
workers themselves, but there is a political and economic limit to this. The 
growth of \wrking class and popular struggles 1. combined \"i th monopoly capital's 
interests in large quantities of black skilled and semi7skilled labour are 1n-
creasingly reflected in new state policy. There is a concerted move to gain 
support for the state from the black petty-bourgeoisie and certain strata of 
skilled workers. This can only be done if material concessions are made - 1n 
the workplace, in theplaces where people live and in society 1n general. On 
the one hand it is clear then that the state should prevent any deterioration 
of these peoples' conditions. Organisations like the Urban Foundation have 
reminded the state that this "incorporation" should be extended as far as the 
"Urban Black Aged";· not least because they are a drain on the incoI!le of the 
"urban" working class and petty-bourgeoisie. 
The granting of concessions to these groups, it seems is to be predicated on 
the tighter control of the majority of African workers. This entails stricter 
113. 
influx control (only those \"ith jobs and accomodation) and separating millions of 
people off as "non-citizens". But if this is to be anything more than a formal 
separation and one which will be resisted, the state needs to give it some 
. 1" 3. ld h h h' . mater1a 1ty. I wou suggest ten, t at testate s response to the pens10ns-
crisis was related to complex political class forces. We should also remember 
that the white working class and the growing number of unemployed (pre- and post-
retirement) amongst them have also demanded the state's attention. Since 1973/4 
white trade unions (eg TUCSA) and politicians have demanded improved state 
pensions. 
1. It has been argued that the attempt at incorporation/containment of the trade 
union movement is rather to avoid their alliance with a radicalised petty-
bourgeoisie, than a response to the workers' power. cf eg M Nicol SALB Vol 5 1980. 
2. Publication with that title. op cit. 
3. Pension payments made in the "homelands"/"independent states", when the 
pensioner receives them would in the state and bourgeois economists' eyes be one 
way of getting '''income - inflow" into the economy. 
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Proposals for a National Contributory Scheme 
The report of the Investigation into the establishment of a National Contributory 
systeml . proposed the following: 
(1) all people economically active who do not belong to any pension fund or 
scheme, or to funds/schemes the benefits of '''hich did not at least equal 
those of the proposed scheme, would become members of the scheme; 
(2) all occupational funds or schemes \"ith equal benefits would be allo\"ed to 
contract out; 
(3) t~ability ~sion rights 1n occupational schemes would be made 
compulsory; 
(4) There would be central control over pension funds .,.., though the question of 
whether it would be state administered or through a consortium in the 
private sector remained open; 
(5) The scheme would involve a 7% contribution divided between the worker and 
the employer and a pension of 75% of the final salary at age of 65 years, 
plus an early, or ill.,..health retirement penS10n; 
(6) contributions would be collected on the same basis as the PAYE tax system. 
Apart from TUCSA representatives - the only worker representatives to be consulted 
(though they are divided on the merits of such a scheme) the state met with a 
barrage of attacks. These will not be dealt with 1n any detail here. Basically 
they were: 
(1) The state was remov1ng crucial investable capital from the "private sector" 
which would lead to nationalisation of part of the industry, just when "industries 
need investment". 
(2) The method of funding is unsound: bourgeois econom1C thought cannot see that 
funds which are not "capitalised" can be just as sound (or as vulnerable) as 
1. ISBN 0621032735 (1976). 
l1S. 
capitalised schemes. Further, the notion of collective, political decisions 
over allocation of funds is seen as a "socialist" measure; they can also 
not stomach the idea that the state would have to go deep into its coffers to 
maintain such a scheme. 
(3) Employers, who are usually glven tax-rebates on contributions, would now 
have to pay more tax into a contributory scheme. 
(4) By the proposals it is implied that the 1nsurance industry cannot offer 
better benefits; the arguement here is that the state's high prescribed invest-
ment requirement prevents this. We have argued, on the contrary, that the state's 
involvement has probably helped funds to remain solvent. 
(5) Employers and workers, and not the state, should control funds (sicl .) 
(6) The state's interest rate control c~uses inflation. 
(7) Private administration would be cheaper and involve less bureaucracy than 
state administration for the worker or pensioner. We have argued that while 
the racially-exclusive state is correctly perceived as bureaucratic/repressive, 
this is not untrue of the capitalists' practices. For example, many workers 
experience difficulties in getting what is due to them, not least because they 
usually wait for months before receiving the first payments~' In the workplace, 
"consent" can be created more effectively amongst certain groups of workers than 
in the broader, "racially"-divided society, but this is done only through drawing 
increasingly rigid distinctions between workers~' 
(8) The scheme would promote labour mobility, through not tying the worker to 
a job with the promise of a maximum pension. 
1. These interpretations were found 1n interviews and newspaper reports and 
Spandau op cit. 
2. Interviews and cases dealt with by the lAS. 
3. The example of the Fattis and Monis Pension Fund is instructive: it was 
extended during the strike in 1979 in order to divide the workers. 
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The proposed scheme \"as very well hushed so that feH organisations were able 
to take it up as a serious option; it is not knowr. \"hether or not the state 
intended making any distinction between "citizens" and "non-citizens" and 
excluding migrant \vorkers. But it is most probable that the scheme would have 
been implemented as divisively as old age pensions are. 
The Old Mutual Alternative 
Froln 1971 Old Mutual and Sanlam were thinking of ways to include unskilled 
and particularly migrant workers in pension schemes. It was argued that employers 
had "ignored the responsibility" and that this move need not be seen as 
running IIcontrary to the idea of self-support". Further, it was argued that 
"the lack of security is one of the major underlying reasons for black unrest". 
In devising a scheme for migrant workers, the BONUSKOR (SANLAM-unden"ritten) 
and ISCOR (self-administered) served as examples. Both have non-contributory 
schemes catering purely for migrant workers and designed to lure them back to the 
same jobs. ISCOR, employing 30 000 African workers in 1976 found that the scheme 
drew an increasing number of workers back. BONUSKOR' s scheme \"as "not regarded 
in a philanthropic light but to encourage workers to return after their sojurn 
hh ld d 1 1 h l. l.n t e orne an s an encourage oya ty to t e company. The calculation of the 
pension is on a fixed end-benefit system related to "recognised service" rather 
than "continuous service~ The worker needs five years continuous service to 
qualify in BONUSKOR's scheme. Only work periods in excess of nine months in 
a year contribute towards the five years continuous serVl.ce. "In this way the 
company hopes to automatically exlude the 'wont works' and vagrants". 
1. People and Profits. Oct 1976. 
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Breaks of more than 6 months, in order to eo to the "homelands" as required 
by law, interrupt the accumulation of "pensionable serivce". Workers are 
encouraged to "graduate" into the company's senior scheme. SANLAN arranges for 
pension payments to be administered by Bantu Commissioners and magistrates in 
the areas workers reutrn to. 
The Old Hutual Group Pension Plan, which operates on a money-purchase basis, 
is similarly attuned to the state's strategy and it 1S interesting to note 
that it 'vas introduced at the end of 1975 while the state was divising the 
N.C.S. The plan provides for a worker and/or his employer to contribute to a 
fund which continues over the workers full working life regardless of changing 
work-situations. To achieve this, Old }[utual tied membership to the individual 
rather than to the employer, and "established a Board of Trustees for each ethnic 
group". 1. The scheme works as a type of savings account and it is argued that 
\vorkers would return to the same company because "his basic need of security is 
met". Old Hutual managers claim that companies have already experienced lower 
turnover and a higher productivity as a result of the scheme. Old Mutual 
also provides for additional benefits and "senior" schemes. 
Old Mutual claims that is has erased the myth that migrant workers cannot be 
traced after retirement, through "using the detailed pass registration system 
and co-operating with the relevant departments"~' At the same time, Old Mutual 
has started an extensive "marketing effort" with the help of African advisors in 
the var10US homelands. 
1. Interview with Nr Wood. op cit. 
2. Interview wi th \v'ood, op ci t. 
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Through preserving each worker's pension rights, the Old Mutual scheme raised 
the question of preservation and transferability of penslon rights. When the 
scheme was established, its adrninistrators and the corrunission considering the 
contributory scheme, sm. the suspension of cash withdrawals as a short-term 
precursor to a compulsory and national fund system. The administrators of 
the fund feel that workers accept the idea of preservation "when it has been 
explained to them", and that it is only a matter of time. They also added, 
rather more reluctantly that they have had to withdraw from two companies 
"b .. d· 1 ,,1. ecause of strlke actlon an VlO ence • 
1. Mr Wood was not willing to reveal the names of these companies. 
The Industrial Council ~ Employer's Organisation option to Control 
the Semi~skilled and skilled labour Force 
In. __ !..~2yhe }letal Industries and Group Life Pension and Provident Fund 
was converted into the contributory Metal Industries Group Pension Fund. 
This m.;ritch was formulated, spurned and carried out by S~\, the maSS1ve 
employers organisation, who had already in the past been by far the strongest 
party in the tripartite agreement between registered unions, industrial council 
and employers and basically administered it. 
The old SEIFSA-administered I.C. fund had been non-contributory and totally 
"" 
unsatisfac.tory. Employers contributed 5% of the workers' income into the 
SEIFSA-administered fund and after twenty years of service they would recei~~ 
R25 per month in pension~· As a result, many individual companies (the number 
is not knm{n) introduced separate company-schemes, self-administered or 
underwritten to supplement the I.C. scheme. They were expected to apply for 
exemption from the Industrial Council, or otherwise to continue contributing 
to the SEIFSA fund. If these companies continued to contribute, the retired 
k 'I C . b d f h h 2. wor ers .. penS10n was su tracte rom t e company sc erne. Further, in 
some industries, eg Apex Industries, wages were not increased in the event 
of increased \.;rorker deductions into a second fund. At APEX, where an Old 
Hutual-administered fund was introduced, deductions of 5% of their wages were 
paid into this fund. According to management, 913 out of 964 black workers 
voted, and only one was against. 3 • 
Ibe contributory Metal Industries Group Pension Fund (MIGPF) introduced in 
1. In 1976, 2 African workers received this amount after 20 years at APEX 
industriesPeopie and Profits, Oct 1976. 
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2. This was the case at Roberts Construction where their fund (discussed above) 
paid out R36 a month, R6 was deducted from the annuities of workers who 
received this from the SEIFSA fund. 
3. People and Profits, op cit. 
~ne 1975, covered about 6 000 companies and 100 000 workers. Employers' 
organisations and recognised trade un~on leaders participated in the agree-
ment. As from that date 5% of the workers' wages were deducted each week 
and frowardedto the Council. 1. No deductions are made or paid in respect 
of periods of absence, except relating to paid leave. 
The introduction of this scheme not suprisingly caused a great amount of 
anger amongst those insurers and employers who had established alternative 
funds. 2 . In order to maintain these schemes they were forced to apply for 
exemption from the industrial council, as workers could not be expected to 
contribute 10% of their wages into two different funds. The benefits offered 
by the new SEIFSA scheme were better than those in most of the company 
schemes; however, in the midst of the furore, it appeared that employers and 
~nsurers had in some cases been able to win the workers' support against 
the SEIFSA scheme. 
But the most important point about the SEIFSA scheme was the step taken 
subsequently to preserve all workers' pension contributions and accumulated 
---
pension rights until retirement age and make them transferable within the 
industries covered by the fund - ie metal, iron, steel and engineering industry.' 
At~is stage, migrant workers are still not included in ~e fund~' An 
; 
. The employer pays._an equivalent of 7% of workers' annual lolages Ito the 
authorities in the respective homelands/"independent" states towards a pension. 
It is not known how effectively this functions. 
1. This is how the fund ~s portrayed ~e workers are notmolare of how much 
control SEIFSA has. 
2. F.M. 2Q/6/75. 
3. With the exception of a felol exempted companies. 
4. Interview with van den Reever, Secretary of SEIFSA fund. 
Hhat has been achieved by this preserved fund, according to managements 
of various companies, is greater stability of certain sections of the labour 
/' 
force, particularly semi-skilled workers with urban residential rights.l. 
Further, they are encouraged to stay within the industry if and vhen they res~gn 
or are dismissed. The central fund holds onto their book (a guarantee, 
marking all contributions) until such time as another job ~s found. Workers 
are given 12 months wi thin \vhich to find new employment in the industry. 
During this time no contributions are made, and it does not contribute towards 
continuous "pensionable service". If work within the industry is not found 
during this period and the worker has been in the fund for less than 10 years, 
he/she receive only their own contributions plus benefits secured pr~r to 
the fund becom ; ng contributory. In this vmy, they hope to exclude "wont works" • 
. -
If workers find work in another industry, they also loose their rights. 
Uv'A...vJ-- ~ cr ~ 
According to certain sources this type of scheme would be usefully applied 
to migrant workers too, although there ~s a fear that the industry would 
become "tied" to unwanted workers. 
~ J:- ~ )~} 
The implications of this type of scheme are significant. SEIFSA is able to 
control the "more qualified" workers and allocate labour more efficiently 
between various member-companies. At the same time it can offer higher 
benefits as fewer withdrmvals are being made, without raising wages.. Central-· 
ised control of the fund and the fact that, as an Industrial Council fund it is 
exem~ the requirements. of _the Pens; on Funds Act, gives SEIFSA more control 
over investment than any conventional privately-administered schemes trustees 
--------
have. It is guite widely known that Errol Drummond is able to direct la!1;e 
,---
proportions of the funds into the metal industry itself. 
1. Interview with van den Reever. 
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In terms of the problems outlined in the prev10us section, the SEIFSA 
scheme raised the question of preservation as an option and solution for 
capital. In 1966, proposals for preservation of all private funds had been 
rejected on the grounds that: 
(a) there was no uniformity bet~veen funds, 
(b) the growth of the "pension fund inqustry" would be inhibited; 
(c) many funds were racially-exclusive,\vhich ~vould make transferability 
probelmatic for black workers; 
(d) ~lfOrkers, white ~vorkers in particular (as only they were consulted) 
regar~2d that attempt as state intervention to prevent the withdrawal 
of contributions. 
SEIFSA amdinistrators argue that workers are happier to deal with the employers 
in this regard than with the state~' 
SEIFSA's preserved scheme also raised the question of the role of insurance 
companies and the ability of the larger companies to bypass them through 
employers organisations administering a uniform scheme. 2 . As the organisation 
has more knowledge of the firm, it is argued that it is better able to assess, 
(and we have said control) the number of workers likely to reamin in the fund 
and those expected to leave; investment and contribution rates are set 
accordingly. 
However, from all available evidence, the SEIFSA acheme has not been beneficial 
for workers, particularly those who leave the fund before retirement. Their 
- ---
-- ....---
experience is that the fund is reluctant to payout what a worker is owedj3. 
the waiting period can extend to 12 months, even when a worker has no intention 
--------
Thus, it seems that the fund is tied u~)~n 
"'----
1. van den Heever. 
2. See discussion above about the tendency towards trusteed funds. 
3. Inter~with MAWUorganiser. 
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investment which it ~s reluctant to forfeit. 
Hhat these exapmles have shmvn is that var~ous agents have been grappling \.,rith 
various alternatives to a National Contributory Scheme. In the light of this 
the 1976 proposals have merely encouraged insurance companies to devise new 
capital ist solutions to \.,rorkers' insecurity of employment. 
Preservation and Transferability of pens~on rights - the state's 
compromise with Finance Capital 
Between 1976 and 1980, finance and industrial capitals' demands for a privately 
funded national 3cheme have been heard. Rather than increased state-regulation 
of finance, the state has to be inserted into capital's circuit on the latter's 
terms. 
In part as a result of the "recovery" of the rate of profit in the advanced 
capitalist countries, and in part because of the state's political and economic 
intervention from 1976 in all spheres of the society the conditions for expanded 
accumulation had been created by 1980. Two features of the 'upswing' in the 
South African economy are a high rate of economic growth. Real GOP rose by 
123-
3,75% ~n 1979, and in the first half of 1980 real GDP was 8,5% higher than in 
1979. 1 • Industrial production was 13% higher in June 1980 than a year ear1ier,2. 
and indicators are an increasing demand for certain skills in mining and 
manufacturing. The state's anti-inflationary policies succeeded ~n bringing 
down the Co nsumer price index, \.,rhich is an indicator of the rate of inflation. 
1. Kaplan (1981) "The current upswing in the South African economy". 
2. SANLfu~ 1980 Economic Survey. "Growth rate is largely the result of an 
increase in private consumption expenditure and fixed investment by private 
business enterprises. 
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In this context the insurance industry has divised, along 'vith members of 
the relevant state departments, a scheme which would not benefit pensioners 'I· lil 
.. h . "l. 1solat10n from t e rest of soc1ety , as it was felt thE National Contributory 
scheme wuuld have done. The reco~~endations for a National system are 1n two 
parts and only the first report \vhich deals with the principles of (1) preservation 
and transferability, and (2) the commutation of a part of lump-sum benefits into 
annuities have appeared. The second report which is in many ways the most 
significant has yet to be published: this deals \vith "the provision of 
satisfactory pension benefits for that section of the community which does not 
. . h. 2. 
enJoy cover 1n t 1S respect. 
As it stands, the proposals are aimed more directly at skilled \vorkers and 
members of the professional-managerial class - ie those people 'vhose with~ 
drawals before retirement are most likely to deplete a fund and at employers 
"who have in the past set up funds to benefit them rather than the employee,.,3. 
But in its efforts to find a solution uhich "would stimulate th<! pension fund 
industry as a mobiliser of personal savings and therefore net domestic saving,,4. 
the state and capital have reached a compromise, which if implemented will 
affect the majority workers. This is particularly clear if we consider how 
various agents of capital have been paving the way for preservation, amongst 
the semi-skilled and unskilled workforce (cf examples of BONUSKOR, Old Hutual, 
SEIFSA) 
1. Urban Foundation Report. 
2. First report of the Inter-departmental Committee of Inquiry into certain 
specific pension matters. 
3. Commission of Enquiry (1976) p 36. 
4. Inter-departmental Report (1980~ p 6. 
The ma~n recommendation and implica'tions of the proposed legislation 
are the following: 
(1) Pension provisions \"ill take place \"ithin an "enclosure", consisting of 
pension funds, Retirement Annuity Funds and proposed special frozen savings 
accounts operated by the Post Office, banks, and building societies. There 
has been strong reaction to this proposal, from insurance companies in 
particular. As we saw earlier the tendency towards trusteed funds invested 
through banks was strong in teh advanced capitalist countries, and is clearly 
not in the immediate interest of insurance companies. 
(2) No wi thdrawalsl. from these funds sould be made, except on retirement, 
death, disablement, emigration, marriage (applying to women). It was shown 
that funds have been paying out large lump-sums to people withdrawing for 
------- . --- ---- -" other reasons eg on resignation, dismissal, retrenchment. Between 1974 and 
~---------------------------------------------~ 
1978, on average ~h of total benefits paid out were for reasons other 
r-- . 
. f f . 2. than retirement or death. The arguements 1n acour 0 preservat10n were; 
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(a) this Houlel enable funds to accumulate for longer periods and therefore offer 
better benefits; 
(b) higher benefits would reduce the burden on the state and possibly mean 
reduced taxation; 
(c) this would provide more long-term capital to be invested in the economy; 
(d) workers would be discouraged from resigning simply to lay their hands on 
their accumulated contributions plus interest gained; 
(e) this gave workers a right to a full pension in spite of resignation, 
dismissal, etc., something which many employers have denied in the past. 
(3) Transferability of all pension rights: when a worker changes employment, 
his/her preserved contributions plus a minumum interest (7%) should be trans-
1. Inter-departmental Report op cit Chapter 3. 
'2. Seen in conjunction with transferability of Pension rights. 
ferred to a fund in the new workplace. The 1976 report ~lso supported 
transferability (rather than preservation) as "free movement .mulcl stimulate 
the economy". This '''as seen as a concession to older workers who were often 
tied to a job for fear of losing the accumulated pension contributions. 
(4) The state laid down requirements for minimum pension benefits: they 
should be twice (or four times in the case of a mar:ded male pensioner) the 
current maXimum social old age pension (then R97 per month for '''hites). The 
insurance companies are very opposed to this recommendation, and thusahas not 
been publicised. 
(5) There are a number of other requirements, dealing mainly with actuarial 
methods which I am not in a position to analyse at this stage. 
127 • 
.RES~S£s 
The implications of this report have already been profound, even though legis-
lation has not yet been passed; this is indicative of the way 1n which funds 
have operated in the past for the majority of workers. Their experience is that 
funds have not benefited them, or the generation before them and that they are used 
as a method of control. If a worker enquires about the status of his/her contrib-
utions it is seldom treated as a right. Hith the majority of workers the "personnel 
management" approach, it seems, has lasted only as long as it took to institute a 
scheme; after that they were threatened with dismissal if ever the fund was quest-
. dl. 10ne • Often deductions are arbitrary - sometimes including overtim~ (particu-
larly ,,,hen a '-TOrker does a long stretch of overtime2 .), and sometimes not. 
In fact. the context in \"hich workers came to hear of the new proposals, was out-
rightly repressive. In the case of Horkers at Wilson-Rmmtree, management raised 
the issue when workers demanded a refund of their contributions into an industrial 
council fund which had, on the decision of the employers, been changed into a 
private, underwritten fund. 
Insurers and pension fund managers are convinced that it is only a matter of time 
until workers "accept the notion of preservation and realise that it is for their 
d" 3. own goo • 
\lliat employers are most concerned about is the cost involved for them - in increased 
contributions and administration; like the insurers, they are convinced that the 
cost will fallon their backs. They are also reluctant to institute a scheme which 
would meet with resistance. At the moment there are quite marked contradictions 
between them and the finance capitalists who, being removed from the, production 
1. examples given by SAPPI workers. 
2. Interview ,,,ith worker from Orlando Pm"er Station. 
3. \.J'ood. Old Hutual. 
process. "arc not very concerned about the ~.;rorker". 1. 
At the moment I do not have enough information about the strikes against suggested 
legislation to make any conclusivp. statements about the level of unity, or conscious-
ness displayed during this struggle, but as far as I can tell, it has already been 
very educative. The major demands made by the workers so far are that contributions 
can be ~.;ri thdrawn before retirement; in the absence of adequate wages, workers 
-------------------
are aware that money should be available to them when they need it. Pension-money is 
.--
invested again to accumulate, while they suffer greater exploitation. They cannot be 
sure that they will receive the benefits promised, and these are usually too small 
to sustain them on retirement. 
Further, workers have begun to look at the pension set-up as a whole: they have 
begun to question the reliance on private pensions, and whether in fact these are 
more "liberal" than state old age pensions, as capitals ideologues have claimed. 
The question of whether or not the state would be responsive to such a demand cannot 
be gone into here, but this should be considered as a serious option and not merely 
a "symbolic" or long-term demand. The fact that the state has been threatening to 
raise the question of a National Contributory Scheme also indicates that they have 
no~~.;rhollY succumbed to finance capital's sectional interests. 
We saw above that the proposals required a minimum benefit; this is a concession 
which finance capital is only prepared to meet if, eventually, all pension rights 
are preserved. Industrial capitalists, on the other hand, faced with increased costs 
and worker resistance. are not uniformly in favour of a compulsory preserved sc~me. 
Predictions are that unless they are obliged to establish funds or maintain them, 
many will in fact withdraw. 
1. Hammond-Tooke, FCI. 
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Initially employers took a hard line against striking workers, for example at 
Hilson-Rmvntree in Octobet", and at Firestone 1n January. But as industrial capital 
itself was unsure of whether or not to support the proposals, individual employers 
were encouraged (by FCI) to take a conciliatory stand and regard it as "an industrial 
l. 
relations issue". As a result, management made three proposals to workers at 
Firestone, which seem to have been followed by other companies: 
1. Horkers could resign and withdraw their contributions within 7 weeks. They 
could take a chance in getting re-employed, but they would loose their bus 
serv1ce bonus, holiday pay and have to requalify for medical-aid and pension 
benefits; 
2. Workers could remain 1n the scheme until Firestone received exemption from 
the proposed preservation requirements; 
3. If worker.s resigned only from the scheme, they could get their contributions by 
30th April, but ~yould have to wait fot" 1 year to requalify. 
Since January the response of management to the strikes at Dunlop (East London), 
Sparrat Electronics (East London), SATV Manufacturing Company, Federate Electronics 
and Hurray and Stewart (r.E. and Uitenhage) has been equally ambivalent and 
. 1 . 2. matl.1pu at1.ve. In most cases .Yorkers have been dismissed on the grounds that pension 
contributions are a condition of service, and the evidence 1.S that they have been 
re-employing selectively. Their attitude towards striking workers and their organ-
isations, is that workers are being "mislead", that they don't understand the 
legislation, and that they are "using it as a political weapon" 3' The 1nsurers 
su ppor t this vie~vpoi nt. 
1. C. du Toit FCI. President. FCI arranged for a statement by Horwood to be 
published, "with the hope of appeasing ~yorkers". 
2. Newspapers and interviews. 
3. van den Heever, op. cit., Hammond-Tooke, op. cit. 
There is evidence to suggest that capital wants to turn the ~l7Orers' demands 
against them. They have suggested that everyone earning below a cert3in wage 
(it cannGt be a 'racial' classification) will not be included in the scheme, or 
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it will be optional for them. On the other hand it has been suggested that 
individual employers should be allowed to apply for exemption of certain categories 
of workers. Workers reject this, as their experience is that 1.n such cases, 
employers have a degree of autonomy which enables them to manipulate divisions 
(e.g. between those "in" and those "out" of schemes). The chances are that 
employers will be able to decide when they want all their workers to belong to a 
uniform, preserved scheme, and threaten workers who resist such a scheme with 
dismissal. This method has always been more widely used than "persuasion and 
education". It has also been suggested that the present withdrawals are "playing 
into the Insurance Companies' hands" 1. This enables them to hold onto the 
employers' contributions which will in future be transferred to other funds. 
1. Hammond-Tooke; Intervie\v. 
I::) I. 
CO~CLUSION 
In conclusion I want to draw some of the maln threads runnlng through this analysis 
together. The attitude of the state has always been that: 
"The government lS opposed to _~he Republic's developing into a \velfare 
---- --_. ---------
state as it is understood and manifested itself in other parts of the 
world, but is committed to a policy which is aimed at the independenc~ 
of the individual and of the connnunity and is conducive to optimal 
. .." 1. soclal funct10nlng. 
~.J'e have seen that in this context 'capitalist solutions" emerged during the 1960' s 
and 1970's, though still overlaid by the political and ideological relations of 
domination ,vhich have characterised all spheres of this society. Attempts at 
creating \ndustrial citizens" were not concerted and had little political effect. 
With the consolidation of monopoly eapitalist relations and gro\ving working class 
and popular struggles during the 1970's certain fractions began a new effort at 
extending minimal concessions to parts of the African working class along with 
urban petty bourgeoisie. 
A crucial gap in this analysis lS an examination of just how successful the 
~
industrial bourgeoisie at manufacturing consent at the point of productio~~ 
This will have to be done at some later stage. 
However, the present conjuncture is throwing into question the state's attempts to 
grant selective concessions the cost of which are ultimately falling upon the 
working class. It is in this context that struggles against the so-called concession 
of preserved pension rights must be seen; for there are definite limits to capital's 
success in convincing workers that they have rights as workers in capitalist society, 
when everything 1S done to maintain them as a yQ~ically ~sorganised force. 
1. Department of Social Welfare and Pensions report, R.P. 91/1975 p. 1. 
The following statement remains true in our situation: 
"No protest that capital is his friend reassures him. Terror has made 
h · f . b 1· . ,,1. ~m dea and exper~ence un e ~ev:tng . 
1. Ho1yoake, G. (1878) 'The New Principle of Industry', Nineteenth Century, 4, 
quoted in Corrigan, P. Ope cit. 
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PATTERN OF STATE EXPENDITURE ON OLD AGE PENSIONS AND THE NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS FROM 1958-1975 (6,p29) 
I Year ended Total Whit.e Coloured Asian Black I March Number ROOO Number ROOO Number ROOO Number ROOO Number ROOO 
I I I I ! 
44 297 I 
! 
I 346 6181 I i 1958 30 195 I 87 307 20 143 3 675 I 6 601 532 ~208 413! 5 845 1 I 1 I ! I I ! I i i 
I I I I 1 , 
3 872 I ! 1 : I I , 1960 I 340 054 I 30 968 i 86 853 121 318 
, 44 522 6 473 i 540 202 206! 5 238 , I 
: , I I i 
i ! i ! ! I 1 7 259 I 1965 354 637 I 41 888 ! 84 604 ,27 263 53 111 7 766 968 : 209 156 i 6 398 , ; 
i I I ! I I , 
14106601 
i 
60100111 236 816110 089 1970 63 897 I 104 135 41 029 I 049 9 609 1 730 i i i i i I 1 
i , i I i 
; 152167 1 9416 I 
I 
I 1973 1 344 349 87 878 114 563 159 715 66 987 : 16 161 10 632 2 586 I I I I I 
I I I 1974 367 105 108 699 (122 216 74 020 71 300 119 608 10 933 3 049 : 162656 12 022 
I 
383 6821140 690 
\ i 
- I I 
1975 128 627 93 044 73 748 I 25 630 12 201 1 4 311 i 169 106 17 705 
I I I I 
\J1 
..... 
83 Pensiocne betaal aan Swartes in selfregerende nasionale state 
Pensions paid to Blacks in self-governing national states . 
----,-
Chkei KWlIlulu Owa WI 
Lebow. Vend. Gaz.nkulu Kan .na Tota,'lTotal 
Jaar' Getal R'OOO Getal R'OOO 
Gatal R'OOO Gatal R'OOO Gatal R'OOO Getel R'OOO Getal R'OOO Getal R'OOO 
yearl Number Number Number 
, Number Numbef Number Number Number I 
2400 211,0 
--,.-
51657 4678,5 13107 
Oudcrdomspensioene 1974/75 24863 2451,9 84195 
10882,0 I 1188,0 10355 938,5 5288 1.188,2 192465 21 544,1 
15256,9 3045 425,2 
I 54106 6714,6 12993 1708,2 
Old·age pensions 1975/76 23021 3696,1 86190 
10678 1361,3 5308 1479,0 195341 30641,3 
1916/77 25147 4388,2 90854 20259,1 3259 
005,8 60972 10351,0 16699 2816,2 10608 1852,0 6530 1988,8 213069 42461,7 
1977/78 28976 6330,0 96113 23071,3 3830 
855,3 62352 12621,8 18124 3449,6 11 076 2266,2 5100 2100,0 226 171 50694,2 
1978/79 33660 74,88,5 95204 24359,8 3901 
881,3 59 156 16099,0 17106 3646,3 10438 2071,0 5900 2300,0 225365 56845,9 
Ongeskikheids· en 1974/75 10185 1086,8 17256 
2320,8 300 36,8 5306 515,6 1109 93,2 1 149 95,3 821 193,1 36126 4341,6 
melaatsheid·pensioenc 1975/76 10282 1623,1 21221 
4157,2 308 62,1 5489 693,6 1186 156,8 1221 138,1 946 266,8 40653 7097,5 
Disability and lfJ76f77 5027 1410,7 26925 
6873,0 511 124,6 6052 1040,2 1487 196,1 1288 200,8 1005 385,7 42295 10231,1 
leprosy pensions 1977/78 5012 1 182,1 28143 
6000,9 614 136,3 5408 1251,6 1617 190,1 1346 260,2 1000 400.0 43 tOO 10221,2 
1978/79 6014 1 239,2 23972 6165,1 923 
138,9 5679 1474,4 1493 325,7 1317 197,9 1050 420,0 40448 9961,2 
Pensioene vir blindes 1974/75 873 88,1 1606 
209,1 41 2,2 . 3035 381,2 574 45,6 493 44,5 114 26,2 6736 796,9 
Pensions for the blind 1975/76 608 100,9 1656 
297,7 60 5,9 2956 383,1 535 72,9 495 67,8 123 36,1 6433 964,4 
1976/77 606 109,5 1757 393,4 42 
11,4 2939 601,3 618 80,6 500 89,9 125 46.5 6587 1332,6 
1977/78 612 141,5 1903 459,5 42 
10,8 2906 852,6 610 77,1 524 110,7 127 50,8 6724 1703,0 
1978/79 794 152,8 1870 481,5 64 
12,9 2761 750,9 563 125,4 494 104,7 130 58,5 6676 1686,7 
Oud·soldatc·pensioenc 1974/75 3 0,3 2 
0,2 1 ·0,0 90 0,6 26 4,7 11 1,3 25 6.0 158 13,1 
Veterans pensions 197si76 20 0,7 19 
6,1 44 0,2 84 7,3 9 1,0 44 fl,5 23 6,8 248 33,6 
1976/77 32 2,8 51 15,4 8 
D,S 95 16,0 10 1,4 48 18,4 31 6,9 275 61,4 
1977i78 43 8.5 99 23,4 16 
3,8 89 17,0 59 13,5 32 7,8 338 74,0 
1978/79 48 10,5 76 22,0 14 
0,8 34 15,8 65 56,6 35 9,6 272 115,3 
1974/75 36524 3633,1 103659 13412,1 2742 
250,0 60 osa 5575,9 14818 1331,5 12008 1079,8 8248 1413,5 236 085 26 695,1 
Totaal 
1975/76 33 931 5420,8 109 086 19717,9 3457 
493,4 62635 7798,6 14n3 1938,1 12438 1578,7 6405 1788,7 242675 38 736,8 
Total j 1976/77 30812 6911,2 119581 27541,5 3820 942,3 70 058 12008.5 18814 3094,3 12444 2161,1 8691 2427,9 282226 54 086,8 1977/78 34643 7662,1 126258 30355,1 4502 1006,2 70755 14743,0 20 311 3716,8 13005 2650,8 6859 2658,6 276333 82692,4 
1978/79 40 !i16 B 891.0 121122 31028.4 4902 
1033,9 ~7630 18340,1 19162 4097,4 12314 2430,2 7115 2788,1 272761 611 609,1 
1. Figur •• for 1977nS.nd 1978179 Ire prellml",ry estimates 
1. Svf." vir 1977178.n 1978179 is yoorlooige ramlngs Bron/Source: 3, 14, 17,31 
I ('\I~ U::::. :L 
84 Pensioene betaal aan Swartes in die RSA, Transkei en Bophuthatswana 
Pensions paid to Slacks in the RSA, Transkoi and Bophuthatswana 
RSA I Transkei Bophuthatswana Totaalrrotal 
--.;.--
Ve~rl Number Number Number Number 
Jaarl Getal R'OOO:\ Getal R'OOO Getal R'OOO Getal R'OOO 
-----------------------------r 
Odd s ensioene 1974175 361 571 39154,8 67717 7710,3 31642 3117,2 460930 49982,3 
u er om p. 1975/76 369842 55376.0 77 574 11 539,4 35906 4954,4 483 322 71 869,8 
Old·agepenslons 1976/77 395196 76114,9 82816 16411,7 40042 6925,8 518054 99452,4 
Ongeskiktheids· en melaatshcids pensioene 
Disability and leprosy pensions 
Pcnsiocne vir blindes 
Pensions for the blind 
Oud·soldate·pensioene 
Vetcra~s pensions 
T otaal / Total 
1977178 417399 92261,8 82631 17931,0 42689 8111,0 542719 118303,8 
1978179 420365 103845,9 84183 20456.5 40813 8693,1 545361 132995,5 
1974175 91 695 10103,9 27972 3207,7 5567 519,0 125234 13830,6 
1975/76 104 502 16066,0 31343 4689,8 6017 573,9 141862 21329,7 
1976/77 112810 23 131,6 31950 6583,0 6529 713,8 151289 30428,4 
1977178 122389 27494,6 34400 7806,1 7400 892,0 164189 36192,7 
1978/79 122448 29861,2 31800 8076,4 10200 1361,4 164448 39299,0 
1974175 11427 1 292,6 1614 188,2 1 231 118,9 14272 1 599,7 
1975/76 11 204 1 656,0 1 784 264,9 1 242 156,8 14230 2077,7 
1976/77 11 398 2223,0 1 730 362,4 1 225 - 159,6 14359 2 745,0 
1977/78 11623 2772,2 1750 402,5 1860 266,0 15233 3440,7 
1978179 11676 2886,7 1775 456,2 2600 418,9 16051 3761,8 
1974175 170 14,2 16 2,1 8 0,7 194 17,0 
1975/76 349 43,3 15 2,5 7 1,2 371 47,0 
1976/77 485 97,7 13 3,1 6 1,2 504 102,0 
1977/78 650 142,2 15 4,0 5 1,1 670 147,3 
1978179 592 193,5 17 4,8 6 1,5 615 199.8 
1974175 464863 50 565,5 97319 11108,3 38448 3755,8 600630 65429,6 
1975176 485897 73 141,3 110716 16496,6 43 172 5686,3 639785 95324,2 
1976177 519889 101 567,2 116515 23 360,2 47802 7800,4 684 206 132727,8 
1977178 552061 122670,8 118796 26143,6 51954 9270,1 722811 158084,5 
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~19~7~8~17~9~~~~~~5~0~~~~~~1_3_6_7_~_,~_ 117775 ~~3~ 53619 10Q~9 7~4~ In 256,1 
'. Svf", vir 1977178 en 1970/79 is voorlopige ramings 1. Figures for 1977/78 and 1978/79 are preliminory estimates. 
Bron/Source: 3,12,14,17,31,33 
o 
If) 
TAB.LE VI, 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON STATE OLD AGE PENSIONS IN THE 1976/7 FINANCIAL YEAR (19, 20,21) 
A B C D E I F G I 
Percentage I !Average Haximum 
I of Total IGovernment I ; Honthlv Honthly 
1 I Number of Expendi ture Percentage i Pensio~ Pension Population I Number of Pensioners in I (ROOO) IOf Total i (~x _1 ) Oct '76 -
Group I Pensioners South Africa On Pensions !Expenditure! (B 12) I Oct '77 
I White I ! 134 548 32,9 114 843 I 61 , 1 % iR71,13 R72,OO I I Asian 14 527 3,5% 6 160 r 3,3% :R35,34 R38,50 I 
I 
I i I Coloured I 78 347 19,1% 33 366 
t 17,7% iR35,49 R38,50 I : 
! Black 182 127 
1 
44,5% 33 653 I 17,9% [R15,40 R18,50 I 
I I I : I I 
I 
I 
~~o~ . ~L188_0~2 , TOT A L 409 549 I 100% 
------ - -
----
H 1 : 
! 
Percentage , 
of Haximum r I Pensi~n Paid, 
r ' 
- I 
I G I 
I 98,8% 91 ,8% 
92,1% 
83,2% 
APPENDIX 
PROCEDURE FOR APPLYING FOR A PENSION 
FACTORS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN A MEANS TEST (SOUrc.-e: (Af~~) 
The maximum free income allowed as at 1 October 1978 was 
R14,38 a month or R172,56 a year. 
An applicant who has no income, or an income not exceeding 
R172,56 per annum or R14,38 per month may receive the maximum 
pension of R276,00 per annum. For every R3,00 per annum of 
income over R172,56 per annum (or every part of R3,00) the 
pension is reduced by R3,00 per annum or RO,25 per month. No 
pension is payable if the income and means are more than R276,00 
per annum. 
The incomes of men over 70 years of age and women of over 65 
years of age are disregarded. 
Eligibility for a pension depends -
(a) upon the ability of the applicant to maintain himself; and 
(b) upon the ability of the applicant's spouse to provide 
support. 
Married persons 
In the case of a ,married couple the income of both spouses is 
added together and divided in half. This establishes the income 
of each of them. 
Children living in the home 
Children who work and live with their parents are expected to 
pay a reasonable amount as rent for their accommodation. 
Items counted as 'Means' 
(a) -Allowances/pensions from former employers. 
(b) Allowances from welfare bodies, unless in payment for 
some service rendered. 
(c) Free-will gifts (but not if from the spouse of a former 
employer) . 
(d) Any house rents received. 
(e) Earnings or any income, for example from farming. 
STOCK FARMING AND AGRICULTURE 
In rural areas, and in towns and villages where commonage or 
large garden areas may be available, stock and agricultural 
produce are valued according to a fixed scale. 
Eligibility for a pension may depend upon the amount of the 
estimated income derived from these sources. 
As examples, the following are some of the values fixed for 
items: 
Livestock 
R.C. 
Cows .............. . 
Goats ............. . 
8,00 ea 
0,50 ea 
Sheep with wool .... 
Sheep without wool 
Poultry (if over 50 
kept) .....•........ 0,25 ea 
Crops 
R.C 
Mealies ............ 0,60 per bag Beans ...... . 
Wheat .............. 1,20 per bag Peanuts .... . 
Kaffircorn ......... 0,70 per bag Pumpkins ... . 
Fixed Property 
R.C. 
0,75 ea 
0,50 ea 
R.C. 
2,00 per bag 
2,00 per bag 
0,05 per bag 
In assessing eligibility for a social pension, the following 
values are taken into account : 
5% on the unencumbered value of property 
up to R600 in value 
7% on the unencumbered value of property 
above R600 in value 
APPENDIX 
THE PAYMENT OF PENSIONS IN SOWETO 
The administration of pensions in Soweto will be quoted as an 
example of how pensions are paid out. 
Pensions are paid out every second month at 10 pension Payout 
Points, 9 in different locations in Soweto, and 1 at the town 
offices of the Department of Co-operation and Development. 
In August 1878 the Department of Plural Relations, as it was 
the named, employed six Black clerks, 3 paymasters, 1 super-
visor and some constables from the South African Police to man 
the payouts. Since the riots in 1976, pensions have not been 
administered indoors, but from the pay vans in large open spaces 
throughout the year, winter or summer. The paymaster said "that 
this had worked well, and since the riots in 1976, it had rained 
only twice on a pension payout day". 
Pension payout days are planned a year in advance, and span a 
period of 2 to 3 weeks every 2 months. The pay vans spend 1 
day at a location, and then move on to the next location. It 
is intended that those pensioners living closest to a particular 
pension payout pOint, ~g Diepkloof, use that particular place to 
collect their pensions. 
However, due to the fact that pensions are only paid out once 
every 2 months, most pensioners have run out of money by the 
time pensions are due to be paid out again. Consequently, 
those pensioners living near the last payout point often feel 
they cannot wait and so present themselves at the first or 
first few payout points. The paymaster requests that the pen-
sioners take their place in the queue by 09hOO. As a result 
they arrive, if they are not ambulant, in an assortment of 
vehicles, including wheelbarrows. Pensions are paid out until 
13hOO or 14hOO and those people who have not yet received their 
pensions are expected to meet the pay van at the next location. 
It often happens that pensioners borrow money to pay exhorbi-
tant transportation costs to get to the pension payout points, 
only to find that they are not able to get their pension that 
6day and have to follow the pay van to the next location. 
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